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Abstract: In this dissertation, I aim to extend understanding on: a). how gender affects 
executive decision-making; and b). how gender-stereotypical actions can lessen two 
forms of realized biases (negative evaluations and social closure) that female chief 
executive officers (CEO) face. Utilizing upper echelons theory and gender role theory, I 
first investigate the antecedents of a CEO’s engagement in two primary types of 
nonmarket actions, corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate political activity 
(CPA). I propose that both CSR and CPA can be descriptively classified according to 
gender stereotypical traits. In particular, I argue that because CSR is communal in nature, 
charitable, and socially oriented, the descriptive stereotype of women suggests that 
female CEOs will engage in more responsible CSR activities which are beneficial for 
society and fewer irresponsible CSR activities which pose possible harms. As such, 
female CEOs will also have a higher overall CSR rating. I further argue that because CSR 
conforms to the prescribed female stereotype, the relationship between CSR and market 
reactions will be more strongly related for female CEOs. On the other hand, I argue that 
female CEOs are both prevented and discouraged from engaging in CPA. In particular, I 
argue that female CEOs face a second type of bias in the form of social closure which 
creates “glass walls” that hinder them from successfully breaking into certain high-profile 
networks. I test this in the context of the male-dominated, “old boys’ club” of politics. 
This “glass wall” form of social closure prevents female CEOs from establishing 
favorable, external political connections and accessing political-enhancing resources. As 
a result, social closure affects female CEOs’ engagement in political activity. Because 
these “glass walls” within political networks create both unintentional and intentional 
biases against women, the benefits returned from engaging in political activity will 
likewise be lower for firms with female CEOs. This dissertation aims to make several 
important contributions to the upper echelons and gender-role literatures, as well as 
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Despite historical under-representation that persists even with organizational and 
governmental safeguards (Brands & Fernandez-Mateo, 2017), the number of women in chief 
executive officer (CEO) positions is small but growing, spawning research about what happens 
when women do break through the “glass ceiling” to join the executive ranks (Ragins, Townsend, 
& Mattis, 1998; Soares, Combopiano, Regis, Shur, & Wong, 2012). Our current understanding of 
female CEOs is that they face a penalty for simply being female in a traditionally male-dominated 
role. Yet our knowledge of whether female CEOs act differently or how such penalties can be 
mitigated, is limited. To address this shortcoming, I examine this line of research on women in 
the executive ranks relying on two, primary theoretical views.  
First, executive research building on upper echelons theory (UET) (Hambrick & Mason, 
1984), argues that: (1) executives act on the basis of their personalized interpretations of strategic 
situations they face, and (2) these personalized interpretations are a function of executives’ 
characteristics such as their experiences, values, and personalities (Hambrick, 2007). Along these 
lines, research shows that gender is an important characteristic that affects how CEOs interpret 
situations and hence the decisions they make (e.g., Davis, Babakus, Englis, & Pett, 2010; Faccio, 
Marchica, & Mura, 2016; Huang & Kisgen, 2013). For example, a meta-analysis by Jeong and 
Harrison (2017) finds that female CEOs are likely to reduce strategic risk-taking, which in turn 
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positively affects the long-term financial performance of their firms. Jeong and Harrison’s 
(2017) results reinforce prior individual-level findings that women tend to take fewer risks (Coates & 
Herbert, 2008; White, Lejuez, & de Wit, 2007), reflecting certain psychological and social 
experiences that can be attributed to an individual’s gender (Meier-Pesti & Goetze, 2005). 
Second, executive research and theory on gender role stereotypes argues that because the 
CEO position has traditionally been occupied by men, women are subject to two related forms of bias 
– the first form of bias for female CEOs is gender-based stereotyping and the second form is social 
closure. Gender-based stereotypes have two facets (Heilman, 2001). On one hand, women are 
descriptively stereotyped as being communal (i.e., nurturing, supportive, empathetic) and men are 
descriptively stereotyped as being agentic (i.e., aggressive, self-interested, commanding) (Eagly & 
Karau, 1991). As a result of such stereotypical views of gender, women are frequently overlooked as 
having leadership potential or perceived as unsuitable for certain (male-typed positions) positions 
(i.e., Heilman, 2013). The oft-cited “think manager, think male” phenomenon is well-documented in 
the literature (Shein, 1973). 
On the other hand, the second facet of stereotype, prescriptive gender-role stereotypes, often 
drive strong expectations that men and women should behave in a gender-consistent manner. 
According to this research, women who violate such prescriptions (i.e., being in leadership roles or 
acting agentically) are subject to backlash in the form of social censure or mistreatment (Heilman, 
2001). Taken together, these descriptive and prescriptive stereotypes create a double bind for female 
CEOs who are often seen as “inappropriate or presumptuous” when they occupy agentic roles or 
display more masculine and agentic behaviors even though such behaviors are often required in roles 
like that of the CEO (Koenig, Eagly, Mitchell, & Ristikari, 2011: 617). In turn, women who occupy 
such roles or behave in more agentic manners tend to face backlash for not conforming to gendered 
expectations of behavior (Greenhaus & Parasuraman, 1993; Heilman & Okimoto, 2007). Empirical 
evidence has suggested that these biased evaluations are prevalent in executive settings as well (e.g., 
Jeong & Harrison, 2017; Lee & James, 2007; Park & Westphal, 2013; Westphal & Stern, 2007).  
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In addition to the gender-stereotype regarding how female leaders are evaluated, the second 
form of bias female CEOs face emanates from the reality that the highest-level coalition of decision-
makers, both in business and society at large, remains an “old boys’ club” (Bass & Avolio, 1994: 
549). The male-dominated culture of power not only celebrates agentic and masculine traits, but 
simultaneously creates both intentional and unintentional biases against women, even if they are in 
similar positions of power (Powell & Butterfield, 1994). That is, even if a woman is successful in 
breaking through “glass ceilings” to join the executive ranks, she may instead now find herself faced 
with lateral “glass walls” in the form of social closure or exclusion from her executive peers 
(Rudman, Moss-Racusin, Phelan, & Nauts, 2012). For example, male executives who wish to keep 
the executive suite free of gender diversity may intentionally exclude female executives from 
important formal and informal networks and their associated social capital benefits (Heilman, 1997; 
Kanter, 1977; Rudman et al., 2012). Similarly, men may unintentionally exclude women if they are 
uncomfortable in mixed-gender groups or men may precipitate bias that hinders women when they 
fail to adjust their behaviors in ways that are considerate of both genders (Powell & Butterfield, 
1994). This “glass wall” effect, whether intentional or unintentional, may not just be limited to 
interactions within a firm’s typically male-dominated internal executive suite, but may also affect 
how successful a female CEO is in building other important high-ranking relationships in any male-
dominated environment, such as the political environment (e.g., Watkins & Smith, 2014). 
The two theoretical views dominating research on female executives – upper echelons and 
gender role theory - are not only complementary in nature, but should be examined in concert. Prior 
research has provided some insight into the role of CEO gender both in determining certain strategic 
proclivities and eliciting bias in the form of negative reactions of stakeholders such as investors in the 
stock market (Jeong & Harrison, 2017), yet our understanding of CEO gender is still incomplete in 
several ways and thus, warrants further examination. First, beyond our current understanding of 
gender and risk-taking, the extant upper echelons literature has yet to address whether female CEOs 
have a propensity towards other types of executive firm-level strategic actions that may reflect other 
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gender-driven mechanisms. This is an issue because while examining strategic risk-taking is a 
promising first-step, this focus on risk-taking alone overlooks the bevy of other strategic options 
CEOs have such as nonmarket strategies; an oversight to which Jeong and Harrison (2017) allude to 
for future research avenues.  
Second, findings that female CEOs elicit negative reactions from investors (e.g., Jeong & 
Harrison, 2017; Lee & James, 2007) – conceivably because of the gender-role biases associated with 
women in the executive ranks - overlooks whether engaging in strategic actions that are consistent 
with gender stereotypes can either nullify or diminish the degree of bias against female CEOs. While 
not all strategic actions may be gendered, investigating additional actions that either conform with or 
deviate from stereotypical views of women offers an opportunity to expand knowledge on the manner 
in which executives’ actions affect their firms. Last, extant research on biases against female CEOs 
has disproportionally focused on only one manifestation of gender bias. While studies have shown 
observers’ biased perceptions and evaluations of female CEOs, less is known about whether female 
CEOs are also subject to other forms of bias, such as intentional and unintentional social exclusion 
from peers. Identifying whether the setting of a traditional “men’s club” creates social closure in the 
form of “glass walls” by excluding female CEOs in important activities that adversely affects their 
firms, may help us advance understanding of the mechanisms relating CEO gender, their actions, and 
subsequent firm outcomes. 
To address these aforementioned issues about women in the executive ranks and in an effort 
to extend understanding of how CEO gender affects firms, I investigate strategic actions that test 
these gender stereotype arguments. Specifically, I first advance theory arguing that certain nonmarket 
strategies, or concerted patterns of firm action intending to improve performance through managing 
institutional or societal contexts (Baron, 1995; Lux, Crook, & Woehr, 2011) reflect descriptive and 
prescriptive gender stereotypes. Nonmarket actions are a fruitful avenue to examine CEO behavior 
because they are voluntary and more discrete in nature, both of which are important characteristics 
that provide CEOs with more latitude in decision making (Den Hond, Rehbein, de Bakker, & 
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Lankveld, 2014). I argue that, consistent with both UET and research on gender bias which manifest 
to the detriment of women (e.g., Lee & James, 2007; Park & Westphal, 2013; Westphal & Stern, 
2007), CEO gender is an important missing contextual factor explaining the mixed findings for both 
antecedents and firm outcomes of nonmarket actions (McWilliams & Siegel, 2000; Zheng, Singh, & 
Mitchell, 2015). In particular, I argue that the first primary form of nonmarket action, corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), which refers to voluntary firm actions that improve social and/or environmental 
conditions (Aguilera, Rupp, Williams, & Ganapathi, 2007; Davis et al., 2010; Waddock, 2004; Wood, 
1991), aligns with communal qualities. Because CSR is generally concerned with improving or 
limiting harm to social or environmental conditions (Aguilera et al., 2007), it fits the descriptive 
feminine stereotype of being more communal in nature, charitable, and socially oriented (Bernardi, 
Bosco, & Columb, 2009; Boulouta, 2013). As such, I suggest that female CEOs will engage in more 
responsible CSR activities which are beneficial for society (e.g., charitable giving, support for worker 
education), fewer irresponsible CSR activities which pose possible harms (e.g., polluting the 
environment; poor working conditions), and thus will have a higher overall CSR rating.  
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Please see Figure 1 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Relatedly, because women are rewarded when they engage in stereotypically gender-
appropriate behaviors and punished when they engage in stereotypically gender-inappropriate 
behaviors (Eagly, Johannesen-Schmidt, & Van Engen, 2003), I also argue that the relationship 
between CSR and market reactions will be more strongly related for female CEOs. Indeed, a growing 
line of gender bias research provides initial evidence that penalization for being in out of role 
positions (i.e., leadership) can be lessened with proper, socially accepted gendered-type leadership 
styles (Eagly & Carli, 2003). Particularly, I argue that female CEOs who adhere to prescriptive 
expectations of engaging in more responsible CSR activities and have higher overall CSR ratings 
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should experience a more positive response from the market, while female CEOs who engage in 
irresponsible activities should experience a more negative response, relative to male CEOs. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Please see Figure 2 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Such stereotypes also suggest that CEO gender might also play a role in corporate political 
activity, the second dominant nonmarket strategy. Specifically, corporate political activity (CPA) is 
defined as corporate attempts to shape government policy in ways favorable to the firm (Baysinger, 
1984). I argue that because the male-dominated culture in the political sphere remains prevalent 
(Collier, 1974; Dolan, 1997), female CEOs face a different type of bias in the form of social closure, 
affecting their actions with respect to CPA and the favors they receive in exchange.  
Firms are dependent upon politicians who create and enforce rules and regulations under 
which business is conducted (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and the norms of an environment are shaped 
by those in positions of power (e.g., Watkins & Smith, 2014), the male-dominated nature of politics is 
less accessible to women, even if these women are in positions of power. Given personal connections 
are paramount to successfully interfacing with politicians (e.g., Gordon, Hafer, & Landa, 2007; 
Ridge, Ingram, & Hill, 2017) but politics remains male-dominated, I argue women face social closure 
in the form of “glass walls” that create persistent gender exclusion and inhibit access to important 
resources necessary to succeed (cf. Cook & Glass, 2014). These glass walls hinder women from 
successfully breaking into the “men’s club” of politics, thus preventing the establishment of strong 
influential connections, access to political-enhancing resources, and firm benefits in exchange for 
their support (Blake, 2014; Paxton, Kunovich, & Hughes, 2007). Females’ inability to establish ties 
may cause female CEOs to be less inclined to pursue CPA as an effective nonmarket strategy.  
While research has focused on lobbying and campaign contributions as two primary forms of 
CPA, I focus on campaign contributions because it serves as a better representation of a CEO’s 
political network influence and ties. Unlike lobbying which occurs through the efforts of hired 
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lobbyists (Nownes, 2006), campaign contributions are individual- or firm-level donations to 
politicians’ political campaign coffers. Because these donations are meant to help establish and 
develop quid pro quo relationships with politicians (e.g., Kroszner & Stratmann, 2000; Milyo, Primo, 
& Groseclose, 2000), there is reason to expect that the male-dominated culture of politics may inhibit 
women’s ability and proclivity to establish, and benefit from, campaign contributions. I argue because 
female CEOs are more excluded from the “men’s club,” they have greater difficultly accessing and 
developing relationships in the male-dominated political world, resulting in the need to consider other 
strategies that may be more effective in accomplishing the same goals. Such “glass walls”, whether 
intentional or unintentional, affect both the ability and proclivity of female CEOs to engage in 
campaign contributions, whether via personal funds or indirectly via their firm’s employment of this 
nonmarket strategy. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Please see Figure 3 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Relatedly, because “glass walls” create social exclusion for women, the benefits returned 
from campaign contributions should be lower for female CEOs than for male CEOs who donate at 
similar levels. As political activities may benefit firms in ways that are difficult to attribute to the 
CPA itself (i.e., inability to rule out motives for political actions that benefit the firms or CEOs from 
which the CPA was generated) but nonetheless help the firm, I use “benefits” broadly but empirically 
analyze various outcomes that may be politically-motivated (i.e., quid pro quo). 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Please see Figure 4 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 This study aims to make several important contributions. First, this study adds to our 
understanding of the upper echelon literature and the role of executive gender in determining 
executive strategic actions and outcomes. Upper echelons research has shown that demographic 
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variables such as age, education, and experience allow researchers to effectively capture 
characteristics such as background and expertise, which are relevant to how CEOs make decisions 
(Finkelstein et al., 2009; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Wang, Tsui, & Xin, 2011). Of these demographic 
variables, gender is a characteristic that broadly affects behavioral and psychological traits but for 
which there is limited research at the CEO level. Adding to our current knowledge of reduced risk-
taking as a gendered trait prevalent among female CEOs (Huang & Kisgen, 2013; Jeong & Harrison, 
2017; Khan & Vieito, 2013), my study aims to shed light on other potentially gender-related 
executive actions. 
 Second, this study hopes to provide further insight to the gender role literature by examining 
the firm-level consequences of gender-typed executive actions. This is important because while 
gender role theory would posit that women in CEO positions face certain societal penalties for gender 
role violations, less is known about whether CEO actions that are conforming or nonconforming to 
gender expectations may respectively improve or hurt their firms. While prior studies have shown that 
role incongruity has detrimental effects for women with respect to leadership effectiveness (Eagly, 
Karau, & Makhijani, 1995), leader emergence (Eagly & Karau, 1991), evaluations of leadership 
abilities (Eagly, Makhijani, & Klonsky, 1992), and perceptions of leadership styles (Eagly et al., 
2003), a small but growing line of research provides initial empirical evidence that penalization for 
being in such out of role positions can be lessened with proper gendered-typed leadership styles 
(Eagly & Carli, 2003). Historically, leadership has been construed as primarily a masculine 
enterprise, and many theories of leadership have focused on the desirability of stereotypically 
masculine qualities in leaders (e.g., Miner, 1978). Nevertheless, there is growing support that 
stereotypically feminine qualities of cooperation, mentoring, and collaboration may likewise be 
beneficial. This implies that certain action-performance relationships can lessen the penalization for 
being ‘out of role’. I extend such inquiry to the realm of nonmarket strategic actions. Importantly, the 
nature of this study also allows me to examine whether male CEOs suffer from similar gender 
stereotyping biases and extend theories to the level of the CEO, where nuanced differences can 
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change or alter theoretical relationships from other levels of the organizational hierarchy (e.g., 
Bertrand & Hallock, 2001; Gayle, Golan, & Miller, 2012; Hill, Upadhyay, & Beekun, 2015; Leslie, 
Manchester, & Dahm, 2017). Prior studies have found that men may experience similar social stigma 
for displaying more feminine traits in some contexts (e.g., Rudman & Mescher, 2013) but this has not 
been extended to the level of the CEO. As such, given theories do not always operate similarly at the 
apex of the organization, the testing of CEO gender will alternatively inform us as to whether male 
CEOs face similar gender violations. This line of inquiry may shed light on the mixed findings 
regarding the performance implications of nonmarket actions (Den Hond et al., 2014; McWilliams & 
Siegel, 2000). 
 Third, this study also hopes to shed light on the nature of the invisible barriers that female 
CEOs face. Prior studies often examine the concept of the “glass ceiling” in terms of internal, vertical 
barriers that prevent women from being promoted to the top of their organizations. However, scholars 
have noted that such barriers may manifest in different ways and the “glass ceiling” may in fact be 
just the first of many obstacles that female CEOs will continue to face. By examining the effects of 
social closure in the form of “glass walls” that female CEOs may experience when interacting with 
external entities or peoples of power, I aim to show female CEOs are inadvertently affected by more 
than just a negative stakeholder bias as eluded to in previous research, and that these barriers 
ultimately affect their ability to establish important and impactful external relationships which may in 
turn have other firm-level consequences. 
Last, this study has important managerial and practical implications. The call for women to 
be equally represented in the executive suite extends beyond a simple call for equality and the tearing 
down of these invisible barriers. Indeed, the evidence of such physical and psychological barricades 
to the advancement of women to the top levels of the organization are still seen in the statistics of the 
executive suite today (Brands & Fernandez-Mateo, 2017). While women comprise half of the 
workforce and half of company-wide managerial positions (Percheski, 2008), there remains unequal 
gender representation in the upper echelons - among Fortune 500 organizations as of 2018, only 21% 
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of board seats, 26% of executive positions, and 11% of top-earner positions are occupied by women 
(Catalyst, 2018). This study aims to join the current discussion about the growing number of women 
in CEO positions. The findings will hopefully shed light on a broader scope of actions associated with 
female CEOs and how and when these create value for firms. Understanding executives’ relationships 
with certain strategic action as well as reactions and social closure effects offers an opportunity to use 
this knowledge both in corporate governance and policy circles but also to facilitate conversation 






REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
2.1. Overview 
In this chapter, I will begin with a review of the upper echelons literature to establish the 
important role executives play in determining firm-level strategic actions and outcomes. Because 
decision-making is in part driven by idiosyncratic differences among executives (Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984), I first examine what prior literature has found in terms of how a CEO’s gender 
may affect his/her engagement in certain strategic behaviors. To explain these findings, I first 
examine the gender to decisions relationship based on gender role descriptive stereotypes in 
regard to how women stereotypically have a propensity to engage in communal behaviors and 
men stereotypically have a propensity to engage in agentic behaviors. I then turn to the role 
congruity literature to examine two manifestations of gender bias that female CEOs in particular 
are likely to face –backlash and social closure. I argue that female CEOs are often subject to 
biased perceptions and backlash in the form of negative evaluations due to the gender-role 
violation and perceived misfit between “leadership” and “female” (e.g., Schein, 1973). I further 
argue that such violations can also manifest in the creation of social closure that prevents female 
CEOs from the establishment of strong ties within male-dominated networks. As a result, female 




I examine these arguments in the context of the implementation of two primary 
nonmarket strategies – corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate political activity 
(CPA). I first establish the importance of both CSR and CPA to firm outcomes and examine how 
CEOs in particular play an important role in directing their firm’s CSR and CPA efforts. I then 
propose that CSR and CPA reflect agentic-communal gender descriptive stereotypes, suggesting 
that female CEOs are more likely to engage in responsible CSR activities and less likely to 
engage in irresponsible CSR activities, as well as less likely to engage in CPA. Because CSR 
fulfills certain prescriptive gender-typed expectations, I also argue that engaging in socially 
responsible actions in ways that are considered prescriptively gender-appropriate may lessen the 
negative evaluation bias female CEOs face. In regards to CPA, because social closure inhibits 
female CEOs from developing important relationships in the male-dominated world of politics, I 
argue that not only will female be less likely to engage in CPA in the form of political donations, 
but also that when they do so, the outcomes associated with this nonmarket strategy will be less 
beneficial for women executives. In conclusion of this chapter, I will present my hypotheses.   
2.1.1. Why study female CEOs? 
According to the New York Times, there are fewer women CEOs than there are CEOs 
named ‘John’ (Wolfers, 2015). Despite organizational and governmental safeguards (Brands & 
Fernandez-Mateo, 2017) and the growing number of women in managerial positions (e.g., 
Percheski, 2008), women continue to remain less represented in leadership roles. Recent statistics 
show that as of 2018, women in Fortune 500 companies hold only 21% of board seats, 26% of 
executive positions, and 4% of CEO positions (Catalyst, 2018). This gender disparity in 
leadership roles has spawned much debate regarding a “glass ceiling” that women face, a 
metaphor used to describe the invisible barriers that prevent women from ascending to the top 
executive positions of power in large corporations (Ragins et al., 1998). As more women are 
breaking through the glass ceiling, scholars have turned their attention to understanding the 
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different ways female executives affect their firms. Research that examines female executives has 
primarily relied on two theoretical views – upper echelons and role incongruity of leadership 
within the larger theoretical context of gender stereotyping. As such, I will begin by reviewing 
the relevant literatures as follows. First, I will turn to upper echelons theory to examine why 
executive gender is an important characteristic that predicts certain actions and matters to firm 
outcomes. I will then turn to the gender role literature, to examine the unique challenges and 
circumstances that female CEOs face.  
2.2. Upper Echelons Theory 
 Since Hambrick and Mason’s (1984) introduction of upper echelons theory (UET), the 
central tenet that executives matter to the firm have been widely accepted not just in the 
management discipline but has also played an important role in shaping research in many 
different fields such as psychology (e.g., Peterson, Smith, Martorana, & Owens, 2003), 
economics (e.g., Bertrand & Schoar, 2003), finance (e.g., Malmendier & Tate, 2005), and 
accounting (e.g., Troy, Smith, & Domino, 2011). At its core, UET focuses on executive 
cognitions, values, and perceptions, and how these influence the process of strategic choice and 
subsequent firm outcomes. Specifically, UET, states that: (1) executives act on the basis of their 
personalized interpretations of strategic situations they face, and (2) these personalized 
interpretations are a function of executives’ characteristics such as their experiences, values, and 
personalities (Hambrick, 2007). As a result, significant organizational outcomes can be associated 
with the characteristics of those actors. 
In addition to these fundamental arguments set forth by Hambrick and Mason (1984), 
UET also builds upon two subordinate points. First, in their initial introduction of UET, the 
authors specified the top management team (TMT) as their focal unit of analysis, and early 
research often focused on differences within the TMT in terms of diversity and its impact on 
various strategic decision-making like business and corporate strategy profiles, international 
14 
 
agendas, alliance formation, and acquisitions (for a review, see Carpenter, Geletkanycz, & 
Sanders, 2004; Hambrick, 2007). This collectivist approach was due in part to the recognized 
nature of strategic decision-making as a difficult task that exceeds the capabilities of one 
individual executive alone (Cyert & March, 1963). Yet, mounting evidence suggests that while 
this collective approach may indeed be suitable for certain research questions, the study of the 
collective TMT suite overlooks the asymmetrical distribution of power and influence among 
these key individuals (e.g., Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; Jensen & Zajac, 2004). As such, there has 
been a growing focus on the chief executive officer (CEO) position and how examining this 
position in isolation may both challenge and add to our general understanding of the broader 
TMT. Empirical studies have generated substantial evidence in support of the focus on CEOs 
within upper echelon theorizing, showing that as the individual ultimately responsible for 
implementing strategic decisions for their firms, CEOs’ characteristics affect their strategic 
choices, which, in turn, have implications for firms’ actions and performance (e.g., Finkelstein, 
Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009; Oh, Li, & Park, 2016).   Various studies have reported that CEOs 
can explain up to 20 percent of variance in company profitability (Crossland & Hambrick, 2011; 
Mackey, 2008; Quigley & Hambrick, 2015). Peterson et al. (2003) in addition, provides a 
comprehensive study that examines how the dynamics of the TMT can be impacted by a CEO’s 
characteristics, which in turn leads to performance implications for the firm. The basis for such 
findings is that the CEO position is inherently distinct from other top executive positions in terms 
of title, compensation, power and status, and thus this asymmetry within the TMT may be a 
powerful force that differentially affect certain relationships within UET (e.g., Bigley & 
Wiersema, 2002; Carpenter & Sanders, 2002).  
Second, the empirical testing of these UET tenets invokes prior research on demography, 
ascertaining that certain observable characteristics are reasonable proxies for the underlying 
individual differences in cognitions, values, and perceptions. In particular, demographics such as 
age, functional background, and educational experiences are some of the most commonly-used 
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proxies for the psychological constructs that shape managerial interpretation and formulation of 
strategies (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Carpenter et al., 2004). Yet the use of demography to 
proxy such harder-to-measure constructs is not without criticisms, challenges, and limitations. 
Some scholars have highlighted the potential for ambiguity and validity issues and suggest that 
demographics should be abandoned in favor of more nuanced variables or alternate 
methodological approaches that yield greater insight into the actual activities and processes of 
executives (e.g., Priem, Lyon, & Dess, 1999). Yet others assert there is more to be gleaned from 
our understanding of how certain overlooked demographics relate to these latent constructs 
(Hambrick, 2007). Along such lines, scholars have alluded to gender as an important 
characteristic that affects how executives, and CEOs in particular, interpret situations and hence 
the decisions they make, especially in light of the small albeit growing number of female CEOs at 
the helm of large corporations (e.g., Davis et al., 2010; Faccio et al., 2016; Huang & Kisgen, 
2013). A meta-analysis by Jeong and Harrison (2017), for example, finds that gender is an 
important characteristic that affects CEO strategic risk-taking, which in turn has both short and 
long-term financial consequences for firms. Jeong and Harrison’s (2017) findings not only 
reinforce prior individual-level studies of gender differences about how women tend to take fewer 
risks (Coates & Herbert, 2008; White et al., 2007) but also that the market’s negative reactions to 
female CEOs also reflect certain societal expectations attributed to individuals’ gender (Meier-
Pesti & Goetze, 2005). Lee and James’ (2007) analysis of media coverage of CEO succession 
announcements, for example, support such findings about gendered expectations, showing both 
that shareholders respond more negatively to the announcement of female CEO appointments 
than to male CEO appointments and that the media announcements of female CEOs focus more 
attention on gender and gender-related issues than announcements of male CEOs. In sum, these 




2.2.1. Gender as a unique demographic executive characteristic 
 The examination of gender as an executive characteristic that is unique from other 
demographics is important for several reasons. First, as indicated in Jeong and Harrison’s (2017) 
meta-analysis, there may in fact be differences in decision making between men and women. In 
addition to Jeong and Harrison’s (2017) meta-analytical findings that women are less risk-taking, 
prior studies have indeed reported differences in actual behaviors between men and women, 
based on both self and external ratings. For example, regarding how likely it is that their decision 
will produce successful outcomes, women generally rate themselves as less overconfident, which 
may explain why women make less risky decisions (Barber & Odean, 2001; Deaux & Farris, 
1977; Lundeberg, Fox, & Punćcohaŕ, 1994). In addition, regarding their view of the workplace, 
women are also more likely to indicate preference for jobs that are more intrinsically rewarding 
rather than extrinsically rewarding (Tolbert & Moen, 1998), and women are more likely to spend 
more time on personal life responsibilities (Hersh & Stratton, 2002). Women are also less likely 
to negotiate pay increases because they are less confrontational (Kray, Thompson, & Lind, 2005). 
In team-settings, women tend to speak less and when given subordinate or equal status, women 
often self-elect to play a more supportive role and are more likely to yield positions of power 
(Ragins & Sundstrom, 1989). Last, in settings that require decision-making, women tend to make 
decisions in a more democratic and participatory way (Eagly & Johnson, 1990), are less 
hierarchical and are more likely to solicit input from others, share power by keeping open 
communication channels, and bolster their subordinates' sense of self-worth (Helgesen, 1990). 
These decision-making behaviors are often collectively referred to as the ‘feminine management 
style,’ and this style has been cited as a key process underlying how team diversity affects team 
outcomes (Van Knippenberg, De Dreu, & Homan, 2004).   
In terms of the small but growing line of CEO gender research, studies have found that 
male CEOs are more likely to invest in industries that have higher value-added growth while 
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female CEOs are less likely to fully capitalize on investment opportunities and thus do not appear 
to “allocate capital as efficiently as male CEOs” (Faccio et al., 2016: 194). Another study found 
that female-led service small-to-medium enterprises (SMEs) often have stronger market 
orientation and attention to customer needs (Davis et al., 2010). Such examples provide initial 
evidence that gender may indeed play an important role in how CEOs interpret their 
environments, thus affecting key variables of decision-makinge (Boden Jr & Nucci, 2000; 
Collins‐Dodd, Gordon, & Smart, 2004).  
More importantly, of all the demographic characteristics utilized in studies that examine 
how CEOs affect their firms, gender arguably encompasses unique socially-constructed barriers 
for the executive as an individual. While there is often a larger variance among executives that 
exists in terms of age, education, and functional experience and background, the norm of the 
executive profile is to be male, and thus being female is more likely to be looked upon as a 
deviation from the norm, resulting in certain “think leader, think male” expectations (Schein, 
1973), which is better captured using gender role theory. Thus, while UET has provided much 
insight regarding the effects of executive collective and individual differences on the firm, the 
extension of gender-based arguments suggests that perceptions and evaluations of these 
deviations matter, and gender is arguably one that has sparked the most debate in recent times. 
Because the CEO position has traditionally been occupied by men, and thus male CEOs do not 
require the justification and legitimization that female CEOs require, research argues that women 
CEOs are often stereotyped and subjected to two related forms of bias. First, because female 
CEOs violate societal gender norms and their stereotypical “feminine” qualities do not fit the 
stereotypical “masculine” qualities of male leaders, they are perceived to be less competent 
leaders and thus often elicit negative evaluations. Second, this stereotype can also manifest in 
social closure due to intentional or unintentional peer exclusion, preventing female CEOs from 
establishing beneficial ties with other powerful figures, who are still predominantly male. 
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2.3. Gender Role Theory 
 In this section, I will examine how gender role theory posits that women face gender-
related stereotypes. That is, female CEOs in particular, are often caught in a “double-bind”– they 
face the stereotype that men and women are ascribed masculine and feminine roles, and being a 
woman or "feminine" is incompatible with being in leadership roles, and conversely, being a man 
or “masculine” (or effectively, “un-feminine”) is associated with competence and leadership. 
Furthermore, by merely ascending to leadership roles, women violate gender expectations ideals 
(Jamieson, 1995), which results in biased perceptions and backlash in the form of negative 
evaluations of their leadership. From gender role theory, I first examine two theories which 
reflect distinct, but related sub-processes – role congruity theory of leadership and backlash 
theory. Next, I will examine how gender stereotyping can result in a second type of bias in the 
form of social closure where certain intentional and unintentional barriers created by established 
practices leads to the exclusion of female CEO from establishing important external connections 
and relationships. 
2.3.1. Role-congruity theory of leadership 
 Over time, evidence regarding gender difference has reinforced the notion that certain 
roles are socially assigned to, and thus expected of, certain genders. Based on these 
generalizations, the socially-accepted premise is that women are more communal while men are 
more agentic (Eagly & Karau, 1991). The female descriptive stereotype is that of the communal 
nurturer (Eagly, 1997). According to both men and women, examples of feminine characteristics 
include: affectionate, cheerful, childlike, compassionate, forgiving language, eager to soothe hurt 
feelings, feminine, flatterable, gentle, gullible, loves children, loyal, sensitive to the needs of 
others, shy, soft-spoken, sympathetic, tender, understanding, warm, and yielding (Prentice & 
Carranza, 2002). Such findings generally suggest that women tend to be viewed as, and are also 
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expected to be, naturally more friendly, unselfish, and supportive (Diekman & Eagly, 2000). In 
contrast, the male descriptive stereotype is that of the agentic atomist—powerful, commanding, 
assertive, and self-interested. According to both men and women, examples of masculine 
characteristics include: breadwinner, acts as a leader, aggressive, ambitious, analytical, assertive, 
athletic, competitive, defends own beliefs, dominant, forceful, has leadership abilities, 
independent, individualistic, makes decisions easily, masculine, self-reliant, self-sufficient, strong 
personality, willing to take a stand, and willing to take risks (Prentice & Carranza, 2002). In sum, 
the ideals for women reflect an emphasis on interpersonal sensitivity, niceness, modesty, and 
sociability, whereas the ideals for men reflect an emphasis on strength, drive, assertiveness, and 
self-reliance (Prentice & Carranza, 2002). 
 The overall acceptance of these expectations of communal qualities in women and 
agentic qualities in men demonstrated in prior research permeates three distinct but related 
beliefs: (a) beliefs that society at large hold about the roles and responsibilities of women and 
men (e.g., Glick & Fiske, 1996; Spence & Helmreich, 1979), (b) beliefs that society at large hold 
about the male and female ideal (e.g., Williams & Best, 1990), and (c) beliefs that women and 
men hold about their ideal selves (Wood, Christensen, Hebl, & Rothgerber, 1997). Meta-analyses 
in the same vein (e.g., Hall & Carter, 1999) provide further evidence that as these ideal behaviors 
become more gender differentiated, they are judged as increasingly appropriate or expected for a 
given gender, further reinforcing societal expectations that women and men ought to differ. 
In the workplace, scholars often maintain that gender serves as an “implicit, background 
identity” (Gutek & Morasch, 1982; Ridgeway, 1997). When it comes to leadership roles, society 
at large holds a stereotype that feminine attributes are incongruent or incompatible with the 
masculine attributes that are thought to be required for success in leadership roles. Femininity and 
leadership lead to divergent expectations while masculinity and leadership converge to redundant 
expectations. For example, women's linguistic styles are often misinterpreted or devalued by men, 
and the less aggressive and less self-promoting forms of communication associated with women 
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are often perceived to be ineffective in the upper echelons of most corporations (Oakley, 2000). 
As a result, the communality quality of women are seen as a misfit for leadership, which requires 
agency and women are seen as out-of-role for leadership positions, thus resulting in women not 
being selected for such roles or perceived as ill-fitting when in role (Ely & Meyerson, 2000).  
2.3.2. Backlash theory 
 Relatedly, backlash theory presents a different theoretical mechanism that rests on 
prescriptive stereotypes of what men and women should be like (Heilman, 2001). Because 
leadership positions have traditionally been perceived in masculine terms and historically 
occupied by men, male leaders are consistently evaluated in more favorable terms than female 
leaders (Eagly et al., 1995), suggesting that when female occupy leadership positions or display 
agentic traits, they face backlash for violating prescriptive norms (Powell, Butterfield, & Parent, 
2002). That is, when women act according to in-role behaviors that fundamentally reflect 
communality, those actions are accepted or rewarded. But acting in out-of-role behaviors or being 
in masculine positions could lead to backlash in the form of dislike and negative evaluations 
(Heilman, 2001). Many studies have indeed demonstrated that perceptions in gender differences 
do exist in evaluating leadership emergence, effectiveness, and style (Eagly & Johnson, 1990; 
Eagly & Karau, 1991; Eagly et al., 1995), and that women are often less preferred for these male-
typed leadership positions (Davison & Burke, 2000). Prior studies (Broverman, Vogel, 
Broverman, Clarkson, & Rosenkrantz, 1972) similarly find that female managers are often 
characterized as less self-confident, less analytical, less emotionally stable, less consistent, and 
ultimately possessing poorer leadership abilities relative to male managers. 
As a result, even if certain agentic behaviors are often required in certain leadership roles 
(Koenig et al., 2011), women who behave in such inappropriate agentic manners suffer less 
favorable evaluations for not conforming to gender expectations (Greenhaus & Parasuraman, 
1993; Rudman et al., 2012; Smith et al., 2013). In sum, according to such prescriptive stereotypes 
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concerning ideals of gender and ideals of the leadership role , the incongruity that many 
stakeholders perceive between the characteristics of being female and the demands of leadership 
roles results in prejudices and backlash against female leaders (Eagly & Karau, 2002).  Thus, the 
prescriptions of gender indicate that women are deemed to possess inferior leadership abilities, 
and their failure to perform well on masculine aspects are interpreted as confirming these 
stereotypes. Conversely, if a female leader fulfills the descriptions of the leadership role by 
displaying masculine aspects of leadership and competency, she is still evaluated less favorably 
because in this instance she has violated her gender role. 
2.3.3. Social closure from the “old boys’ club” 
 The “think leader, think male” mentality associated with gender stereotyping is troubling 
for female CEOs not just because this mindset has been shown to affect perceptions and 
evaluations of their leadership ability (Eagly & Karau, 2002), it may also further reinforce social 
barriers that preemptively prevent women from either reaching these positions of power or fully 
being able to utilize the power of their positions once they arrive. In other words, if the perception 
is that women lack the qualities needed to succeed as CEOs, this not only results in backlash in 
the form of dislike or negative evaluations, but also certain forms of social penalization which 
may further limit their access to powerful sponsors or appropriate resources (e.g., Ibarra, 1993; 
Ibarra, Carter, & Silva, 2010). One explanation for this is in male-dominated environments that 
results in an “old boy’s club” culture (Bass & Avolio, 1994: 549) and the related celebration or 
norm of agentic and masculine traits simultaneously create both intentional and unintentional 
biases against women (Powell & Butterfield, 1994). In the workplace context, the "old boys’ 
club" is a colloquial term that describe the top of an informal social system that spans within and 
across organizations, and excludes women from membership. In the old boys’ club, the power 
advantages in the formal structure transfers to patterns of friendship and alliances within the 
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informal system, creating an efficient distribution system of friendship, obligations, and 
reciprocation (Lipman-Blumen, 1976). 
 As others have pointed out (e.g., Auster, 1992), the glass ceiling that female executives 
face is not isolated to one spot, but manifest in many different forms of gender bias as well. Even 
if a woman is successful in breaking through vertical barriers to join the executive ranks (i.e., 
“glass ceilings”), the concept of the old boys’ club suggests women may be faced with additional, 
lateral challenges in the form of social closure or exclusion from executive peers (Rudman et al., 
2012). For example, male executives may intentionally discriminate against female executives in 
an attempt to exclude women and to simply maintain the tradition of the men’s club culture 
(Heilman, 1997; Kanter, 1977). Alternatively, male executives may unintentionally behave in 
ways that result in the exclusion of women (Powell & Butterfield, 1994).  This “glass wall” effect 
as a result of social closure, whether intentional or unintentional, may not just be limited to the 
firm’s internal executive suite, but may also affect how successful a female CEO is in building 
important relationships in any male-dominated environment (Watkins & Smith, 2014). For 
example, scholars have found that top managers’ ties to external organizational ties increases 
opportunity for boundary-spanning activities (Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997) and that the 
external social network of TMT members can affect firm performance (Collins & Clark, 2003) – 
to the degree women are excluded from these networks, then, not only will they be less able to 
boundary span but their organizations may likewise suffer as a result.   
The general sentiment that women may be disadvantaged in a male-dominated network 
has seen various support through the years. Kanter’s sex discrimination theory, for example 
(1977), examines the “shadow structure” within corporations – when it comes to informal 
conversation or social activities, women are often excluded, limiting their access to valuable 
connections and opportunities. From a social networks perspective, exclusion from the old boy’s 
network limits an individual’s access to the valuable information, influence, and status that is 
embedded in that network of relationships (Lin, 2006). Similarly, the segregation and homophily 
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literature implies that valuable resources are often clustered among specific social groups, 
suggesting that access to these resources depends on certain key similarities between individuals 
and thus acceptance into the network or group. Being in a network or group with individuals who 
share the same characteristics should therefore provide the greatest access to these resources. As 
such, men are likely to receive greater access to resources and more benefits in networks similarly 
dominated by men, while women will have less access and receive relatively fewer benefits even 
if they are able to gain access into a male-dominant network. 
2.3.4. The penalty against female CEOs 
 The aforementioned biases associated with gender stereotyping and social closure create 
a precarious situation as female CEOs battle both negative public evaluations as well as social 
exclusion from peers. Even if men and women may differ in some aspects, the effects of female 
executives on firm performance - or in other words, the effectiveness of women as executives - is 
inconclusive at best (e.g., Terjesen, Sealy, & Singh, 2009). Despite the general perceived notion 
that women should not be agentic and thus are especially penalized in executive roles where 
agency is expected, communal traits and behaviors are increasingly becoming valued and 
accepted leadership characteristics. Therefore, even in these masculine roles of leadership, some 
research has explored how female leaders can be positively viewed as more compassionate, 
attentive, and sensitive to stakeholder needs than their male counterparts (Dennis & Kunkel, 
2004; Ibrahim, Angelidis, & Tomic, 2009), and research specifically on transformational 
leadership has shown that this communal approach to leading (Bass & Avolio, 1994; Lowe, 
Kroeck, & Sivasubramaniam, 1996) is increasingly associated with effective leadership (Eagly et 
al., 2003). Thus, while role incongruity theory predicts that female top leaders may be particularly 
susceptible to negative evaluations because they may be perceived as violating the prescriptive 
norms of their communal gender roles, it is possible that, instead, female top leaders can be 
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perceived favorably, especially if their “feminine leadership style” is seen as a strength (Rosette 
& Tost, 2010). 
In addition, while women may not be welcomed in the old boys’ club because they do not 
fit the in-group norm of these male-dominated networks, a growing line of research examines the 
unique resource portfolio that women may bring to the table precisely because of their ‘out-of-
group’ status. In the TMT for example, scholars have noted that women add to the diversity of 
experiences in the TMT and as a result, their additional insight allows for varying points of view, 
a more comprehensive set of solutions, and thus higher quality decisions (Hoffman & Maier, 
1961; Wiersema & Bantel, 1993). An example of this unique portfolio includes distinct risk-
taking attitudes that would influence firm strategic decisions to be less risky and yield certain 
performance advantages (Huang & Kisgen, 2013). Furthermore, as noted earlier, women have 
certain management styles that may positively influence group decision-making. The presence of 
the feminine management style may in turn encourage more elaborate information processes, 
more active information exchange and integration, thus effectively balancing the polarization 
tendency toward risk-seeking in more male-dominated TMTs (Van Knippenberg et al., 2004).  
In sum, even in the face of inconclusive evidence that women are not effective leaders, 
the growing acceptance of certain feminine management tactics coupled with women’s ability to 
bring a unique portfolio of resources to the table, women in leadership roles still elicit negative 
reactions and face situations of social exclusion. Scholars have likewise found evidence for such 
mixed reactions (Heilman, Block, & Martell, 1995) such that successful female managers 
continue to be regarded more negatively than their successful male counterparts. This could 
account for Jeong and Harrison’s (2017) findings that although female CEOs positively relate to 
long-term financial performance through reduced risk-taking as a mediating mechanism, their 




2.3.5. Combatting role-incongruity with gender-appropriate actions 
 In the previous section, we establish through UET as well as the gender role literature 
that executive gender is an important characteristic in that it affects firm decisions and outcomes 
(particularly to evaluators like shareholders). Moreover, women face intentional and unintentional 
social closure in the form of “glass walls”, because they are in traditionally male-dominated 
positions. Despite the wealth of knowledge regarding CEO gender, there are a number of ways 
that our understanding is still incomplete and as such, the issue warrants further examinations.  
First, the extant upper echelons literature has yet to address whether female CEOs have a 
propensity towards other types of strategic actions beyond strategic risk-taking. The exclusion of 
a broader set of outcomes is an issue because as Jeong and Harrison (2017) suggest, risk-taking is 
only one of the multitude of strategic options CEOs have control over. Understanding a fuller 
compliment of strategic actions associated with CEO gender enhances our theoretical knowledge 
while also posing implications for practice with respect to governance mechanisms which 
consider executives’ natural proclivities toward certain decisions.   
Second, findings that female CEO appointments elicit negative reactions from investors 
(e.g., Jeong & Harrison, 2017; Lee & James, 2007) highlights the negative bias women 
executives face but fails to address how female CEOs can either nullify or lessen the degree of 
this penalty for simply being female. That is, extending the current literature that certain feminine 
leadership tactics may in fact be effective and viewed in a positive manner, perhaps certain 
strategic actions that are deemed gender appropriate will also lessen the role violation that female 
CEOs face. While not all executive actions may be classified according to gender stereotypes, 
investigating additional actions or situations that conform to or deviate from stereotypical views 
of women offers an opportunity to expand knowledge on the manners in which executives can 
use their actions to control how the market responds as well as other firm outcomes. 
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Last, extant research on gender-stereotypes against female CEOs addresses only one 
manifestation of bias associated with such stereotypes – backlash in the form of observers’ 
negative perceptions and evaluations owing to prejudiced views of gender appropriate behavior – 
without considering whether female CEOs are also subject to biases that result in intentional and 
unintentional social exclusion from peers and how that might affect their firms. Examining how 
gender biases for female CEOs may manifest in ways more concretely than just negative 
perceptions and evaluations, such as social closure in the form of “glass walls” that effectively 
keep women out of certain men’s club and thus adversely affect their firms, may help us advance 
a more complete understanding of the mechanisms relating CEO gender, their actions, and 
subsequent firm outcomes. To address these issues, I investigate CEO actions that test gender 
stereotype arguments. I utilize the context of nonmarket strategies and associated outcomes, 
which as I will highlight next, provide an ideal setting for addressing these aforementioned issues 
within CEO gender research. Before moving forward, I first review the nonmarket strategy 
literature. 
2.4. Nonmarket Strategies 
 The following sections on nonmarket strategies will be organized as follows. I will first 
address theory regarding the premise of nonmarket actions, defined as a firm’s concerted pattern 
of actions to improve its performance by managing the institutional or societal context of 
economic competition (Baron, 1995; Lux et al., 2011), on firm-level outcomes. In particular, 
nonmarket strategies often take two dominant forms, corporate social responsibility (CSR), and 
corporate political activity (CPA). The voluntary and discretionary nature of both of these 
nonmarket strategies can often be directly tied to the CEO (Den Hond et al., 2014) and I further 
argue that both reflect gendered expectations, suggesting that female CEOs are more likely to 
engage in CSR and conversely, they are less likely to engage in CPA. Consistent with research on 
biases which manifest to the detriment of females (e.g., Lee & James, 2007; Westphal & Stern, 
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2007; Park & Westphal, 2013), CEO gender is an important missing contextual factor explaining 
the mixed findings for both antecedents and performance outcomes of firms’ nonmarket actions 
(McWilliams & Siegal, 2000; Zheng, Singh, & Mitchell, 2015; Zhu & Chung, 2014). As such, I 
argue that these mixed findings could perhaps be explained by how consistent these nonmarket 
actions are to the CEO’s gender and societal expectations of what is considered gender 
appropriate behavior. 
2.4.1. Nonmarket actions and firm outcomes 
 While firm performance is typically characterized by ‘market’ interactions between 
suppliers, customers, and competitors, a stream of research explores how a firm’s ‘nonmarket’ 
interaction with their social, political, legal and cultural environments may similarly play a role in 
affecting firm outcomes. Specifically, a firm’s nonmarket environment takes into consideration a 
broader scope of action that pertains to ethical behavior, policy attainment, and social 
responsibility (Doh, Lawton, & Rajwani, 2012). Scholars have provided insight into various 
nonmarket strategies (Aguinis & Glavas, 2012; Hillman, Keim, & Schuler, 2004) and a large 
body of literature has examined the effects of nonmarket strategy on firm survival, performance, 
and sustainable competitive advantage (e.g., Baron, 1995; Frynas, Mellahi, & Pigman, 2006; 
McWilliams & Siegel, 2000; Oliver & Holzinger, 2008; Sun, Mellahi, & Thun, 2010). 
 Despite the rich research history on nonmarket actions, we still lack conclusive evidence 
regarding the relationship between nonmarket strategy and firm performance – a recent review 
reported that only approximately half of empirical studies reported a positive association between 
nonmarket strategies and organizational performance, while the rest reported mixed, insignificant, 
or even negative relationships at times (for a review, see Den Hond et al., 2014). As a result, 
many scholars have since began focusing on the underlying mechanisms or contingency factors 
that may affect the effectiveness of nonmarket actions on various firm outcomes (e.g., Aguinis & 
Glavas, 2012; Goll & Rasheed, 2004; Zheng et al., 2015). Examples of these contingency factors 
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include the consideration of consumer perceptions (Luo & Bhattacharya, 2006), access to finance 
(Madsen & Rodgers, 2015), political resources (Frynas et al., 2006), and relationships with 
primary stakeholders (Hillman & Keim, 2001). 
Of the many types of nonmarket actions, two have emerged as dominant in the literature: 
(1) corporate social responsibility (CSR), which refers to “corporate actions that appear to 
advance some social good that allows a firm to enhance organizational performance, regardless of 
motive;” and (2) corporate political activity (CPA), which refers to “corporate attempts to manage 
political institutions and/or influence political actors in ways favorable to the firm” (Mellahi et 
al., 2016: 144). In the following section, I will examine both CSR and CPA independently. For 
each type of nonmarket action, I will first discuss its implications in terms of its firm-level 
outcomes followed by the role of executives in implementing each nonmarket strategy. Of the 
many levels of analyses and theoretical directions used in both CSR and CPA research, scholars 
contend that the role of executives and their personal interest is of particular importance in 
understanding nonmarket actions because the degree of managerial discretion and opportunism 
evident in nonmarket activities may serve as a crucial moderating mechanism. As discussed 
earlier, UET argues that top executives can have excessive influence over firm decision-making 
and the voluntary nature of nonmarket action provides executives with the level of discretion and 
number of plausible alternatives needed to reflect their personal proclivities. Prior scholars have 
similarly suggested that this discretionary and voluntary nature of nonmarket actions allow 
executives to play a larger role in determining nonmarket actions. To understand how executive 
gender plays a role in the degree of managerial discretion in these activities, I will examine 
descriptive and prescriptive gender stereotypes as they apply to these nonmarket actions and 
propose my hypotheses that integrate arguments from the upper echelons and gender role 
literature to explain the relationship between gender and certain nonmarket strategy proclivities, 
as well as subsequent various firm outcomes. 
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2.4.2. Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and its firm-level effects 
While the exact definition of corporate social responsibility (CSR) varies in the literature 
(Margolis & Walsh, 2003), a key underlying premise is that CSR refers to voluntary firm actions 
that improve social and/or environmental conditions (Aguilera et al., 2007; Davis, 1973; Wood, 
1991). One explanation for this variance in definitions is due to the fact that CSR can manifest in 
different ways and thus can be viewed as a composite or multi-dimensional construct, capturing a 
range of economic, social, and environmental initiatives that can manifest differentially through 
certain processes, policies, or programs (Wood, 1991). Because of CSR’s discretionary nature, 
firms must weigh the advantages and disadvantages of engaging in CSR: on one hand, some 
argue that managers have a priority to maximize wealth of their stakeholders (Friedman, 1962), 
and to the extent that CSR is inconsistent with this objective of maximizing wealth, CSR should 
be avoided. Yet others argue that firms have a duty to society that goes beyond maximizing 
wealth (Whetten, Rands, & Godfrey, 2001). A successful CSR strategy can provide many 
advantages, including product differentiation (McWilliams & Siegel, 2000; Waddock & Graves, 
1997), avoidance of potential government-imposed fines (Belkaoui, 1976; Freedman & Stagliano, 
1991; Shane & Spicer, 1983) and the reduction of risk (Godfrey, 2005). Thus even if CSR may 
not maximize the present value of the firm's future cash flows, CSR may still ultimately 
maximize the market value of the firm (Mackey, Mackey, & Barney, 2007). Despite such 
arguments and a body of research offering supportive findings, other studies have produced 
mixed results regarding the impact of CSR on firm performance. Scholars posit that conflictive 
findings for the CSR-firm performance relationship may be due to missing variables and the 
contingent nature of the relationship, suggesting a need to look at moderating factors that might 




2.4.3. Corporate Political Activity (CPA) and its firm-level effects 
 Corporate political activity (CPA) is defined as corporate attempts to shape government 
policy in ways favorable to the firm (Baysinger, 1984). CPA activities are also considered 
multidimensional in nature and like CSR, consist of a complex mix of activities – political 
donations, lobbying, grassroots advocacy, petitioning, media campaigns, and participating in 
trade associations, among others. Because the aforementioned activities are also discretionary in 
nature, executives can craft a unique CPA strategy from these mix of activities to match the firm's 
resources and objectives to its political environment (Hart, 2001; Hillman & Hitt, 1999).  
 In the growing literature on CPA, researchers have given the most attention to lobbying 
and political donations (e.g., Baysinger et al., 1985; Keim & Zeithaml,1986; Sethi,1982). 
Lobbying is a political tactic used by firms in which representatives of the firm (i.e., lobbyists) 
convey information to policy makers. This process may take the form of research and surveys, 
technical reports, “think tank” projects, and expert witness testaments, among others (Hillman & 
Hitt, 1999). Political donations on the other hand, is a tactic that involves providing financial 
contributions to the campaigns of policy decision makers directly (Hillman & Hitt, 1999), 
conceivably to help elect individuals who will adopt positions favorable to the contributing firm 
(Hillman et al., 2004; Lux et al., 2011). Offering financial support occurs most frequently through 
the direct financial contributions to a political decision maker or donations to his/her political 
party or a supportive political action committee (PAC). Regardless, both forms of CPA are 
thought to influence politicians to act in ways that are either overtly observable (e.g., offering tax 
breaks, subsidies, and/or government contracts) or hard to detect (e.g., preventing cost-inducing 
regulations) and thus beneficial to firm (Ridge et al., 2017). Due to the data limitations and 
inherent difficulties in tracking these hard to observe actions, scholars often note the expectation 
that beneficial outcomes will result and use more distal measures like firm-performance (Lux et 
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al., 2011) as evidence of the returns to firm from CPA. I adopt this convention as well, noting that 
benefits to firms may entail both overtly visible and hard to observe outcomes.  
 Despite certain similarities between the nonmarket nature of CSR and CPA such as its 
voluntary and multi-dimensional nature, some have argued that CPA is a more likely source of 
sustainable competitive advantage. Unlike CSR which is more visible and relatively imitable by 
competitors (McWilliams & Siegel, 2000, 2001; McWilliams & Siegel, 2011), CPA is often 
covert in nature and more difficult to imitate (Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994). An effective CPA 
strategy is one that both capitalizes on the firm’s unique resources and prevents the availability of 
substitute resources to competitors, such as in the formation of mutually beneficial quid pro quo 
relationships between firms and policy makers (McWilliams, Van Fleet, & Cory, 2002). Scholars 
have noted that CPA is an important determinant of firm performance (Hillman et al., 2004; Lux 
et al., 2011) and can aid in firms obtaining government subsidies (Haley & Schuler, 2011), 
lowering effective tax rates (Richter, Samphantharak, & Timmons, 2009), and attaining trade 
protections (Drope & Hansen, 2004). Yet, the impact of CPA on various firm-level performance 
measures is similarly mixed, as others have noted that CPA may have a negative impact on firm 
outcomes such as market value (Coates IV, 2012; Hadani & Schuler, 2013). Other research has 
reported no effect – including non-significant impacts of campaign contributions on performance 
or increased financial capital (Ansolabehere, Snyder Jr, & Ueda, 2004; Hersch, Netter, & Pope, 
2008). In sum, these mixed results suggest that, as with CSR, there may be essential contextual 
factors that are missing in prior examinations of how CPA affects firms. 
2.4.4. Executive influence on CSR and CPA 
In response to the mixed evidence in nonmarket research, scholars (e.g., Aguinis & 
Glavas, 2012; Doh et al., 2012) have suggested that the current research is lacking the underlying 
psychological processes associated with CSR and CPA. In the context of CSR, idiosyncratic 
differences among executive’s motives, judgement and choices may lead to differences in 
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nonmarket intentions. As stated by Waldman and Balven (2014), CSR activities are consciously 
and deliberately initiated and endorsed by leaders of organizations, and as a result, it may be that 
such decisions are “not about whether organizations act responsibly, but about how individuals 
act and make decisions” (2014: 224). For example, executives may engage in self-serving CSR 
activities to gain approval from other business leaders (Wright & Ferris, 1997) and many recent 
studies investigate the agency conflicts involved in pursuing CSR objectives (e.g., Barnea & 
Rubin, 2010). As cases in point, Petrenko and colleagues (Petrenko, Aime, Ridge, & Hill, 2016) 
found that narcissistic CEOs are more likely to engage in CSR activities as a result of their 
personal need for attention and relatedly, Tang and colleagues (Tang, Qian, Chen, & Shen, 2015) 
found that hubristic CEO were less likely to engage in socially responsible activities but more 
likely to engage in socially irresponsible activities. In addition, studies have examined the effects 
of various facets of executive individual differences on CSR, such as CEO intellectual 
stimulation, charismatic leadership, and CEO political ideologies (Chin, Hambrick, & Treviño, 
2013; Waldman, Siegel, & Javidan, 2006). 
 Similar research has also been prevalent in the CPA literature. In addition to contextual 
determinants such as firm dependence on government contracts or federal regulation for 
economic survival, as well as access to expertise and resources to pay the high costs of CPA, 
CPA can also be influenced by executives, especially since individual relationships between 
executives and politicians are often seen as the ties that bind “the worlds of business and 
government together" (Salamon & Siegfried, 1977: 1032). A firm's level of CPA is 
fundamentally decided upon by executives in terms of amount of resources allocated to CPA 
(Griffin & Dunn, 2004; Wilts, 2006) and the recognition of public policy issues (Wilts, 2006). As 
a result, the political propensity of top managers may be an important factor to consider when it 
comes to a firm’s CPA strategy (Blumentritt, 2003).  
While CEOs are expected to engage in CPA that enhances value for the firm (Hillman et 
al., 2004), CEOs may have a high degree of autonomy in CPA decisions that goes unprotested by 
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other executives, even under circumstances that may be value-destroying (Hart, 2010). To a 
greater degree than CSR, the clandestine nature of CPA may allow CEOs to behave in 
opportunistic manners (Hadani & Schuler, 2013). Because of the prestige associated with their 
positions, CEOs can often gain access to private information about the public policy environment 
through personal relationships with journalists, public officials, other CEOs, and public policy 
makers (Hart, 2004; Reich, 2010). As a result, CEOs often sustain corporate political ties or 
engage in political activities for personal reasons such as to boost their personal reputations and 
advance their careers, even if these political ties and activities may not be collectively valuable to 
their firms (Sun et al., 2010). For example, CPA has been associated with personal benefits such 
as increased pay (Arlen & Weiss, 1995; Gupta & Swenson, 2003), and increased stock option 
compensation (Yu & Yu, 2012). In addition, Gordon et al. (2007) finds that executives differ in 
their willingness to contribute to campaign contributions, and other studies have examined the 
moderating role of CEO personality, political ideologies, and discretion through duality in a 
CEO’s participation in CPA (Gordon, 2006; Hadani, Dahan, & Doh, 2015). 
2.5. The gender-typing of nonmarket actions 
 Because prior research has shown that CEOs play an important role in shaping a firm’s 
CSR and CPA, and that CEOs may differ in their attitude towards engaging in these activities 
(e.g., Ozer, 2010), I further propose that from a gender role perspective, these actions are gender-
typed such that female CEOs are both descriptively inclined and prescriptively expected to 
engage in CSR, and concurrently descriptively inclined to and prescriptively discouraged from 
engaging in CPA. Relatedly, when female CEOs engage in CSR in accordance to these 
expectations, the market may lessen their negative bias towards them. Conversely, when a female 
CEO engages in CPA, the exclusion bias they face in the form of social closure from political 
networks may lead to adverse effects that result in a less than effective CPA strategy.  
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2.5.1. The feminine gender-typing of CSR 
 As suggested earlier, the descriptive female stereotype of being cooperative, 
collectivistic, and trustworthy is that of the “quintessential steward” (Donaldson, 1990; Oliver, 
Krause, Busenbark, & Kalm, 2018; Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003). As such, female executives 
are expected to be less inclined toward masculine, self-interested opportunism and more inclined 
toward feminine, pro-social, pro-organizational collaborative efforts. Indeed, central CSR 
activities reflect these female communal traits – because CSR is generally concerned with 
improving and limiting harm to social or environmental conditions (Aguilera et al., 2007; Davis, 
1973; Wood, 1991), it is often viewed as a “softer” strategic action that aligns well with 
communal qualities associated with the female gender. Therefore, there is reason to believe that a 
female CEO will be positively related to more responsible CSR activities and negatively related 
to irresponsible CSR activities.  
There are two reasons to expect why female and male CEOs may differ in regards to their 
engagement in CSR activities (cf. Jeong & Harrison, 2017). First, because prior research indicates 
that women are more communal and have a tendency towards care and concern for others, these 
characteristics should translate into a care for the environment and other social causes. 
Furthermore, these communal tendencies suggest women should not only have a desire to do 
good, but also a strong desire to avoid harm to the environment or others. Second, the 
socialization of women over time might lead them to learn and abide by what is considered 
socially desirable or appropriate behavior. That is, while descriptive norms may suggest that 
women are inclined to engage in responsible activities and disengage in irresponsible activities, 
female CEOs may also self-impose adherences with the female gender role stereotype of care and 
concern in order to balance the tension between the role incongruity stereotype they face which 
can devalue their performance. The gender-typed norms of CSR, then, may lead female CEOs to 
abide by such societal rules and engage in more CSR behaviors, as is expected of their gender.  
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Taken together, I argue that the normative learned expectations of being female will 
result in female CEOs doing more good and causing less harm. That is, female CEOs will not 
only engage in more activities that are considered responsible to the environment and others, but 
limit activities that are considered irresponsible to the environment and others. Coinciding with 
this responsibility/irresponsible dichotomy, scholars have begun paying considerable attention to 
the deconstruction of CSR activities into its positive and negative aspects: responsible actions 
represent positive, voluntary corporate actions designed to improve social or environmental 
conditions (e.g., charitable giving, support for worker education), while irresponsible actions 
represent negative, corporate actions that negatively affect these conditions (e.g., polluting the 
environment; poor working conditions; Tang et al., 2015). This dichotomous approach indicates 
that CEOs can potentially engage in both responsible and irresponsible activities, and thus they 
represent two distinct aspects of CSR (Lange and Washburn, 2012). When we consider the 
totality of female CEOs’ CSR actions, then, not only should they be associated with more 
responsibility and fewer irresponsible actions, but the overall CSR profiles in terms of the totality 
of their positive and negative actions considered jointly should be higher as well. 
In sum, because females are descriptively expected to be more communal in nature, 
charitable, and socially oriented (Boulouta, 2012; Bernardi et al., 2009), female CEOs will 
engage in both more responsible CSR activities which are beneficial for the environment and 
society and fewer irresponsible CSR activities which pose possible harms; thus, women 
executives will have a higher overall CSR rating as well. 
H1a. There will be a positive relationship between Female CEO and responsible CSR 
activities. 
H1b. There will be a negative relationship between Female CEO and irresponsible CSR 
 activities. 




The prescriptive female stereotype on the other hand suggests that because CSR is 
considered appropriate for women (Eagly et al., 2003; Eagly & Carli, 2003), the relationship 
between CSR and market reactions may be more strongly related for female CEOs. I argue this 
for two interrelated reasons. First, because women are prescriptively expected to behave 
communally, they will receive more positive (or at least less negative) reactions associated with 
gender-based stereotypes when they do so. Echoing earlier research that provides initial evidence 
that penalization for being in such out-of-role positions (i.e., CEO) can be lessened with socially 
accepted gendered-type leadership styles (Eagly et al., 2003), I argue that the engagement in 
gender appropriate actions within the scope of a CEO’s decision-making may yield similar 
results. Prior studies provide evidence that CSR activities are legitimate within the scope of CEO 
actions. Thus combined with the communal nature of CSR, female CEOs engaging in responsible 
CSR activities are not only acting within the accepted scope of CEO appropriate activities, but are 
also abiding by gender expectations of appropriate behavior. Along the same lines, studies 
(Oliver et al., 2018) show that from a “benevolent sexism” perspective, female CEOs should be 
supported and given the resources necessary to maintain their communal nature. Thus by 
conforming to the stereotype of being communal by engaging in CSR, female CEOs stand a 
higher chance of removing or at least lessening negatives reactions from those who hold such 
gender-stereotyped views, and at the same time, affirm stereotypical views of who they should 
act. At the same time, if women engage in irresponsible actions, they will violate the stereotype 
and be punished accordingly. Taken together, the relationship between female CEOs’ CSR 
actions – whether responsible or irresponsible - and market-reactions should be stronger than for 
their colleagues.  
Second, and related, the relationship for female CEOs and CSR market reactions are 
expected to differ from male CEOs in that while men may face a certain level of gendered 
expectations as well (i.e., prescription to be dominating and assertive, etc.), they do not suffer 
gender-related biases as severely as women. Indeed, prior studies indicate that men often have 
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more leeway to engage in both typical and atypical masculine behaviors (Smith et al., 2013), thus 
men seem to receive the benefit of the doubt, even if their actions violate typical gender 
stereotypes. Furthermore, because CSR is a nonmarket strategy that is within the scope of a 
CEO’s discretion, stakeholders may view such actions as a “strategic move”, and thus, even if 
communality is not prescribed to men, society will not penalize them as severely for role 
violation as opposed to women who either display agentic behaviors or fail to display communal 
behaviors (Smith et al., 2013). Thus, not only may female CEOs be able to remove or lessen 
penalties by responding in gender-appropriate ways and be penalized more severely when 
violating such expectations, but such role violation management tactics may not apply to men, 
implying the relationship between both positive and negative forms of CSR and market response 
will be stronger for women (i.e., more strongly positive for responsible actions; more strongly 
negative for irresponsible actions). Taken together then, when female CEOs engage (fail to 
engage) in CSR that matches (does not match) expectations, they remove or lessen (strengthen) 
biases associated with stereotypes while consequently male CEOs may not enjoy (suffer) the 
same benefit (penalty). As a result, we expect that the relationship between CSR and market 
participants reactions to be more strongly positive for female CEOs than males. Formally stated: 
H2a. CEO gender will moderate the relationship between responsible CSR activities and 
market-based performance such that the relationship will be more strongly positive for 
Female CEOs. 
H2b. CEO gender will moderate the relationship between irresponsible CSR activities 
and market-based performance such that the relationship will be more strongly negative 
for Female CEOs.  
H2c. CEO gender will moderate the relationship between overall CSR rating and market-




2.5.2. The masculine gender-typing of CPA  
 Of the different idiosyncratic differences among CEOs that may play a role in influencing 
CPA, gender has been historically under-examined. Part of this reason is due to the fact that the 
exclusion of women from politics has been a deep-seated convention (e.g., The United States was 
founded on the principle of representative government but existed for almost a century and a half 
before women were even admitted to full citizenship with rights to vote, etc.) and the implicit 
understanding is that positions of power and leadership like those of running businesses and of 
states are male domains. As such, it may be of little surprise that the overwhelming majority of 
political figures continue to be male (Paxton et al., 2007). Yet in more recent times, in addition to 
the growing number of women in the executive suite, more women are also running for and being 
elected to governmental offices, and women-held positions in national government are at the 
highest they have ever been (Lovenduski, 2005; Paxton et al., 2007), suggesting that such a 
change could have important consequences in politics (Bolzendahl & Brooks, 2007; Waring, 
Greenwood, & Pintat, 2000). Still, like what we have observed in the corporate workplace, the 
gender gap remains prevalent in terms of citizens’ political participation, and women remain less 
politically engaged than men (Burns, 2007; Gallego, 2007; Paxton et al., 2007; Schlozman, 
Burns, & Verba, 1999). 
 While the first type of nonmarket action I examined (i.e., CSR) mainly reflects bias in 
terms of lessening gender violation stereotypes through the use of acceptable corporate practices 
both in terms of being female and CEO, the two-fold bias against women in terms of both role 
incongruity and social closure is arguably stronger in the realm of politics. That is, while 
descriptive stereotypes suggest women may shy away from CPA because it is associated with 
agentic characteristics such as conflict and opportunism, more so in the engagement of CPA 
versus the engagement of CSR do barriers exist that prevent women from engaging in CPA 
successfully. There are several reasons for this – the control of the culture of politics by men 
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(Lawless & Fox, 2005) as well as the perpetuation of sexism in politics, the association of power 
and leadership with men, and a view of women as outcasts in the political system (Campbell & 
Wolbrecht, 2006; Huddy & Terkildsen, 1993; Rosenwasser & Dean, 1989). These reasons may 
affect a female CEOs ability and inclination to engage in CPA. 
 Several empirical studies indicate that while women may be no less competent in politics, 
women continue to face social biases in this sphere (Dolan, 2014; Hayes & Lawless, 2015; 
Holman, Merolla, & Zechmeister, 2011). First, as noted by Ulbig and Funk (1999), “conflict and 
politics go hand in hand” (Ulbig & Funk, 1999: 267) and a major part of politics is in the pursuit 
of power and the occurence of conflict, thus a preference for conflict avoidance generally results 
in lower levels of political participation for women (Ulbig & Funk, 1999; Wojcieszak, 2011). As 
such, women face similar descriptive and prescriptive pressures that state women and men should 
differ in their conflict tolerance and avoidance behavior (Tannen & Leapman, 1998) and thus 
women should be less politically interested, informed, and efficacious than men (Verba, Burns, & 
Schlozman, 1997), while men should have a greater taste for aggression and conflict, and thus are 
more suited for political engagement (Baxter & Lansing, 1983; Carpini & Keeter, 1996). 
Furthermore, not only do stereotypical views suggest women should avoid conflict, but these also 
suggest women should engage in actions that reflect the pursuit of communal goals (e.g., such as 
helping and working with others through CSR as seen earlier) rather than actions that reflect the 
pursuit of power and political ambition (Diekman, Brown, Johnston, & Clark, 2010). Further, 
when women violate these stereotypes, they are often faced with backlash in the form of negative 
evaluations. 
 The aforementioned assumptions may serve as an underlying reason for women’s low 
engagement in politics, mirroring those that explain similarly low numbers of women in the 
executive suite. Namely, women are less likely to engage in politics because of their lower access 
to socio-economic resources. After all, politics has been described as the most explicitly 
masculine human activity of all (Squire, 2016), and has been more exclusively limited to men and 
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more self-consciously masculine. Previous research views of the “masculinized ethos” of politics 
suggests that even as women increasingly enter other formerly male-dominated fields, such as 
medicine or business (Diekman et al., 2010), women are discouraged from political participation 
(Krook, 2010; Lawless & Fox, 2005; Young, 2000). Importantly, the absence of political activity 
from women is more of an indication that they are first unable to participate, rather than 
unwilling, explaining why so few women run for office to begin with (Campbell & Wolbrecht, 
2006; Krook, 2010; Lawless & Fox, 2005; Palmer & Simon, 2003), which leads to my main 
argument of social closure that female CEOs face within the political domain. 
 While it is possible that some political activity may indeed be communal in nature, such 
as the helping of constituents and collaborating on legislation drafts, CPA continues to be 
recognized as the promotion of power goals. Furthermore, when women do engage in politics, 
they are often perceived to be pursuing a ‘feminist’ agenda (Phillips, 1998) with intentions of 
reshaping the political environment through the inclusion of women or reversal of women biasing 
policies (Squires, 2013), further creating tension regarding women and their aim to topple current 
power structures in the realm of politics. 
Because the male-dominated culture in the political sphere remains prevalent (Collier, 
1974; Dolan, 1997), I argue social closure affects the actions and outcomes for female CEOs with 
respect to CPA. Specifically, because firm outcomes can be indirectly affected by the politicians 
who create and enforce rules and regulations under which business is conducted (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978) and the norms of an environment are often shaped by those in power (e.g., 
Watkins & Smith, 2014), the male-dominated nature of politics is likely to be less welcoming of 
women, even if they are CEOs. Given personal connections are paramount to successfully 
interfacing with politicians (Gordon et al., 2007; Ridge et al., 2017), social closure prevents 
female CEOs from establishing these important, personal connections, which also dampens their 
proclivity to turn to CPA as an effective nonmarket strategy Social closure in effect creates “glass 
walls” that hinder women from being accepted into the political men’s club, establishing strong 
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influential connections, and accessing political-enhancing resources (Blake, 2014; Burns, 2007; 
Burns et al., 1997; Dalton, 2008; Gallego, 2007; Hurst, 2017; Norris, 2002; Paxton et al., 2007; 
Schlozman et al., 1999). 
In particular, I examine a CEO’s engagement in CPA via political donations (e.g., Hart, 
2010; Hillman & Hitt, 1999), which has been one of the most intensely studied forms of corporate 
political activity and refers to donations to politicians’ political campaign coffers that are meant 
to help establish and develop quid pro quo relationships with politicians in exchange for firm and 
personal benefits (e.g., Kroszner & Stratmann, 2000; Milyo, Primo, & Groseclose, 2000; Tahoun, 
2014). Unlike lobbying, the other dominant form of CPA which occurs through hired lobbyists 
(Nownes, 2006), there are a number of reasons to expect that the male-dominated culture of 
politics may inhibit a female CEO’s ability and proclivity to establish and benefit from political 
donations in particular.  
First, because female CEOs are more likely to be locked out of the men’s club of politics, 
they will have greater difficultly developing mutually beneficial relationships with politicians, 
affecting both their ability and proclivity to engage in political donations. Political donations 
often function as a financial inducement to important policy makers in exchange for firm and 
personal benefits (Hillman et al., 2004). Thus, at the heart of the issue, donations are a way of 
establishing the quid pro quo relationships such that in exchange for financial support to assist in 
gaining political power, favors are returned in the form of promising access to information and 
policies that are beneficial to the firm. Given such difficulties in access the political network, 
female CEOs may less able and willing to donate to politicians to than their male colleagues. That 
is, broadly speaking, they are less able to get into the boy’s club and, at the same time, realize the 
obstacles and thus avoid attempting to do so as well.  
A second, and related, reason exists that suggest female CEOs may be less able to - and 
thus deterred from engaging in - these tacit quid pro quo relationships. If women are more likely 
to be excluded from the political network and thus lack strong ties in that sphere, this has several 
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implications regarding their political activities. Female CEOs that are not well connected 
politically lack the opportunity to establish ties with the right politicians, which can hinder their 
proclivity to donate. Subsequently, politicians may be less inclined to seek out the partnership 
with whom they have no prior connections because individuals inherently look first within their 
network for support and knowledge on potential prospects of new relationships (i.e., Granovetter, 
1983). Being outside of the network indicates that female CEOs may be sought out as donors less 
often. Political figures may also be less motivated to address the concerns of an unconnected 
donor, especially if it poses a conflict to another more established donor and thus may choose not 
to accept their donations to prevent the establishment of a relationship. For example, there have 
been instances where both Republicans and Democrats alike have been reported turning down 
donations to prevent unwanted associations (e.g., Henessey, 2015; Lerer, 2018). Thus, the unclear 
notion of how political donations will be received may inhibit female CEOs in several ways. 
Some male politicians may take such concerns over donations to an extreme with respect to not 
wanting to be seen as creating conflict with women (as seen in the Mike Pence example and his 
refusal to be alone with women who are non-family members). Business-politicians relationships 
are also a prime area for concern for media and watchdog groups, conceivably because of the 
potential for quid pro quo relationship where business funds politicians and politicians act in the 
interest of businesses instead of the constituents they are elected to represent. As such, politicians 
are often leery of being perceived as using their position in government to benefit private interests 
and sensitive to the potential that donations may be seen as quid pro quo (see Tahoun, 2014), and 
thus they often rely on personal relationships to help vet whom to associate with. To the degree 
that male politicians do not want to be seen as creating a conflict of interest either with gender or 
with business, they may shy away from establishing relationships with female CEOs generally 
relative to males and specifically, with CEOs who are not part of their trusted network (as is more 
likely the case with women executives). As a result, it stands to reason that female CEOs will be 
less able and less willing to engage in political donations.  
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Third, the fact that female CEOs are not in the network also means these executives 
cannot gain access to the network to ascertain whether politicians will act as desired, which leads 
to another reason why female CEOs may also be less inclined to engage in political contributions 
than their male counterparts. That is, a female CEO’s inability to form ties within the political 
sphere not only indicates she does not have the adequate relationships that will result in favorable 
exchanges even if a financial donation is made, and furthermore, such a use of financial resources 
may not be the most effective nonmarket strategy to pursue. Essentially, these resources may be 
put to better use elsewhere, where these is a greater promise or certainty of a favorable or positive 
return. The decision to avoid wantonly expending money towards donations may constitute a 
constructed preference – that is, a reflection of the fact that politics has been traditionally, and 
continues to be, dominated by men and female CEOs are more likely to preemptively reduce 
political spending, especially if they do not have established, meaningful ties within those circles 
that will result in favorable outcomes in exchange for financial support. In other words, female 
CEOs may be aware of the “glass walls” that prevent them from gaining access to the men’s club 
and thus may perceive gaining access as inefficient use of resources, lessening their desire to try. 
Furthermore, as with men, women may feel less comfortable trying to establish such ties with 
men or, having surmounted biases to arrive at the top, feel they should no longer have to operate 
under conditions where they voluntarily face additional invisible barriers. As such, they may have 
a lower inclination to take the steps necessary to break down these voluntary barriers. Taken 
together, female CEOs may be both less able and less willing to make political contributions. 
H3. There will be a negative relationship between Female CEOs and political 
contributions. 
Because female CEOs may be excluded from these political circles, I also argue the 
benefits in exchange for donations may be lower for female CEOs than for their male colleague. 
If and when a female CEO chooses to invest in these politicians, without personal connections 
and an established understanding of the quid pro quo relationship in exchange for the financial 
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support, political contributions may not be effective for female CEOs for several reasons. On one 
hand, if female CEOs are typecast as not belonging of the network, politicians may feel less 
social pressure to help those that are not prominent within the network. That is, the lack of a tie or 
imbalance of power may indicate less of a need to engage in tacit quid pro quo relationships even 
upon receipt of a contribution. Similarly, there is likely less social pressure to return benefits to 
those with whom a politician does not have personal ties, friendship, or trust. As a result, when 
female CEOs do donate, they may not return the same beneficial outcomes on a per-donation 
basis as their more connected male colleagues. Second, and related, given their lack of network 
connections and power, female CEOs are also less likely to be able to demand favors post-
contribution or retaliate when benefits are not received in kind. In either instance, the money 
donated by female CEOs may be less effective at eliciting benefits in return.   
As a result of the lack of network connectivity and power, even if a female CEO chooses 
to engage in political contributions, the lack of established quid pro quo relationships with policy 
makers and relative lack of network or power to enforce the “agreement” may result in a less 
positive outcome in exchange for their financial support compared to male CEOs who are more 
likely to have these established relationships because of their prototypical traits. Furthermore, 
female CEOs exclusion from the network and the flow of information found within these ties may 
limit their ability to identify and leverage politicians who are willing to form mutually beneficial 
relationships. In either situation, when female CEOs do give, relative to men, their donations are 
less effective at bringing about positive outcomes. Therefore, the relationship will be weaker for 
female CEOs compared to their male counterparts. 
H4. CEO gender will moderate the relationship between political contributions and 
beneficial outcomes the CEO’s firm receives such that the expected positive relationship 








This chapter discusses the methodology employed to test the hypotheses that were 
developed in Chapter II. Explanations are provided regarding the sample and measures of 
focal variables.  
3.1. Sample  
 To test my arguments, I utilize a sample of publicly-traded firms operating in the United 
States (U.S.). While CSR and CPA occur worldwide (e.g., Choi, Jia, & Lu, 2014; Hillman et al., 
2004; Mellahi et al., 2016), the U.S. context is beneficial because the country allows both 
donations to politicians and other firm-level actions that may influence government – which is not 
universally the case – and requires individuals and firms to publicly report their actions in this 
area (Djankov, Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shelifer, 2009). As such, the U.S. is an ideal context 
to enable empirical testing of the arguments that may not be possible in other countries. Data was 
drawn from seven sources. First, all firm-level financial and corporate data is collected from 
Compustat. Second, information regarding CEO gender, compensation, and employment data is 
collected from Execucomp. Third, data pertaining to CSR is collected from the Morgan Stanley 
Capital International’s (MSCI) Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) database, formerly 
known as Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini (KLD) Research & Analytics, Inc. Fourth, data pertaining  
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to political contributions at the firm- and individual-levels is collected from the Center for 
Responsive Politics (CRP), a research group that examines the effects of contributions and 
lobbying on elections, government actions, and public policy. Fifth, board information is 
collected from BoardEx. The sixth and seventh sources provide CPA-related firm benefit data, 
which comes from two sources – Good Jobs First (goodjobsfirst.org/subsidy-tracker), a national 
search engine that tracks subsidies and other forms of government financial assistance to 
businesses; and usaspending.gov, an official website of the U.S. federal government that 
documents federal government contracts (Tahoun, 2014).  
I start with a sample of firms between the years 1992 and 2018 inclusive. The year 1992 
was chosen based on the earliest data available in Execucomp (a repository for data on 
executives) while 2018 is the most recent year with data available. Following prior research, I 
exclude firms in highly regulated industries - categorized according to their Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) code - such as financial, insurance, and utilities, because performance returns 
within these industries are often not comparable to other firms and industries, and executives are 
often limited in their latitude of discretionary decision-making, in turn affecting their ability to 
enact strategic decisions (McGahan & Porter, 1997; McNamara, Aime, & Vaaler, 2005). To 
establish temporal precedence, independent variables are measured in the time-period before the 
dependent variable. Accounting for temporal lagged variables and missing data that was not 
reported, the final dataset consists of observations where data from the aforementioned databases 
can be matched. 
ESG provides available data between 1991 and 2016; as such, observations for 2017 and 
2018 are dropped for models where CSR is included. This data on CSR strategies includes 140 
female CEOs and 4,371 male CEOs; however, accounting for missing variables across all 
datasets yielded a sample of 77 female CEOs and 2,226 male CEOs for empirical testing.  
Furthermore, since CSR is used as a dependent variable in the testing of H1a-c, and subsequently 
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as an independence variable in the testing of H2a-c, the final sample sizes are 10,413 and 11,005 
respectively – differing in size to account for temporally lagged variables.  
Measuring the aspects of CPA-related activities and firm-level benefits to test my 
hypotheses present a number of challenges. First, there is not a readily available database from 
which to obtain firm or individual political donations information and the same can be said from 
associated firm-related political benefits. To limit the number of potential mismatches through 
this hand-coding matching process and to create a meaningful sample for analysis, I focused data 
collection efforts for the testing of H3-4 on industries whereby a female CEO is present during 
my sample time period between 1992-2018. Data regarding firm-level political contributions in 
the form of lobbying and PAC spending was collected from CRP’s online database 
(www.opensecrets.gov). According to the CRP, a PAC is a political committee organized for the 
purpose of raising and spending money to elect and defeat candidates. PACs are most commonly 
organized by businesses or politicians for the sake of business, labor, or ideological interests. 
Regulations regarding PAC contributions include maximum giving amounts of $5,000 to a 
candidate committee per election (primary, general or special), up to $15,000 annually to any 
national party committee, and $5,000 annually to any other PAC. PACs may also receive up to 
$5,000 from any one individual, PAC or party committee per calendar year. Because affiliated 
PACs are treated as one donor for the purpose of contribution limits and firms may organize 
multiple PACs (especially if the firm is a parent firm), I matched companies in by sample by 
company name to identify all PACs associated with the company.   
CEO political contributions was obtained by the individual political contributions data as 
collected by the U.S. Federal Election Commission (FEC), the regulatory agency that monitors 
and requires the disclosure of campaign funding information. The FEC publicly provides 
information on all individual contributions in excess of $200 to individual candidates, federal 
office campaign committees, national, state, and local parties, and to PACs, of which the earliest 
records date back to the 1990 election. Individuals may give up to $2,700 to a candidate 
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committee per election, up to $5,000 to each PAC a year, and up to $33,900 annually to any 
national party committee. 
To prevent mismatches between the FEC database and Execucomp, a thorough process of 
matching by first, middle, and last name, employer information, state, and ZIP code was utilized. 
This included the use of other online resources such as Bloomberg Executive to verify the 
donor’s identity, especially if employer information is missing, or lists other firms that the CEO is 
involved with (i.e., often times, employer information may be a company that they are on the 
board of, etc.). I first began with collecting individual donations data on all female CEOs to 
prevent any missing data in my female CEO sample. Of my sample, 131 female CEOs were 
present in the FEC database – the remaining female CEOs have not engaged in any individual 
political contribution since 1990 and thus were effectively assigned a zero. I then created a 
nearest neighbor 5:1 matched sample based on year, sic-code, and company size (ROA and 
number of employees), to identify a matched subsample of male CEOs. Only male CEOs that can 
be verified are included. For instance, if there are two CEOs in this subsample with identical first 
and last names, living in the same zip code or operating in the same industry, they were dropped. 
This collection effort resulted in individual political donation data for 780 CEOs in total.  
In addition, data on benefits presents various other challenges, such as: 1. Not all firms 
and or industries may be ‘in the market’ of engaging in CPA and thus, cannot conceivably receive 
benefits (Bonardi, Hillman, & Keim, 2005); 2. Some benefits stemming from the government do 
not apply across all firms and/or industries (e.g., approval or denial of requests for rate increases 
for public utilities; Bonardi et al., 2006); 3. While officials can “ utilize various means, such as 
stalling/pushing legislation, that influence firms directly (e.g., contracts, subsidies) as well as the 
environments (e.g., regulation, concentration),” some of the means by which these officials do so 
are difficult to both track (e.g., stalling legislation) and define as a benefit that is not earned 
(Ridge, Hill, & Ingram, 2018: 2017); accordingly, outside of single-industry studies, most 
research on possible beneficial outcomes from CPA utilizes firm performance (Lux et al., 2011; 
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Ridge et al., 2017). When coupling these issues with the limited number of female CEOs, 
analyses of possible gender-based differences may be inhibited. To address some of these issues, 
data regarding CPA-related firm benefits was also limited to the same industries whereby a 
female CEO is present between the sample time frame.  
To examine more proximal firm benefits, my first data source, Good Jobs First, is a 
national policy resource center that aims to promote corporate and government accountability and 
their Subsidy Tracker current database consists of over 600,000 unique observations of 
government assistance to firms. First, to identify firms in my limited sample that have received 
any government assistance, I matched based on company names and industry. Good Jobs First 
has developed a proprietary system of matching names of the company as it appears in the 
original government source, to the ultimate owner of the recipient firm, based on a number of 
verifiable sources such as the Croctail compilation of subsidiary lists U.S. publicly traded 
companies are required to include in their 10-K filings with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. Through this process, they have identified parent firms for over 100,000 entries, 
accounting for over 75% of the total dollar value tracked. Due to the comprehensiveness of their 
matching program, company names from Execucomp and Compustat are matched to the parent 
name as identified by Good Jobs First. All industries present in my limited sample have received 
subsidies at some point during my sample time frame of 1992-2018, addressing the issue that not 
industries may receive government-related benefits. 
My second data source, usaspending.gov, is an official website of the U.S. federal 
government that documents federal government contracts. The Federal Funding Accountability 
and Transparency Act of 2006 (FFATA) signed into law in 2006 requires all federal contract, 
grant, loan, and other financial assistance awards of more than $25,000 be displayed on a publicly 
accessible and searchable website to give the American public access to information on how tax 
dollars are being spent. The earliest fiscal year of data currently dates back to 2008. Similarly, all 
industries presented in my limited sample have likewise received contracts. Accounting for 
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restricted sample and time frame of data available as well as the aggregation by two-year political 
cycle, H3 is tested using a sample of 2,008 firm-year observations, and H4 is testing using a 
sample of 1,962 firm-year observations.  
3.2. Variables  
CEO gender is a binary dummy indicator for female CEOs and male CEOs as tracked by 
Execucomp’s executive gender information. Fifteen miscoded female CEOs were corrected from 
the original Execucomp dummy variable when the CEO was verified to be female. 
A firm’s corporate social responsibility (CSR) is determined by a firm’s ESG ratings 
(Mattingly & Berman, 2006; Waddock & Graves, 1997). The ESG ratings have been widely used 
in prior research to measure CSR (e.g., Kacperczyk, 2009; Petrenko et al., 2016). ESG ratings are 
carried out by independent analysts who consider a variety of CSR characteristics, of which the 
seven key CSR factors include: Community, Corporate Governance, Diversity, Employee 
Relations (see Appendix A for more information). For each factor, the ESG rating consists of a 
summary of strengths (i.e. positive rating) and concerns (i.e., negative ratings) where each is 
categorized with a binary variable if a respective strength or concern is present. If a firm did not 
have a strength or concern regarding that factor, it is give a score of “0” instead. A full list of 
strengths and weaknesses are available in the Appendix (See Table A). In keeping with our 
theoretical argument that firms can engage in both responsible and irresponsible CSR activities 
concurrently, the strengths and concerns sub-dimensions will first be measured independently 
since strengths correspond to responsible, or “doing good” CSR practices, while concerns 
correspond to irresponsible, or causing/allowing harm” CSR practices. For consistency with prior 
studies, I also consider the overall net scores of both ratings together (i.e., strengths minus 
concerns), as is commonly utilized in past research (e.g., Dahlmann & Brammer, 2011; Hillman 
& Keim, 2001; Hull & Rothenberg, 2008).  
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Since I am primarily interested in how nonmarket actions may be prescriptively gender-
stereotyped which in turn determines whether these actions are positively evaluated for 
conforming to gender norms, a market definition of firm performance seem likely to be more 
appropriate than accounting definitions of firm performance in this context (Margolis & Walsh, 
2001) as such behaviors are ways that can either create or destroy shareholder wealth. For that 
reason I will use Tobin's Q, a widely accepted measure of firm value and market-related 
performance (e.g., Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988). However, since both accounting and market 
definitions have been used to study the relationship between nonmarket actions and firm 
performance, as well as the effects of gender (Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes, 2003), I will also 
consider the effects on accounting-based performance in terms of return of assets (ROA), an 
accounting measure for profit, acknowledging that the implication of these robustness results may 
differ from those of market-based performance. 
As CEOs may engage in political donations either through the use of firm resources or 
personal resources, I utilize two separate measures of political activity based on the firm’s 
financial donations and individual CEO financial donations to candidates, parties, and corporate 
political action committees (PACs) as tracked by the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP). PAC 
contribution amounts were totaled by political cycle per firm, yielding a dollar amount (in 
thousands). Because firm contributions are aggregated by political cycle, political cycles are 
included as a control for all models containing firm contributions. For each identified CEO in my 
matched sample, information regarding their donation amount, donation date, and donation 
recipient (i.e. PAC, party, or candidate) was collected. Donations were then summed by year to 
create a total CEO donation by year variable. 
While politicians may benefit firms in ways that are overtly visible such as through 
subsidies (i.e., a sum of money granted to assist a firm or industry; de Figueiredo & Silverman, 
2006) and government contracts (e.g., Ridge et al., 2017), politicians can also benefit firms in 
ways that are less overtly visible through various techniques that are not possible to track such as 
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stalling legislation or overlooking enforcement, or ways that are difficult to assign intent, such as 
the inability to rule out alternative motives for an action, and yet nonetheless help the firm (Ridge 
et al., 2018). As such, for H4, I first examine two outcomes that would seem to most directly 
reflect CPA-related firm benefits or favors that are overtly visible – government subsidies and 
government contracts – as well as benefits that may materialize in the form of firm performance. I 
utilize Subsidy Tracker (www.goodjobsfirst.org), a national search engine for economic 
development subsidies and other forms of government financial assistance to businesses. Subsidy 
tracker divides various subsidy programs into categories at the local, state, and federal level (see 
Appendix B for more information). Based on these categories, I create a composite measure of all 
firm benefits by year to capture the total dollar value of government subsidy awards. This method 
of totaling grants and/or allocated tax credits received is in line with how prior studies have 
examined government assistance to businesses.  As a second measure, I considered government 
contract spending based on the dollar amount obligated to the firm on a fiscal year-basis, 
according to government contract receipts as tracked by usaspending.gov. Since I am primarily 
interested in how nonmarket actions may be prescriptively gender-stereotyped which in turn 
determines whether these actions are positively evaluated for conforming to gender norms, again 
a market definition of firm performance seem likely to be more appropriate than accounting 
definitions of firm performance in this context (Margolis & Walsh, 2001) as such behaviors are 
ways that can either create or destroy shareholder wealth. For that reason, I similarly use Tobin's 
Q (e.g., Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988) and in line with prior research, I also consider the 
effects on accounting-based performance in terms of return on assets (ROA), an accounting 
measure for profit, as well as return on equity (ROE), again acknowledging that the implication 
of these robustness results may differ from those of market-based performance. 
I control for a variety of individual-, firm-, and industry-level confounding factors. I first 
consider CEO confounding variables that may also affect their propensity to engage in the 
strategic actions like those at the heart of this inquiry. For example, prior studies have shown that 
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the longer the tenure of a CEO or as a CEO ages, the higher the likelihood of psychosocial effects 
associated with executive experience and the ageing process when it comes to decision-making 
(e.g., Serfling, 2014; Simsek, 2007). As such, I control for the age of the CEO (CEO age) as well 
as the number of years in the CEO position (CEO tenure). Research has also shown that when a 
CEO simultaneously serves as the Chair of the board of directors, known as duality, this has 
consequences to firm outcomes and the breadth of CEO discretionary activities (Boyd, 1995). I 
measure CEO duality by dummy coding whether a CEO also serves as a board chair. There is 
also rich empirical evidence that CEO compensation can drive strategic decision-making in ways 
that benefit the CEO as an individual, as noted in the classical agency problem perspective (Fama 
& Jensen, 1983). As such I control for CEO compensation (Carpenter, 2000) in terms of their 
short-term compensation based on salary and bonuses, long-term compensation based on the 
dollar value of restricted stock and stock options, as well as percent of shares owned. 
To account for firm-specific conditions, I control for the availability of slack resources 
since firms with excessive resources may have more discretion to allocate funds to CSR and CPA 
(Arora & Dharwadkar, 2011; Hillman et al., 2004). I measure slack as the ratio of current assets 
to current liabilities. I also control for a firm’s debt-equity ratio. To account for past performance, 
I include a firm’s prior year’s ROA as a control. To account for company size, I took the natural 
logged of the number of employees and included that as a control as well. While lobbying is also 
recognized as a dominant form of CPA, lobbying efforts are implemented via hired lobbyists, as 
opposed to reflective of the CEO’s personal influence and political connectedness (Nownes, 
2006). However, to isolate its effect, I include lobbying expenditure as a control for H4. 
Furthermore, because board structure may affect a board’s ability to exercise control over a 
CEO’s decision-making (Westphal, 1998) and prior studies have found evidence that board’s play 
a role in determining non-market strategies (Mellahi et al., 2016), I control for board 
independence in terms of the ratio of outside directors to the total board members in a given year, 
as well as board diversity, measured as the ratio of female directors to the total board members in 
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a given year, which prior research has established that board diversity plays an influential role in 
CSR strategies (Bear et al., 2010). Last, I account for industry (2-digit SIC code) and year effects, 
to control for possible industry and time differences in my sample. 
3.3. Estimation methods 
Based on the nature of my dependent and independent variable, as well as tests for 
heteroskedasticity, firm-specific heterogeneity, autocorrelation, and contemporaneous correlation, 
I treat my sample as a population-averaged panel-data and fit all hypotheses testing with a 
generalized estimating equation (GEE) approach with robust standard errors (cf. Chatterjee & 
Hambrick, 2007; Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011; Petrenko et al., 2016). While this GEE approach 
is asymptotically equivalent to a weighted-GLS estimator and to a full maximum-likelihood 
estimator, results are robust to these other estimation techniques, as appropriate, while controlling 
for nonindependence of the observations (i.e., gender being invariant over time).  For all 
hypotheses except for H1, I specified a Gaussian distribution with an identity link function, in 
order to produce regression-type models. Because H1 consists of positive count numbers to 
capture counts of responsible and irresponsible activities, I specified a negative binomial 
distribution with a log link function instead for these models. Variables that are interacted (except 
for indicator or binary variables, such as gender) are standardized prior to creating their 
interaction terms (Aiken, West, & Reno, 1991; Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2014) to prevent 
multicollinearity issues. As noted above, I also incorporate one-year lags to establish temporal 
spacing of all dependent, independent and control variables such that dependent variables are 
measured at time t, and independent and control variables are measured at time t-1.  
To note, despite CEO gender being both the antecedent to behaviors in the first set of 
hypotheses, as well as the moderator in the second set of hypotheses, the different theoretical 
frameworks used in my hypothesizing do not imply that these arguments are to be tested 
sequentially in the form of moderated mediation models. Not only would this pose an empirical 
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issue, but as prevalent in the gender role literature, descriptive and prescriptive stereotypes (i.e. 
what women are like, versus what women should be like) are related but distinct stereotypes that 
do not rely on one other to be present (Heilman 2001; Smith et al., 2013). Thus these descriptive 






ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
The following chapter presents the results of statistical analysis used to test the 
hypotheses outline in Chapter II, following the methodology presented in Chapter III.  
4.1. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Tables 1 through 4 depict descriptive statistics and correlations for each hypothesis testing. 
Means and standard deviations are reported as untransformed values. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Please See Tables 1-4 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Tables 5 through 14 present main tests of the hypotheses, as well as robustness tests. The 
coefficient estimates presented are standardized, robust standard errors are reported in the 
parentheses following the estimated coefficients, followed by the p-values in in brackets. 
Significant results at 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 probability levels are highlighted. Result tables also 
report the Wald Chi2 and the change in Wald Chi2 for each model, since control models are 
omitted for parsimony. In the next paragraphs I present the results for each of the hypotheses 
included in this dissertation.  
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4.2. Results for H1 and H2 
  My first set of hypotheses argues that female CEOs will be related to certain CSR 
activities. In particular, the hypotheses were that there will be a positive relationship between 
Female CEO and responsible CSR activities (H1a), a negative relationship between Female CEO 
and irresponsible CSR activities (H1b), and a positive relationship between Female CEO and 
overall CSR ratings (H1c). Results of these tests appear in Table 5. I find a positive and 
significant relationship between female and CSR strengths and the CSR net score (b = 0.20; p = 
0.007 and b = 0.40; p = 0.016, respectively) and a positive but insignificant relationship between 
female and CSR concerns, providing support for H1a and H1c, but not for H1b. That is, the 
findings suggest female CEOs are associated with higher levels of CSR strengths and have more 
positive CSR net scores than their male colleagues, but do not appear to engage in CSR concerns 
in a significantly different fashion than male CEOs. In terms of the practical significance of these 
findings, female CEOs engage in approximately 22% more responsible CSR activities than male 
CEOs and have a higher overall net score by approximately 8%. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Please see Table 5 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
My second set of hypotheses argues that the relationship for female CEOs and CSR 
market reactions are expected to differ from male CEOs in that men may not suffer gender-
related biases as severely as women. Thus H2a states that CEO gender will moderate the 
relationship between responsible CSR activities and market-based performance such that the 
relationship will be more strongly positive for Female CEOs, H2b states CEO gender will 
moderate the relationship between irresponsible CSR activities and market-based performance 
such that the relationship will be more strongly negative for Female CEOs, and H2c states CEO 
gender will moderate the relationship between overall CSR rating and market-based performance 
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such that the relationship will be more strongly positive for Female CEOs. Results of these tests 
appear in Table 6.  
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Please see Table 6 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
For this set of hypotheses, I only find support for H2b – there is a significant, negative 
moderation between female and CSR concerns (ß = -0.09; p = 0.041). To further interpret the 
interaction effects, Figure 5 provides graphical presentations of the marginal effects for 
standardized values of irresponsible CSR activities for both men and women, captured at one 
standard deviation below and above the sample mean. In terms of the practical significance of this 
finding, when female CEOs engage in similarly high counts of irresponsible CSR activities (one 
standard deviation above), male CEOs outperform female CEOs by approximately 5 percent. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Please see Figure 5 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
4.3. Robustness tests for H1 and H2 
Since CEO research is often plagued with endogeneity issues including reverse causality 
or omitted variables, my results may be biased by the fact that female CEOs may be hired 
precisely because they have the characteristics wanted for the firm and thus their levels of CPA 
and CSR are due to their mandate rather than to gender biases or social closure issues. To address 
these issues, I utilized several different methods. I first considered whether female CEOs are 
more likely to be selected for certain strategies or firm conditions or vice versa such that female 
CEOs are more likely to be attracted to work for certain firms (Faccio et al., 2016). To do so, I 
utilized a 2-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) approach to control for potential selection bias of a 
female CEO. The 2SRI estimator is similar to the 2-stage instrumental variable approach except 
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in the second stage regression, the endogenous variables are not replaced by first-stage predictors, 
but instead, the first-stage residuals are included as additional regressors in the main models 
(Terza, 2018). This is an estimation method that has been used in recent strategic management 
empirical research and addresses some of the inconsistencies apparent in IV testing estimations 
(Wiersma & Zhang, 2011; Wowak et al., 2015). In the first step, the probability of a firm having a 
female CEO is initially modelled using a probit regression based on lagged predictors known to 
influence the selection of a female CEO. As expected, strong predictors included variables such 
as board gender diversity and board independence. I then used the residuals from this initial 
model to derive its inverse Mills ratio to control for potential selection bias (Heckman, 1979), 
which is then included as an indicator variable alongside other controls. Tables 7-8 present results 
for H1 and H2 including this additional control. Results continue to be consistent even with the 
inclusion of this endogeneity control variable across all findings.  
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Please see Tables 7-8 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
I also considered the use of a propensity score matched sample to address potential issues 
related to endogeneity, as well as the large disparity in number of male and female CEO firm 
years in my sample (Huang & Kisgen, 2013; Faccio et al., 2016). This methodology allows for 
the identification of a control sample of firms ran by male CEOs that display no observable 
different to firms run by female CEO, creating a matched whereby firms are indistinguishable 
aside from the CEO gender. Using this approach, the probability of having a female CEO by year 
is first modelled using a logit regression based on my list of control variables. Thus for each 
female CEO-year observation, a matched nearest neighbor sample of five male CEO-year 
observations with the lowest difference in propensity scores was created. Results were consistent 
when limiting the sample size to just the matched sample, as well as an examination of the 
average treatment effect t-statistic.  
60 
 
Last, I apply the impact threshold of a confounding variable (ITCV) to assess the degree 
to which confounding factors could indeed overturn estimates for certain strategic actions. ITCV 
captures the degree to which an omitted variable confound “would be great enough to alter an 
inference” (Frank, 2000: 149). Across my findings, results of ITCV suggest that in order to 
invalidate these findings on CSR strength and CSR net score 26.6% and 18.26% of the sample 
would need to be replaced with an effect of 0 to overturn these estimates. Furthermore, an omitted 
variable would have to be jointly correlated with the CSR strengths and CSR net score and CEO 
gender at 0.076 and 0.054 respectively. Given that the omitted variable would have to be more 
strongly correlated to the independent and dependent variable than any control other than board 
gender diversity coupled with the assumption that I have reasonable control variables, leads to the 
conclusion that these results are less likely to be due to omitted variable (e.g., Hubbard, 
Christensen, & Graffin, 2017). 
I also considered several alternative measures for my hypotheses testing. First, an 
alternate measure for CSR strengths and concerns based on the removal of first human rights 
(because concerns as indicated by the ESG ratings have more to do with specific regional labor 
issues that affect only a limited number of industries), as well corporate governance (a factor that 
scholar have argued is more reflective of agency issues rather than corporate responsible) 
(Capelle-Blancard & Petit, 2017), continued to yield consistent results for both H1 and H2. 
Second, I also considered several alternative measures to capture performance effects for H2. 
Winsorizing Tobin’s Q at the 5 percent level to control for extreme values still resulted in the 
consistent results. Furthermore, consistent results were found with the use of ROA and ROE.  
4.4. Results for H3 and H4 
In the examination of CPA as another nonmarket strategy, I argue that female CEOs may 
be both less able and less willing to make political contributions and thus H3 states there will be a 
negative relationship between Female CEOs and political contributions. Results are found in 
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Table 9. Conceptualizing political contributions from both the firm- and individual-levels, I find 
conflicting results – female is positively and significantly related to firm-level contributions (b = 
23.95; p = 0.049), while negatively and significantly related to individual-level contributions (b = 
-2.80; p = 0.041). In terms of the practical significance of these findings, female CEOs tend to 
have firm contributions approximately 45% higher than male CEOs, but individually contribute 
approximately 32% less than male CEOs. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Please see Table 9 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Last, because I argue that contributions by female CEOs may be less effective at eliciting 
firm benefits in return, H4 states CEO gender will moderate the relationship between political 
contributions and beneficial outcomes the CEO’s firm receives such that the expected positive 
relationship will be weaker for Female CEOs. Table 10 presents results for tests of this 
hypothesis.  
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Please see Table 10 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Testing benefits using both subsidy awards and government contracting, support for this 
hypothesis is likewise mixed. Female negatively moderates the positive direct relationship 
between firm- and individual- level contributions and subsidy awards (ß = -1531.35; p = 0.060; ß 
= -8637.41; p = 0.004), but no effect is found for government contracting. To further interpret the 
interaction effects of the significant, Figures 6-7 provides graphical presentations of the marginal 
effects for standardized values of firm and individual contributions for both men and women, 
captured at one standard deviation below and above the sample mean. In terms of the practical 
significance of these findings, relative male CEOs peers receive approximately 33 percent and 
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200 percent as much for subsidy awards at similarly high levels of firm or individual 
contributions respectively (one standard deviation above). 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Please see Figures 6-7 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Last, I also considered Tobin’s Q for my hypotheses testing of H4 to consider the market 
reaction as a separate type of gender bias. I find conflicting results for market-based performance 
in that there is a significant positive interaction between female and firm-level donations on 
Tobin’s Q ((ß = 0.048; p = 0.024), but no significant interaction effect for female and individual-
level contributions. In terms of the practical significance of these findings, relative male CEOs 
peers have approximately 5 percent higher market performance at similarly high levels of firm 
contributions respectively (one standard deviation above). 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Please see Table 11 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Please see Figure 8 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
4.5. Robustness tests for H3 and H4 
 I employed similar methods to account for endogeneity in the testing of H3 and H4 in 
order to account for whether female CEOs are more likely to be selected for certain political 
strategies or firm conditions or vice versa such that female CEOs are more likely to be attracted 
to work for certain firms (Faccio et al., 2016). Tables 12-14 present results with the inclusion of 
the inverse mills ratio to account for selection bias and results were again consistent. I excluded 
the inverse mills ratio as an endogeneity control in the test of the direct effect of CEO gender to 
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individual contributions since individual contributions can be made independent of the CEO’s 
executive role within the firm  (i.e., donors do not have to reveal employer information, etc.) and 
since individual contributions is more of reflection of a CEO’s individual proclivity to engage in 
politics, rather than a reflection of the firm’s political proclivities.  
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Please see Tables 12-14 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Similarly, results remained consistent with the use of a propensity score matched as well. 
While data collection for H3 and H4 are already restricted to firms in industries where female 
CEOs have been present, the matched sample approach again allows for the identification of an 
even more restricted control sample of firms ran by male CEOs that display no observable 
difference to firms run by female CEOs. In sum, multiple tests employed to address the issue of 
endogeneity and there is little evidence that the endogenous matching between firms and CEOs 
explains the hypothesized association between CEO gender and nonmarket strategies and 
performance via CSR and CPA.  
Using ROA and ROE as robustness tests for H4, yielded consistent results with my main 
initial findings, for both firm and individual contributions.  
Instead of considering the dollar amount of subsidies and contracts, I created an alternate 
binary variable to indicate whether a company received any subsidy award or government 
contracting in a given year. I then tested this utilizing a Bernoulli binomial distribution with a 
logit link function. Results indicate that relative to men, women have a higher probability of 
winning subsidy awards and government contracts relative to male CEOs that donate at similar 
levels in terms of both firm and individual contributions. This finding presents an interesting 




4.6. Perceived communal and agentic traits of female CEOs 
Many scholars have called for a finer grained examination of female leaders since not all 
female leaders are homogenous. While my findings thus far do support arguments regarding 
gender stereotypes in part, understanding the heterogeneity among female CEOs may shed further 
light on the effects of perceived feminine and masculine traits. That is, while women are expected 
to be communal according to their descriptive stereotype, not all women fit the stereotype. Others 
argue that women in leadership already defy the stereotype, thus facing a double bind by 
displaying more agentic characteristics (Phelan & Rudman, 2010). Thus, I wanted to further 
examine whether the female CEOs in my sample are affected by their perceived communal and 
traits. 
To do so, official headshots of the female CEOs in the sample were obtained from the 
company website. Of the female CEOs, 174 headshots were verified and available on the 
company website. Each headshot was cropped to only show her face, from the shoulder up. 170 
raters were recruited to rate their perceived communal and agentic traits utilizing Rudman et al’s 
(2012) Proscriptive and Prescriptive Traits Scale. Rudman et al.’s scale is based on Prentice and 
Carranza’s (2002) traits, but revised to include traits often found in backlash research. The final 
scale consists of 16 communal traits that are considered prescriptive for women (i.e., warm, 
friendly, cooperative, etc.) and 13 agentic traits that are considered proscriptive for women (i.e., 
aggressive, arrogant, demanding, etc.). Raters rated on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree) the extent to which they agree each of the characteristics describe the person in 
the picture. As a robustness test, a second follow-up study of 98 different raters was carried out 
with alternate official headshots and there was no significant difference in the use of a different 
official headshots of the same CEO. Both communal and agentic measures displayed high 
reliability (communal; α=.95) and (agentic; α=.96). 
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Testing the interaction of perceived proscription and prescription traits of women in H2 
and H4 yielded the following results, presented in tables 15-16. Accounting for missing variables, 
72 of these female CEOs were used in the tests of H2, and 94 in the tests of H4. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Please see Tables 15-16 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Consistent with my findings, women who are perceived as more communal receive more 
negative market reactions when they engage in irresponsible CSR activities (ß = -0.09; p = 0.037) 
while there was no significant interaction for agentic women when they engage in irresponsible 
CSR activities. Furthermore, there was not a significant interaction for communal women 
receiving more positive market reaction when they engage in responsible CSR activities. Instead 
however, agentic traits weaken the otherwise positive relationship between responsible CSR 
activities and market reaction (ß = -0.022; p = 0.091). In terms of the practical significance of 
these findings, female CEOs perceived to be communal (one standard deviation above) 
experience market performance approximately 27% lower than for the same level of irresponsible 
CSR activities. Subsequently, female CEOs perceived to be agentic (one standard deviation 
above) continue to experience market performance approximately 10% lower, despite having the 
same high level of responsible CSR activities. In sum, these findings imply that female CEOs 
experience lower market performance when a. they engage in irresponsible CSR activities but are 
perceived as communal, and b. they engage in responsible CSR activities but are perceived as 
agentic. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Please see Figures 9-10 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Likewise, for H4, we see in from Tables 17-18 that agency negative moderates the 
relationship between firm and individual donations and subsidy awards (ß = -988.877; p = 0.047; 
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ß = -308.133; p = 0.067), while communality positively moderates the relationship between firm 
donations and government contracts (ß =38261.3; p = 0.064). These relationships are depicted in 
Figures 11-12 for ease of interpretation. In terms of the practical significance, for the same level 
of firm and individual donations, agentic women receive 7% and 45% less in subsidy awards 
respectively. Communal women on the other hand receive approximate 41% more in government 
contracts. In sum, these findings suggest that: a. women who are perceived to be communal 
receive more government-related benefits, and b. women who are perceived to be agentic receive 
fewer government-related benefits.  
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Please see Tables 17-18 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 










As the small but growing number of women in CEO positions continues to spark interest 
in  what happens when women break through the “glass ceiling” to join the executive ranks 
(Ragins, Townsend, & Mattis, 1998; Soares, Combopiano, Regis, Shur, & Wong, 2012), this 
dissertation aims to join the scholarly discussion around the topic and extend understanding on 
how CEO gender affects executive decision-making, as well as how actions that can be gender-
typed can impact the different biases that these female CEOs in particular may face, such as 
negative evaluations or social exclusion from peers.  
I based the theoretical premise of my dissertation on the complementary nature of two 
core theories - upper echelons theory (UET) and gender role theory. Because UET states that 
executive decision-making is in part driven by idiosyncratic differences among executives 
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984), and prior research alludes to gender being a unique demographic 
that warrants further attention, I first argue that gender affects a CEO’s engagement in certain 
strategic behaviors. I examine the gender to decisions relationship based on gender role 
descriptive stereotypes in regard to how women stereotypically have a propensity to engage in 
communal behaviors and men stereotypically have a propensity to engage in agentic behaviors. I 
then turn to the role congruity literature to examine two manifestations of gender bias that female  
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CEOs in particular are likely to face – backlash and social closure. To test these arguments, I 
investigate CEO engagement in two primary types of nonmarket actions, corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) and corporate political activity (CPA), as well as the unique biases the 
female CEOs may face in relation to each, since both CSR and CPA can be descriptively 
classified according to gender stereotypical traits.  
In particular, I argue that because CSR is communal in nature, charitable, and socially 
oriented, the descriptive stereotype of women suggests that female CEOs will engage in more 
responsible CSR activities which are beneficial for society and fewer irresponsible CSR activities 
which pose possible harms. As such, female CEOs will also have a higher overall CSR rating. 
Empirical hypotheses testing of these arguments suggest that while female CEOs may indeed 
engage in more responsible CSR activities and have a higher overall CSR rating, there is no 
significant difference between male and female CEOs in the number of irresponsible activities 
they engage in.  
Such findings support recent scholarly efforts in deconstructing CSR activities into their 
dichotomous responsible and irresponsible aspects (Capelle-Blancard & Petit, 2017). Thus, 
considering the totality of CSR actions, female CEOs are only associated with more responsible 
actions but not less irresponsible activities. One possible reason for this finding, which contrasts 
research about the communal nature of women found at other levels, is the context of the CEO 
position. Specifically, theoretical rationale applicable to women in general may not hold at the 
CEO position (e.g., Hill et al., 2015) due to the unique demands of the position – in this way, 
female CEOs may either feel pressure to engage in actions that are more self- or firm-interested 
rather than more broadly communal in order to “keep up with the boys” so to speak, or perhaps, 
seeing their male colleagues engage in such actions without penalty (Orlitzky et al., 2003), 
consider such actions as part and parcel to leading publicly-traded firms. A similar reason is that 
while the agentic/communal stereotype may be long held, female CEOs who have broken through 
the glass ceiling may not feel the bounds of such biases and thus, not conform to their normative 
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expectations in this way. Ultimately, the finding that male and female CEOs do not differ in 
corporate irresponsible actions opens up avenues for future research aimed at understanding the 
phenomena as well as the boundary conditions of the agency-communal dichotomy. Future 
research may benefit from qualitative or other direct inquiry approaches, offering unique insights 
that are not amenable to the methodological approach I adopt.  
I further argue that because CSR conforms to the prescribed female stereotype, the 
relationship between CSR and market reactions will be more strongly related for female CEOs. 
First, because women are prescriptively expected to behave communally, they will receive more 
positive (or at least less negative) reactions associated with gender-based stereotypes when they 
do so. Echoing earlier research that provides initial evidence that penalization for being in such 
out-of-role positions (i.e., CEO) can be lessened with socially accepted gendered-type leadership 
styles (Eagly et al., 2003), I expected that gender appropriate actions within the scope of a CEO’s 
decision-making should yield similar results. Thus, by conforming to the stereotype of being 
communal and engaging in CSR, female CEOs stand a higher chance of removing or at least 
lessening negatives reactions from those who hold such gender-stereotyped views, and at the 
same time, affirm stereotypical views of how they should act. At the same time, if women engage 
in irresponsible actions, they will violate the stereotype and be punished accordingly. Taken 
together, the relationship between female CEOs’ CSR actions – whether responsible or 
irresponsible - and market-reactions should be stronger than for their male colleagues. Yet the 
empirical testing of these arguments yielded only partial support.  
In my sample, there was no empirical support to suggest that female CEOs who engage in 
more CSR are reacted to more positively relative to their male peers. That is, female CEOs are 
not rewarded for behaving according to prescriptive expectations. However, when women engage 
in irresponsible actions and thus effectively violate their prescriptive stereotype, the market does 
reactive more negatively. Such findings are in line with prior research which indicates that men 
often do not suffer gender-related biases as severely as women (i.e. Smith et al., 2013). In sum, 
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my findings regarding female CEOs and CSR suggest that while female CEOs seem to adhere to 
their descriptive expectations of being more communal in nature, such conformity to stereotypes 
do not provide an added benefit. Indications of violating these communal expectations however, 
can lead to market penalization.   
In regards to another type of nonmarket strategy, I argue that female CEOs are both 
prevented and discouraged from engaging in CPA. In particular, I argue that female CEOs face a 
second type of bias in the form of social closure which creates “glass walls” that hinder them 
from successfully breaking into certain high-profile networks. I test this in the context of the 
male-dominated, “old boys’ club” of politics. This “glass wall” form of social closure prevents 
female CEOs from establishing favorable, external political connections and accessing political-
enhancing resources. As a result, social closure affects female CEOs’ engagement in political 
activity. In particular, I examine a CEO’s engagement in CPA via political donations (e.g., Hart, 
2010; Hillman & Hitt, 1999), which has been one of the most intensely studied forms of corporate 
political activity and refers to donations to politicians’ political campaign coffers that are meant 
to help establish and develop quid pro quo relationships with politicians in exchange for firm and 
personal benefits (e.g., Kroszner & Stratmann, 2000; Milyo, Primo, & Groseclose, 2000; Tahoun, 
2014). Thus, at the heart of the issue, donations are a way of establishing the quid pro quo 
relationships such that in exchange for financial support to assist in gaining political power, 
favors are returned in the form of promising access to information and policies that are beneficial 
to the firm. Given such difficulties in access the political network, female CEOs may less able 
and willing to donate to politicians to than their male colleagues. Examining this using both firm-
level political contributions and CEO individual-level contributions yielded mixed results.  
While female CEOs do indeed engage in less individual-level political contributions, 
results indicate that firms headed by female CEOs actually have higher levels of firm-level 
political contributions. These findings present an interesting contrast and ultimately, as with 
findings about female CEOs not engaging in different levels of corporate irresponsibility than 
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their male colleagues, suggest some interesting sociological conditions of the CEO position. In 
particular, female CEOs may sense their lack of connectivity to the “old boy’s network” that 
dominates politics and feel a stronger need to direct firm-resources to build such connections. At 
the same time, the male-dominated world of politics may see female CEOs as particularly apt 
targets for quid pro quo exchanges (Tahoun, 2014), and solicit contributions; if so, this may drive 
firm-level contributions up. Future research can further examinee the question, and direct 
observations approaches such as surveying female CEOs or engaging in qualitative research may 
be particularly beneficial to gain insights in this area. In particular, the archival approach I adopt 
faces limitations in assessing the potential “communal” nature of firm contributions and whether 
female CEOs support firm-level contributions as a way to gain political favor or fill CEO role 
expectations. Furthermore, personal proclivity to invest personal funds may be a better indication 
of personal political affiliation and orientation, since individual contribution may not be tied to 
the firm. For example, since it is probable and common for CEOs, men and women, to make 
political contributions without acknowledging their executive position within their companies, 
even in my sample there were numerous examples of female CEO’ listing their occupation as 
“housewife” while holding executive office. 
Last, I argue that because these “glass walls” within political networks create both 
unintentional and intentional biases against women, the benefits returned from engaging in 
political activity will likewise be lower for firms with female CEOs. Because female CEOs may 
be excluded from these political circles, the benefits in exchange for donations may be lower for 
female CEOs than for their male colleague. If and when a female CEO chooses to invest in these 
politicians, without personal connections and an established understanding of the quid pro quo 
relationship in exchange for the financial support, political contributions may not be effective for 
female CEOs. My results indicate that female CEOs receive lower subsidy amount awards 
relative to male CEOs for the same level of firm and individual-level contributions, but there is 
no difference when it comes to size of government contracts. However, further robustness tests 
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yield some interesting findings that warrant further attention. In spite of the findings for subsidies 
and lack of findings for government contracts, additional analysis suggests that female CEOs who 
engage in CPA experience higher market performance, and have a higher probability of winning 
subsidy awards and government contracts. Future research should address these in more detail. 
Such results may be supported by neighboring arguments regarding tokenism and benevolent 
sexism in which female targets are more likely to elicit helpful behavior from men (Eagly & 
Crowley, 1986). Furthermore, female CEOs may receive benefits to meet government-related 
quotas (i.e. female or minority-owned programs, etc.), yet the benefits received may be minimal 
(King et al., 2010). 
Robustness tests of the female CEO sample also yielded important directions for future 
research. The coarseness of gender as an executive trait assumes that all female CEOs are 
equivalent and while I did find support that gender-stereotypes do exist at this over-arching level, 
a further examination into our female sample yielded more insight into how perceived gender 
traits affect biases. In regard to CSR, female CEOs who are perceived to be communal do face a 
more severe penalty for engaging in irresponsible activities. Furthermore, while we did not find a 
significant difference between men and women and how the market evaluates their responsible 
activities, agentic women face a market penalty, even when they do engage in responsible CSR 
activities. That is, while responsible CSR is associated with a more positive market response, 
agentic female CEOs still face a discount.  
The findings of this dissertation have important theoretical underpinnings. First, this 
study adds to our understanding of the upper echelon literature and the role of executive gender in 
determining executive nonmarket strategic actions and their outcomes. Unlike other demographic 
variables often studied in upper echelons, gender is a characteristic that not only broadly affects 
behavioral and psychological traits but, inherently is a characteristic largely influenced by social 
norms and expectations. In examining the relationship between CEO gender and nonmarket 
strategies, these findings add to our current knowledge of gender-related executive actions and 
73 
 
outcomes, of which risk-taking has been the most studied (Huang & Kisgen, 2013; Jeong & 
Harrison, 2017; Khan & Vieito, 2013).  
Second, these findings also provide further insight to the gender role literature, especially 
in terms of how conforming or nonconforming gender-typed expectations may respectively 
improve or hurt the firms of female CEOs. My results seem to indicate that while certain action-
performance relationships can strengthen the penalization for female CEO’s being “out of role” 
(i.e., engaging in irresponsible CSR, investing in politics, being perceived as agentic), there is less 
evidence that gender-appropriate actions can lessen the penalization. Furthermore, these findings 
seem to indicate that female CEOs continue to face invisible barriers, especially in regard to 
CPA.  
The findings of this dissertation also have important managerial and practical 
implications. Beyond just the statistics of the executive suite that speak to the invisible barriers 
that female executives face, these findings shed light on the challenges that female CEOs 
continue to face – engaging in either CSR and CPA do not seem to yield the necessary effect that 
result in added firm value. However, when we consider the factor that female CEOs may have a 
higher probability of receiving an award (but the amount will be lower), speaks to some attempts 
to ensure equality or inclusion, yet there is still much research that is needed to understand the 
“blackbox” of gender-related executive action and performance.   
5.2. Limitations and future directions 
Like all studies, this dissertation is not without its limitations. The mixed findings for 
CSR and CPA point to several limitations and opportunities for future studies. First, in regard to 
CSR, scholars suggest that the composite score nature of the ESG database may not be an 
accurate reflection of CSR activities for several reasons (Capelle-Blancard & Petit, 2017). First, 
ESG considers all CSR factors to be equally weighted, when in reality not all issues equally affect 
all firms. Second, recent evidence also suggests that firms exposed to CSR criticism are 
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especially exposed in one single dimension (Capelle-Blancard & Petit, 2017), again challenging 
the notion that all factors are equally weighted in the minds of stakeholders. Future research could 
consider providing a more nuanced examination of these factors and the multi-dimensional nature 
of CSR and whether female CEOs are more likely to engage in certain types of CSR activities, 
beyond just activities that are considered responsible in nature. 
Regarding CPA, political contributions and government related benefits to firms continue 
to be a widely-debated topic, with scholars still trying to uncover how firms benefit from different 
types of political activities. As such, the archival approach of considering donation dollar amount 
may only be one aspect of CPA. Future direction could instead examine CEO political 
connectedness in other ways such as examining a female CEO’s ability to develop explicit 
relationships with politicians. (e.g., appointing politicians as a member of the firm’s board of 
directors). An interesting examination would be whether female CEOs are more likely to 
establish political connections with other female politicians and whether such connections yield 
the same level of benefits, considering how female politicians may face similar effects of social 
closure from their male peers. The findings regarding the probability of receiving government-
assistance should also be considered in more detail. Considering the government has contract 
programs targeted toward female and minority business owners, future studies can examine the 
extent to which these programs are beneficial to female and minority business owners and 
executives. 
Last, CSR and CPA continue to be two of the most heavily researched nonmarket 
strategy, yet rarely are they studied in conjunction (Den Hond et al., 2014). While this 
dissertation begins to uncover the role of executive gender in these strategies, much of the work 
developed here deals with the gender-typing of CSR and CPA and arguably presents each 
nonmarket strategy as independent of one another. Future research should consider the crucial 
interplay CSR and CPA may have with one another in developing overall nonmarket strategies 







Aguilera, R. V., Rupp, D. E., Williams, C. A., & Ganapathi, J. 2007. Putting the S back in 
corporate social responsibility: a multilevel theory of social change in organizations. 
Academy of Management Review, 32(3): 836-863. 
Aguinis, H., & Glavas, A. 2012. What we know and don’t know about corporate social 
responsibility: A review and research agenda. Journal of Management, 38(4): 932-968. 
Aiken, L. S., West, S. G., & Reno, R. R. 1991. Multiple regression: Testing and interpreting 
interactions: Sage. 
Ansolabehere, S., Snyder Jr, J. M., & Ueda, M. 2004. Did firms profit from soft money? Election 
Law Journal, 3(2): 193-198. 
Arlen, J., & Weiss, D. M. 1995. A political theory of corporate taxation. The Yale Law Journal, 
105(2): 325-391. 
Arora, P., & Dharwadkar, R. 2011. Corporate governance and corporate social responsibility 
(CSR): The moderating roles of attainment discrepancy and organization slack. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 19(2), 136-152. 
Auster, E. R. 1992. Demystifying the glass ceiling: Organizational and interpersonal dynamics 
of gender bias: York University, Faculty of Administrative Studies. 
Barber, B. M., & Odean, T. 2001. Boys will be boys: Gender, overconfidence, and common stock 
investment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(1): 261-292. 
Barnea, A., & Rubin, A. 2010. Corporate social responsibility as a conflict between shareholders. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 97(1): 71-86. 
Baron, D. P. 1995. Integrated strategy: Market and nonmarket components. California 
Management Review, 37(2): 47-65. 
Bass, B. M., & Avolio, B. J. 1994. Shatter the glass ceiling: Women may make better managers. 
Human Resource Management, 33(4): 549-560. 
Baxter, S., & Lansing, M. 1983. Women and politics: The visible majority: University of 
Michigan Press. 
Baysinger, B. D. 1984. Domain maintenance as an objective of business political activity: An 
expanded typology. Academy of Management Review, 9(2): 248-258. 
Bear, S., Rahman, N., & Post, C. 2010. The impact of board diversity and gender composition on 
corporate social responsibility and firm reputation. Journal of Business Ethics, 97(2): 
207-221. 
Belkaoui, A. 1976. The impact of the disclosure of the environmental effects of organizational 
behavior on the market. Financial Management: 26-31. 
Bernardi, R. A., Bosco, S. M., & Columb, V. L. 2009. Does female representation on boards of 




Bertrand, M., & Hallock, K. F. 2001. The gender gap in top corporate jobs. ILR Review, 55(1): 3-
21. 
Bertrand, M., & Schoar, A. 2003. Managing with style: The effect of managers on firm policies. 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(4): 1169-1208. 
Bigley, G. A., & Wiersema, M. F. 2002. New CEOs and corporate strategic refocusing: How 
experience as heir apparent influences the use of power. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 47(4): 707-727. 
Blake, M. 2014. The right to exclude. Critical Review of International Social and Political 
Philosophy, 17(5): 521-537. 
Blumentritt, T. P. 2003. Foreign subsidiaries' government affairs activities: The influence of 
managers and resources. Business & Society, 42(2): 202-233. 
Boddewyn, J. J., & Brewer, T. L. 1994. International-business political behavior: New theoretical 
directions. Academy of Management Review, 19(1): 119-143. 
Boden Jr, R. J., & Nucci, A. R. 2000. On the survival prospects of men's and women's new 
business ventures. Journal of Business Venturing, 15(4): 347-362. 
Bolzendahl, C., & Brooks, C. 2007. Women's political representation and welfare state spending 
in 12 capitalist democracies. Social Forces, 85(4): 1509-1534. 
Boulouta, I. 2013. Hidden connections: The link between board gender diversity and corporate 
social performance. Journal of Business Ethics, 113(2): 185-197. 
Boyd, B. K. 1995. CEO duality and firm performance: A contingency model. Strategic 
Management Journal, 16(4): 301-312. 
Brands, R. A., & Fernandez-Mateo, I. 2017. Leaning out: How negative recruitment experiences 
shape women’s decisions to compete for executive roles. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 62(3): 405-442. 
Broverman, I. K., Vogel, S. R., Broverman, D. M., Clarkson, F. E., & Rosenkrantz, P. S. 1972. 
Sex-Role Stereotypes: A Current Appraisal1. Journal of Social Issues, 28(2): 59-78. 
Burns, N. 2007. Gender in the aggregate, gender in the individual, gender and political action. 
Politics & Gender, 3(1): 104-124. 
Campbell, D. E., & Wolbrecht, C. 2006. See Jane run: Women politicians as role models for 
adolescents. The Journal of Politics, 68(2): 233-247. 
Capelle-Blancard, G., & Petit, A. 2017. The weighting of CSR dimensions: One size does not fit 
all. Business & Society, 56(6), 919-943. 
Carpenter, M. A., & Sanders, W. G. 2002. Top management team compensation: The missing 
link between CEO pay and firm performance? Strategic Management Journal, 23(4): 
367-375. 
Carpini, M. X. D., & Keeter, S. 1996. What Americans know about politics and why it matters: 
Yale University Press. 
Chatterjee, A., & Hambrick, D. C. 2007. It's all about me: Narcissistic chief executive officers 
and their effects on company strategy and performance. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 52(3): 351-386. 
Chatterjee, A., & Hambrick, D. C. 2011. Executive Personality, Capability Cues, and Risk 
Taking: How Narcissistic CEOs React to Their Successes and Stumbles. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 56(2): 202-237. 
Chin, M., Hambrick, D. C., & Treviño, L. K. 2013. Political ideologies of CEOs: The influence 
of executives’ values on corporate social responsibility. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 58(2): 197-232. 
Coates IV, J. C. 2012. Corporate Politics, Governance, and Value Before and After C itizens U 
nited. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 9(4): 657-696. 
Coates, J. M., & Herbert, J. 2008. Endogenous steroids and financial risk taking on a London 
trading floor. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 105(16): 6167-6172. 
77 
 
Cohen, P., West, S. G., & Aiken, L. S. 2014. Applied multiple regression/correlation analysis 
for the behavioral sciences: Psychology Press. 
Collier, J. F. 1974. Women in politics. Woman, Culture, and Society, 133: 89. 
Collins‐Dodd, C., Gordon, I. M., & Smart, C. 2004. Further evidence on the role of gender in 
financial performance. Journal of Small Business Management, 42(4): 395-417. 
Collins, C. J., & Clark, K. D. 2003. Strategic human resource practices, top management team 
social networks, and firm performance: The role of human resource practices in creating 
organizational competitive advantage. Academy of Management Journal, 46(6): 740-
751. 
Crossland, C., & Chen, G. 2013. Executive accountability around the world: Sources of cross-
national variation in firm performance–CEO dismissal sensitivity. Strategic 
Organization, 11(1): 78-109. 
Crossland, C., & Hambrick, D. C. 2007. How national systems differ in their constraints on 
corporate executives: A study of CEO effects in three countries. Strategic Management 
Journal, 28(8): 767-789. 
Crossland, C., & Hambrick, D. C. 2011. Differences in managerial discretion across countries: 
how nation‐level institutions affect the degree to which CEOs matter. Strategic 
Management Journal, 32(8): 797-819. 
Cyert, R. M., & March, J. G. 1963. A behavioral theory of the firm. Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 2. 
Dahlmann, F., & Brammer, S. 2011. Exploring and explaining patterns of adaptation and 
selection in corporate environmental strategy in the USA. Organization Studies, 32(4): 
527-553. 
Davis, K. 1973. The case for and against business assumption of social responsibilities. Academy 
of Management journal, 16(2): 312-322. 
Davis, P. S., Babakus, E., Englis, P. D., & Pett, T. 2010. The influence of CEO gender on market 
orientation and performance in service small and medium‐sized service businesses. 
Journal of Small Business Management, 48(4): 475-496. 
Davison, H. K., & Burke, M. J. 2000. Sex discrimination in simulated employment contexts: A 
meta-analytic investigation. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 56(2): 225-248. 
Deaux, K., & Farris, E. 1977. Attributing causes for one's own performance: The effects of sex, 
norms, and outcome. Journal of research in Personality, 11(1): 59-72. 
Den Hond, F., Rehbein, K. A., de Bakker, F. G., & Lankveld, H. K. v. 2014. Playing on two 
chessboards: Reputation effects between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and 
corporate political activity (CPA). Journal of Management Studies, 51(5): 790-813. 
Dennis, M. R., & Kunkel, A. D. 2004. Perceptions of men, women, and CEOs: The effects of 
gender identity. Social Behavior and Personality: an international journal, 32(2): 155-
171. 
Dezsö, C. L., & Ross, D. G. 2012. Does female representation in top management improve firm 
performance? A panel data investigation. Strategic Management Journal, 33(9): 1072-
1089. 
Diekman, A. B., Brown, E. R., Johnston, A. M., & Clark, E. K. 2010. Seeking congruity between 
goals and roles: A new look at why women opt out of science, technology, engineering, 
and mathematics careers. Psychological Science, 21(8): 1051-1057. 
Diekman, A. B., & Eagly, A. H. 2000. Stereotypes as dynamic constructs: Women and men of the 
past, present, and future. Personality and social psychology bulletin, 26(10): 1171-1188. 
Doh, J. P., Lawton, T. C., & Rajwani, T. 2012. Advancing nonmarket strategy research: 
Institutional perspectives in a changing world. Academy of Management Perspectives, 
26(3): 22-39. 
Dolan, K. 1997. Gender differences in support for women candidates: Is there a glass ceiling in 
American politics? Women & Politics, 17(2): 27-41. 
78 
 
Dolan, K. 2014. Gender stereotypes, candidate evaluations, and voting for women candidates: 
what really matters? Political Research Quarterly, 67(1): 96-107. 
Donaldson, L. 1990. The ethereal hand: Organizational economics and management theory. 
Academy of Management Review, 15(3): 369-381. 
Drope, J. M., & Hansen, W. L. 2004. Purchasing protection? The effect of political spending on 
US trade policy. Political Research Quarterly, 57(1): 27-37. 
Eagly, A. H. 1997. Sex differences in social behavior: Comparing social role theory and 
evolutionary psychology. American Psychologist, 52(12): 1380-1383. 
Eagly, A. H., & Carli, L. L. 2003. The female leadership advantage: An evaluation of the 
evidence. The Leadership Quarterly, 14(6): 807-834. 
Eagly, A. H., Johannesen-Schmidt, M. C., & Van Engen, M. L. 2003. Transformational, 
transactional, and laissez-faire leadership styles: A meta-analysis comparing women and 
men. Psychological Bulletin, 129(4): 569. 
Eagly, A. H., & Johnson, B. T. 1990. Gender and leadership style: A meta-analysis. 
Psychological Bulletin, 108(2): 233. 
Eagly, A. H., & Karau, S. J. 1991. Gender and the emergence of leaders: A meta-analysis. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60(5): 685. 
Eagly, A. H., & Karau, S. J. 2002. Role congruity theory of prejudice toward female leaders. 
Psychological Review, 109(3): 573. 
Eagly, A. H., Karau, S. J., & Makhijani, M. G. 1995. Gender and the effectiveness of leaders: A 
meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 117(1): 125. 
Eagly, A. H., Makhijani, M. G., & Klonsky, B. G. 1992. Gender and the evaluation of leaders: A 
meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 111(1): 3. 
Ely, R. J., & Meyerson, D. E. 2000. Advancing gender equity in organizations: The challenge and 
importance of maintaining a gender narrative. Organization, 7(4): 589-608. 
Faccio, M., Marchica, M.-T., & Mura, R. 2016. CEO gender, corporate risk-taking, and the 
efficiency of capital allocation. Journal of Corporate Finance, 39: 193-209. 
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. 1983. Separation of ownership and control. The Journal of Law 
and Economics, 26(2): 301-325. 
Finkelstein, S., Hambrick, D. C., & Cannella, A. A. 2009. Strategic leadership: Theory and 
research on executives, top management teams, and boards: Strategic Management 
(Oxford U). 
Freedman, M., & Stagliano, A. 1991. Differences in social-cost disclosures: A market test of 
investor reactions. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 4(1). 
Friedman, M. 1962. Capitalism and freedom: With the assistance of Rose D. Friedman: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Frynas, J. G., Mellahi, K., & Pigman, G. A. 2006. First mover advantages in international 
business and firm‐specific political resources. Strategic Management Journal, 27(4): 
321-345. 
Gallego, A. 2007. Unequal political participation in Europe. International Journal of Sociology, 
37(4): 10-25. 
Gayle, G.-L., Golan, L., & Miller, R. A. 2012. Gender differences in executive compensation and 
job mobility. Journal of Labor Economics, 30(4): 829-872. 
Geletkanycz, M. A., & Hambrick, D. C. 1997. The external ties of top executives: Implications 
for strategic choice and performance. Administrative Science Quarterly: 654-681. 
Glick, P., & Fiske, S. T. 1996. The ambivalent sexism inventory: Differentiating hostile and 
benevolent sexism. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70(3): 491. 
Godfrey, P. C. 2005. The relationship between corporate philanthropy and shareholder wealth: a 
risk management perspective. Academy of Management Review, 30(4): 777-798. 
79 
 
Goll, I., & Rasheed, A. A. 2004. The moderating effect of environmental munificence and 
dynamism on the relationship between discretionary social responsibility and firm 
performance. Journal of Business Ethics, 49(1): 41-54. 
Gordon, J. N. 2006. The rise of independent directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of 
shareholder value and stock market prices. Stan. L. Rev., 59: 1465. 
Gordon, S. C., Hafer, C., & Landa, D. 2007. Consumption or investment? On motivations for 
political giving. The Journal of Politics, 69(4): 1057-1072. 
Granovetter, M. (1983). The strength of weak ties: A network theory revisited. Sociological 
Theory, 201-233. 
Greenhaus, J. H., & Parasuraman, S. 1993. Job performance attributions and career advancement 
prospects: An examination of gender and race effects. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes, 55(2): 273-297. 
Griffin, J. J., & Dunn, P. 2004. Corporate public affairs: Commitment, resources, and structure. 
Business & Society, 43(2): 196-220. 
Gupta, S., & Swenson, C. W. 2003. Rent seeking by agents of the firm. The Journal of Law and 
Economics, 46(1): 253-268. 
Gutek, B. A., & Morasch, B. 1982. Sex‐ratios, sex‐role spillover, and sexual harassment of 
women at work. Journal of Social Issues, 38(4): 55-74. 
Hadani, M., Dahan, N. M., & Doh, J. P. 2015. The CEO as chief political officer: managerial 
discretion and corporate political activity. Journal of Business Research, 68(11): 2330-
2337. 
Hadani, M., & Schuler, D. A. 2013. In search of El Dorado: The elusive financial returns on 
corporate political investments. Strategic Management Journal, 34(2): 165-181. 
Haley, U. C., & Schuler, D. A. 2011. Government policy and firm strategy in the solar 
photovoltaic industry. California Management Review, 54(1): 17-38. 
Hall, J. A., & Carter, J. D. 1999. Gender-stereotype accuracy as an individual difference. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 77(2): 350. 
Hambrick, D. C. 2007. Upper echelons theory: An update: Academy of Management Review, 
32(2): 334-343. 
Hambrick, D. C., & Mason, P. A. 1984. Upper Echelons: The Organization as a Reflection of Its 
Top Managers. The Academy of Management Review, 9(2): 193-206. 
Hart, D. M. 2001. Why do some firms give? Why do some give a lot?: High‐tech PACs, 1977–
1996. Journal of Politics, 63(4): 1230-1249. 
Hart, D. M. 2004. " Business" Is Not an Interest Group: On the Study of Companies in American 
National Politics. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci., 7: 47-69. 
Hayes, D., & Lawless, J. L. 2015. A non-gendered lens? Media, voters, and female candidates in 
contemporary congressional elections. Perspectives on Politics, 13(1): 95-118. 
Heilman, M. E. 1997. Sex discrimination and the affirmative action remedy: The role of sex 
stereotypes, Women in Corporate Management: 5-17: Springer. 
Heilman, M. E. 2001. Description and prescription: How gender stereotypes prevent women's 
ascent up the organizational ladder. Journal of Social Issues, 57(4): 657-674. 
Heilman, M. E., Block, C. J., & Martell, R. F. 1995. Sex stereotypes: Do they influence 
perceptions of managers? Journal of Social behavior and Personality, 10(4): 237. 
Heilman, M. E., & Chen, J. J. 2005. Same behavior, different consequences: reactions to men's 
and women's altruistic citizenship behavior. Journal of Applied Psychology, 90(3): 431. 
Heilman, M. E., & Okimoto, T. G. 2007. Why are women penalized for success at male tasks?: 
the implied communality deficit. Journal of Applied Psychology, 92(1): 81. 
Helgesen, S. 1990. Women’s way of leading. The Female Advantage: Women's Ways of 
Leadership: 5-40. 
Hennessey, K. 2015. Republicans reject donations from white supremacist linked to Charleston 
shootings. Los Angeles Times. 
80 
 
Hentschel, T., Braun, S., Peus, C., & Frey, D. (2018). The communality-bonus effect for male 
transformational leaders–leadership style, gender, and promotability. European Journal 
of Work and Organizational Psychology, 27(1), 112-125. 
Hersch, P., Netter, J. M., & Pope, C. 2008. Do campaign contributions and lobbying expenditures 
by firms create “political” capital? Atlantic Economic Journal, 36(4): 395-405. 
Hill, A. D., Upadhyay, A. D., & Beekun, R. I. 2015. Do female and ethnically diverse executives 
endure inequity in the CEO position or do they benefit from their minority status? An 
empirical examination. Strategic Management Journal, 36(8): 1115-1134. 
Hillman, A. J., & Hitt, M. A. 1999. Corporate political strategy formulation: A model of 
approach, participation, and strategy decisions. Academy of Management Review, 24(4): 
825-842. 
Hillman, A. J., & Keim, G. D. 2001. Shareholder value, stakeholder management, and social 
issues: what's the bottom line? Strategic management journal, 22(2): 125-139. 
Hillman, A. J., Keim, G. D., & Schuler, D. 2004. Corporate political activity: A review and 
research agenda. Journal of Management, 30(6): 837-857. 
Hoffman, L. R., & Maier, N. R. 1961. Sex differences, sex composition, and group problem 
solving. The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 63(2): 453. 
Hofstede, G. 2003. Culture's consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, institutions and 
organizations across nations: Sage publications. 
Holman, M. R., Merolla, J. L., & Zechmeister, E. J. 2011. Sex, stereotypes, and security: A study 
of the effects of terrorist threat on assessments of female leadership. Journal of Women, 
Politics & Policy, 32(3): 173-192. 
Huang, J., & Kisgen, D. J. 2013. Gender and corporate finance: Are male executives 
overconfident relative to female executives? Journal of Financial Economics, 108(3): 
822-839. 
Huddy, L., & Terkildsen, N. 1993. Gender stereotypes and the perception of male and female 
candidates. American journal of political science: 119-147. 
Hull, C. E., & Rothenberg, S. 2008. Firm performance: The interactions of corporate social 
performance with innovation and industry differentiation. Strategic management 
journal, 29(7): 781-789. 
Ibarra, H. 1993. PERSONAL NETWORKS OF WOMEN AND MINORITIES IN 
MANAGEMENT - A CONCEPTUAL-FRAMEWORK. Academy of Management 
Review, 18(1): 56-87. 
Ibarra, H., Carter, N. M., & Silva, C. 2010. Why men still get more promotions than women. 
Harvard Business Review, 88(9): 80-85. 
Ibrahim, N., Angelidis, J., & Tomic, I. M. 2009. Managers’ attitudes toward codes of ethics: are 
there gender differences? Journal of Business Ethics, 90(3): 343-353. 
Jamieson, K. H. 1995. Beyond the double bind: Women and leadership: Oxford University Press 
on Demand. 
Jensen, M., & Zajac, E. J. 2004. Corporate elites and corporate strategy: How demographic 
preferences and structural position shape the scope of the firm. Strategic Management 
Journal, 25(6): 507-524. 
Jeong, S.-H., & Harrison, D. A. 2017. Glass breaking, strategy making, and value creating: Meta-
analytic outcomes of women as CEOs and TMT members. Academy of Management 
Journal, 60(4): 1219-1252. 
Kacperczyk, A. 2009. With greater power comes greater responsibility? Takeover protection and 
corporate attention to stakeholders. Strategic Management Journal, 30(3): 261-285. 
Kanter, R. M. 1977. Some effects of proportions on group life: Skewed sex ratios and responses 
to token women. American journal of Sociology, 82(5): 965-990. 
81 
 
King, E. B., Hebl, M. R., George, J. M., & Matusik, S. F. (2010). Understanding tokenism: 
Antecedents and consequences of a psychological climate of gender inequity. Journal of 
Management, 36(2), 482-510. 
Koenig, A. M., Eagly, A. H., Mitchell, A. A., & Ristikari, T. 2011. Are leader stereotypes 
masculine? A meta-analysis of three research paradigms. Psychological Bulletin, 137(4): 
616. 
Kray, L. J., Thompson, L., & Lind, E. A. 2005. It’sa bet! A problem-solving approach promotes 
the construction of contingent agreements. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 
31(8): 1039-1051. 
Krook, M. L. 2010. Quotas for women in politics: Gender and candidate selection reform 
worldwide: Oxford University Press. 
Kroszner, R. S., & Stratmann, T. 2000. Does political ambiguity pay? Corporate campaign 
contributions and the rewards to legislator reputation. National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
Lawless, J. L., & Fox, R. L. 2005. It takes a candidate: Why women don't run for office. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Lee, P. M., & James, E. H. 2007. She'‐e‐os: gender effects and investor reactions to the 
announcements of top executive appointments. Strategic Management Journal, 28(3): 
227-241. 
Lerer, L. 2018. Democratic candidates begin to steer away from corporate donors. The Christian 
Science Monitor. 
Leslie, L. M., Manchester, C. F., & Dahm, P. C. 2017. Why and when does the gender gap 
reverse? Diversity goals and the pay premium for high potential women. Academy of 
Management Journal, 60(2): 402-432. 
Lin, C. P. 2006. Gender differs: Modelling knowledge sharing from a perspective of social 
network ties. Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 9(3): 236-241. 
Lipman-Blumen, J. 1976. Toward a homosocial theory of sex roles: An explanation of the sex 
segregation of social institutions. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 1(3, 
Part 2): 15-31. 
Lovenduski, J. 2005. Feminizing politics: Polity. 
Lowe, K. B., Kroeck, K. G., & Sivasubramaniam, N. 1996. Effectiveness correlates of 
transformational and transactional leadership: A meta-analytic review of the MLQ 
literature. The Leadership Quarterly, 7(3): 385-425. 
Lundeberg, M. A., Fox, P. W., & Punćcohaŕ, J. 1994. Highly confident but wrong: Gender 
differences and similarities in confidence judgments. Journal of Educational 
Psychology, 86(1): 114. 
Luo, X., & Bhattacharya, C. B. 2006. Corporate social responsibility, customer satisfaction, and 
market value. Journal of Marketing, 70(4): 1-18. 
Lux, S., Crook, T. R., & Woehr, D. J. 2011. Mixing business with politics: A meta-analysis of the 
antecedents and outcomes of corporate political activity. Journal of Management, 37(1): 
223-247. 
Mackey, A. 2008. The effect of CEOs on firm performance. Strategic management journal, 
29(12): 1357-1367. 
Mackey, A., Mackey, T. B., & Barney, J. B. 2007. Corporate social responsibility and firm 
performance: investor preferences and corporate strategies. Academy of Management 
Review, 32(3): 817-835. 
Madsen, P. M., & Rodgers, Z. J. 2015. Looking good by doing good: The antecedents and 
consequences of stakeholder attention to corporate disaster relief. Strategic Management 
Journal, 36(5): 776-794. 
Malmendier, U., & Tate, G. 2005. CEO overconfidence and corporate investment. The Journal 
of Finance, 60(6): 2661-2700. 
82 
 
Margolis, J. D., & Walsh, J. P. 2001. People and profits?: The search for a link between a 
company's social and financial performance: Psychology Press. 
Margolis, J. D., & Walsh, J. P. 2003. Misery loves companies: Rethinking social initiatives by 
business. Administrative Science Quarterly, 48(2): 268-305. 
Mattingly, J. E., & Berman, S. L. 2006. Measurement of corporate social action: Discovering 
taxonomy in the Kinder Lydenburg Domini ratings data. Business & Society, 45(1): 20-
46. 
McGahan, A. M., & Porter, M. E. 1997. How much does industry matter, really? Strategic 
Management Journal, 18(S1): 15-30. 
McNamara, G., Aime, F., & Vaaler, P. M. 2005. Is performance driven by industry‐or firm‐
specific factors? A response to Hawawini, Subramanian, and Verdin. Strategic 
Management Journal, 26(11): 1075-1081. 
McWilliams, A., & Siegel, D. 2000. Corporate social responsibility and financial performance: 
correlation or misspecification? Strategic Management Journal, 21(5): 603-609. 
McWilliams, A., & Siegel, D. 2001. Corporate social responsibility: A theory of the firm 
perspective. Academy of Management Review, 26(1): 117-127. 
McWilliams, A., & Siegel, D. S. 2011. Creating and capturing value: Strategic corporate social 
responsibility, resource-based theory, and sustainable competitive advantage. Journal of 
Management, 37(5): 1480-1495. 
McWilliams, A., Van Fleet, D. D., & Cory, K. D. 2002. Raising rivals’ costs through political 
strategy: An extension of resource‐based theory. Journal of Management Studies, 
39(5): 707-724. 
Meier-Pesti, K., & Goetze, E. 2005. Masculinity and femininity as predictors of financial risk-
taking: Evidence from a priming study on gender salience. ACR European Advances. 
Mellahi, K., Frynas, J. G., Sun, P., & Siegel, D. 2016. A review of the nonmarket strategy 
literature: Toward a multi-theoretical integration. Journal of Management, 42(1): 143-
173. 
Milyo, J., Primo, D., & Groseclose, T. 2000. Corporate PAC campaign contributions in 
perspective. Business and Politics, 2(1): 75-88. 
Miner, J. B. 1978. Twenty years of research on role‐motivation theory of managerial 
effectiveness. Personnel Psychology, 31(4): 739-760. 
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. 1988. Management ownership and market valuation: 
An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 20: 293-315. 
Nownes, A. J. 2006. Total lobbying: What lobbyists want (and how they try to get it): 
Cambridge University Press. 
Oh, W.-Y., Li, Z., & Park, S. 2016. The effects of CEO characteristics and incentives on 
corporate social responsibility, Corporate Responsibility: 162-182: Springer. 
Oliver, A. G., Krause, R., Busenbark, J. R., & Kalm, M. 2018. BS in the boardroom: Benevolent 
sexism and board chair orientations. Strategic Management Journal, 39(1): 113-130. 
Oliver, C., & Holzinger, I. 2008. The effectiveness of strategic political management: A dynamic 
capabilities framework. Academy of Management Review, 33(2): 496-520. 
Ozer, M. 2010. Top management teams and corporate political activity: Do top management 
teams have influence on corporate political activity? Journal of Business Research, 
63(11): 1196-1201. 
Palmer, B., & Simon, D. 2003. Political ambition and women in the US House of 
Representatives, 1916-2000. Political Research Quarterly, 56(2): 127-138. 
Park, S. H., & Westphal, J. D. 2013. Social discrimination in the corporate elite: How status 
affects the propensity for minority CEOs to receive blame for low firm performance. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 58(4): 542-586. 




Percheski, C. 2008. Opting out? Cohort differences in professional women's employment rates 
from 1960 to 2005. American sociological review, 73(3): 497-517. 
Peterson, R. S., Smith, D. B., Martorana, P. V., & Owens, P. D. 2003. The impact of chief 
executive officer personality on top management team dynamics: One mechanism by 
which leadership affects organizational performance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 
88(5): 795-808. 
Petrenko, O. V., Aime, F., Ridge, J., & Hill, A. 2016. Corporate social responsibility or CEO 
narcissism? CSR motivations and organizational performance. Strategic Management 
Journal, 37(2): 262-279. 
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. 1978. The external control of organizations: A resource 
dependence approach. NY: Harper and Row Publishers. 
Phillips, A. 1998. Feminism and politics: Oxford University Press on Demand. 
Powell, G. N., & Butterfield, D. A. 1994. Investigating the “glass ceiling” phenomenon: An 
empirical study of actual promotions to top management. Academy of Management 
Journal, 37(1): 68-86. 
Powell, G. N., Butterfield, D. A., & Parent, J. D. 2002. Gender and managerial stereotypes: have 
the times changed? Journal of Management, 28(2): 177-193. 
Prentice, D. A., & Carranza, E. 2002. What women and men should be, shouldn't be, are allowed 
to be, and don't have to be: The contents of prescriptive gender stereotypes. Psychology 
of Women Quarterly, 26(4): 269-281. 
Priem, R. L., Lyon, D. W., & Dess, G. G. 1999. Inherent limitations of demographic proxies in 
top management team heterogeneity research. Journal of Management, 25(6): 935-953. 
Quigley, T. J., & Hambrick, D. C. 2015. Has the “CEO effect” increased in recent decades? A 
new explanation for the great rise in America's attention to corporate leaders. Strategic 
Management Journal, 36(6): 821-830. 
Ragins, B. R., & Sundstrom, E. 1989. Gender and power in organizations: A longitudinal 
perspective. Psychological Bulletin, 105(1): 51. 
Ragins, B. R., Townsend, B., & Mattis, M. 1998. Gender gap in the executive suite: CEOs and 
female executives report on breaking the glass ceiling. Academy of Management 
Perspectives, 12(1): 28-42. 
Reich, R. B. 2010. Aftershock: The next economy and America's future: Vintage. 
Richter, B. K., Samphantharak, K., & Timmons, J. F. 2009. Lobbying and taxes. American 
Journal of Political Science, 53(4): 893-909. 
Ridge, J. W., Ingram, A., & Hill, A. D. 2017. Beyond lobbying expenditures: How lobbying 
breadth and political connectedness affect firm outcomes. Academy of Management 
Journal, 60(3): 1138-1163. 
Ridgeway, C. L. 1997. Interaction and the conservation of gender inequality: Considering 
employment. American Sociological Review: 218-235. 
Rosenwasser, S. M., & Dean, N. G. 1989. Gender role and political office: Effects of perceived 
masculinity/femininity of candidate and political office. Psychology of Women 
Quarterly, 13(1): 77-85. 
Rosette, A. S., & Tost, L. P. 2010. Agentic women and communal leadership: How role 
prescriptions confer advantage to top women leaders. Journal of Applied Psychology, 
95(2): 221. 
Rudman, L. A., & Mescher, K. 2013. Penalizing men who request a family leave: Is flexibility 
stigma a femininity stigma? Journal of Social Issues, 69(2): 322-340. 
Rudman, L. A., Moss-Racusin, C. A., Phelan, J. E., & Nauts, S. 2012. Status incongruity and 
backlash effects: Defending the gender hierarchy motivates prejudice against female 
leaders. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 48(1): 165-179. 
84 
 
Salamon, L. M., & Siegfried, J. J. 1977. Economic power and political influence: The impact of 
industry structure on public policy. American Political Science Review, 71(3): 1026-
1043. 
Schein, V. E. 1973. The relationship between sex role stereotypes and requisite management 
characteristics. Journal of Applied Psychology, 57(2): 95. 
Schlozman, K. L., Burns, N., & Verba, S. 1999. " What Happened at Work Today?": A 
Multistage Model of Gender, Employment, and Political Participation. The Journal of 
Politics, 61(1): 29-53. 
Serfling, M. A. 2014. CEO age and the riskiness of corporate policies. Journal of Corporate 
Finance, 25: 251-273. 
Shane, P. B., & Spicer, B. H. 1983. Market response to environmental information produced 
outside the firm. Accounting Review: 521-538. 
Siciliano, J. I. 1996. The relationship of board member diversity to organizational performance. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 15(12): 1313-1320. 
Simsek, Z. 2007. CEO tenure and organizational performance: An intervening model. Strategic 
Management Journal, 28(6): 653-662. 
Smith, A. N., Watkins, M. B., Burke, M. J., Christian, M. S., Smith, C. E., Hall, A., & Simms, S. 
2013. Gendered Influence: A Gender Role Perspective on the Use and Effectiveness of 
Influence Tactics. Journal of Management, 39(5): 1156-1183. 
Soares, R., Combopiano, J., Regis, A., Shur, Y., & Wong, R. 2012. 2011 Catalyst Census: 
Fortune 500 Women Board Directors. Catalyst. 
Spence, J. T., & Helmreich, R. L. 1979. Comparison of masculine and feminine personality 
attributes and sex-role attitudes across age groups. Developmental Psychology, 15(5): 
583. 
Squire, C. 2016. Significant differences: Feminism in psychology: Routledge. 
Squires, J. 2013. Gender in political theory: John Wiley & Sons. 
Sun, P., Mellahi, K., & Thun, E. 2010. The dynamic value of MNE political embeddedness: The 
case of the Chinese automobile industry. Journal of International Business Studies, 
41(7): 1161-1182. 
Sundaramurthy, C., & Lewis, M. 2003. Control and collaboration: Paradoxes of governance. 
Academy of Management Review, 28(3): 397-415. 
Tahoun, A. 2014. The role of stock ownership by US members of Congress on the market for 
political favors. Journal of Financial Economics, 111(1): 86-110. 
Tang, Y., Qian, C., Chen, G., & Shen, R. 2015. How CEO hubris affects corporate social (ir) 
responsibility. Strategic Management Journal, 36(9): 1338-1357. 
Tannen, D., & Leapman, M. 1998. The argument culture: Simon & Schuster Audio. 
Terjesen, S., Sealy, R., & Singh, V. 2009. Women directors on corporate boards: A review and 
research agenda. Corporate governance: an international review, 17(3): 320-337. 
Terza, J. V. 2018. Two-stage residual inclusion estimation: A practitioners guide to Stata 
implementation. The Stata Journal, 17(4), 916-938. 
Tolbert, P. S., & Moen, P. 1998. Men's and women's definitions of “good” jobs: Similarities and 
differences by age and across time. Work and occupations, 25(2): 168-194. 
Troy, C., Smith, K. G., & Domino, M. A. 2011. CEO demographics and accounting fraud: Who 
is more likely to rationalize illegal acts? Strategic Organization, 9(4): 259-282. 
Ulbig, S. G., & Funk, C. L. 1999. Conflict avoidance and political participation. Political 
Behavior, 21(3): 265-282. 
Van Knippenberg, D., De Dreu, C. K., & Homan, A. C. 2004. Work group diversity and group 
performance: an integrative model and research agenda. Journal of Applied Psychology, 
89(6): 1008. 
Verba, S., Burns, N., & Schlozman, K. L. 1997. Knowing and caring about politics: Gender and 
political engagement. The Journal of Politics, 59(4): 1051-1072. 
85 
 
Waddock, S. 2004. Parallel universes: Companies, academics, and the progress of corporate 
citizenship. Business and Society Review, 109(1): 5-42. 
Waddock, S. A., & Graves, S. B. 1997. The corporate social performance–financial performance 
link. Strategic Management Journal, 18(4): 303-319. 
Waldman, D. A., Siegel, D. S., & Javidan, M. 2006. Components of CEO transformational 
leadership and corporate social responsibility. Journal of Management Studies, 43(8): 
1703-1725. 
Wang, H., Tsui, A. S., & Xin, K. R. 2011. CEO leadership behaviors, organizational 
performance, and employees' attitudes. The Leadership Quarterly, 22(1): 92-105. 
Waring, M., Greenwood, G., & Pintat, C. 2000. Politics: Women's insight: Inter-Parliamentary 
Union. 
Watkins, M. B., & Smith, A. N. 2014. Importance of women's political skill in male-dominated 
organizations. Journal of Managerial Psychology, 29(2): 206-222. 
Westphal, J. D. 1998. Board games: How CEOs adapt to increases in structural board 
independence from management. Administrative Science Quarterly: 511-537. 
Westphal, J. D., & Stern, I. 2007. Flattery will get you everywhere (especially if you are a male 
Caucasian): How ingratiation, boardroom behavior, and demographic minority status 
affect additional board appointments at US companies. Academy of Management 
Journal, 50(2): 267-288. 
Whetten, D., Rands, G., & Godfrey, P. 2001. What are the Responsibility of Business to Society? 
A. Pettigrew, H. Thomas. R. Whittington (eds.), Handbook of Strategy and 
Management: Sage Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi. 
White, T. L., Lejuez, C., & de Wit, H. 2007. Personality and gender differences in effects of d-
amphetamine on risk taking. Experimental and clinical psychopharmacology, 15(6): 
599. 
Wiersema, M. F., & Bantel, K. A. 1993. Top Management Team Turnover as an Adaptation 
Mechanism – The Role of the Environment. Strategic Management Journal, 14(7): 485-
504. 
Wiersema, M. F., & Zhang, Y. 2011. CEO dismissal: The role of investment analysts. Strategic 
Management Journal, 32(11), 1161-1182. 
Williams, J. E., & Best, D. L. 1990. Measuring sex stereotypes: A multination study, Rev: Sage 
Publications, Inc. 
Wilts, A. 2006. Identities and preferences in corporate political strategizing. Business & society, 
45(4): 441-463. 
Wojcieszak, M. 2011. Pulling toward or pulling away: Deliberation, disagreement, and opinion 
extremity in political participation. Social Science Quarterly, 92(1): 207-22. 
Wowak, A. J., Mannor, M. J., & Wowak, K. D. 2015. Throwing caution to the wind: The effect 
of CEO stock option pay on the incidence of product safety problems. Strategic 

















APPENDIX A: ESG Ratings on Seven Main CSR Factors 
Community Strengths 
1. Charitable Giving 
2. Innovative Giving 
3. Non-US Charitable Giving 
4. Support for Housing 
5. Support for Education 
6. Indigenous Peoples Relations 
7. Volunteer Programs 
Community Concerns 
1. Investment Controversies 
2. Negative Economic Impact 
3. Indigenous Peoples Relations 
4. Tax Disputes 
Corporate Governance Strengths 
1. Limited Compensation 
2. Ownership Strength 
3. Transparency Strength 
4. Political Accountability Strength 
Corporate Governance Concerns 
1. High Compensation 
2. Ownership Concern 
3. Accounting Concern 
4. Transparency Concern 




3. Board of Directors 
4. Work/Life Benefits 
5. Women & Minority Contracting 
6. Employment of the Disabled 




Employee Relations Strengths 
1. Union Relations 
2. No-Layoff Policies 
3. Cash Profit Sharing 
4. Employee Involvement 
5. Retirement Benefits Strength 
6. Health & Safety Strengths 
Employee Relations Concerns 
1. Union Relations 
2. Health & Safety Concerns 
3. Workforce Reductions 
3. Retirement Benefits Concern 
Environment Strengths 
1. Beneficial Products & Services 
2. Pollution Prevention 
3. Recycling 
4. Clean Energy 
5. Communications 
6. Property, Plant, & Equipment 
7. Management Systems 
Environment Concerns 
1. Hazardous Waste 
2. Regulatory Problems 
3. Ozone Depleting Chemicals 
4. Substantial Emissions 
5. Agricultural Chemicals 
6. Climate Change 
Human Rights Strengths 
1. Positive Record in South Africa 
2. Indigenous Peoples Relations Strength 
3. Labor Rights Strength 
Human Rights Concerns 
1. South Africa 
2. Northern Ireland 
3. Burma Concerns 
4. Mexico 
5. Labor Rights 




3. Benefits to Economically Disadvantaged 
Product Concerns 
1. Product Safety 




APPENDIX B: Subsidy Tracker Categories 
Category Description 
Megadeal Subsidy packages worth $50 million or more each that were 
compiled using not only official disclosure sources. 
Tax credit/rebate Corporate income tax credits, sales tax exemptions and other 
programs in which a company’s tax obligation is reduced or the 
firm is rebated taxes previously paid. 
Property tax abatement Reductions on real property and business personal property. 
Grant A variety of programs in which corporations are awarded a 
specific amount of money outright or in connection with meeting 
job performance or other goals. 
Grant/loan hybrid 
program 
Programs that contain feature of both grants and loans, such as 
forgivable loans in which the company may not have to pay back 
the money if certain goals are met. 
Loan or bond financing Programs that provide company with financing that needs to be 
repaid. 
Enterprise zone Programs tied to investment in specific geographic areas that 
often bundle a variety of state and/or local tax breaks. 
Tax increment financing Subsidies based on the diversion of a portion of property taxes 
linked to an increase in assessed value brought about by 
redevelopment (sometimes based on sales taxes). 
Training reimbursement Programs that pay for or reimburse companies for the cost of 
training new or existing workers. 
Cost reimbursement Programs, usually involving film production, that reimburse 
companies for specific expenditures (other than worker training) 
in the state. 
Infrastructure assistance Programs that cover costs such as installation of utilities or 
building of private roads at a company facility. 
Industrial revenue bond Low-cost financing based on tax-exempt bonds. 
Tax credit/rebate and 
grant 










APPENDIX C: Prescriptive and Proscriptive Traits for Women 
Women’s Prescriptions Women’s Proscriptions 
1. Emotional 
2. Warm 
3. Interested in children 
4. Sensitive to others 






11. Supportive  
12. Polite 
13. Humble 













11. Cold towards others 
12. Self-centered 
13. Cynical 









APPENDIX D: Tables 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficients for H1a-c  
    Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
(1) CEO Gender (1=Female) 0.03 0.16                
(2) CSR Strengths 1.99 2.86 0.08               
(3) CSR Concerns 2.19 2.11 -0.03 0.34              
(4) CSR Net -0.20 2.92 0.10 0.73 -0.39             
(5) CEO Age 55.90 7.05 -0.06 0.03 0.06 -0.02            
(6) CEO Tenure 7.13 7.40 -0.04 -0.11 -0.08 -0.05 0.42           
(7) CEO Duality 0.56 0.50 -0.03 0.12 0.15 0.01 0.29 0.27          
(8) CEO Long-Term Compensation 4561.99 6156.59 -0.01 0.37 0.29 0.16 0.04 -0.02 0.09         
(9) CEO Short-Term Compensation 1256.56 1884.51 -0.02 0.13 0.20 -0.02 0.09 0.02 0.10 0.30        
(10) CEO % of Shares Owned 1.74 4.93 0.00 -0.11 -0.07 -0.06 0.14 0.34 0.12 -0.06 -0.06       
(11) Board Independence 0.79 0.12 0.02 0.17 0.10 0.10 -0.06 -0.13 0.09 0.08 -0.05 -0.12      
(12) Board Diversity 0.11 0.10 0.28 0.30 0.00 0.30 -0.03 -0.13 0.09 0.11 0.03 -0.06 0.18     
(13) Firm Size 2.15 1.29 0.02 0.49 0.40 0.20 0.08 -0.09 0.17 0.40 0.23 -0.12 0.03 0.27    
(14) ROA 0.05 0.11 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.08   
(15) Slack  2.39 1.98 -0.02 -0.17 -0.17 -0.04 -0.01 0.12 -0.07 -0.13 -0.12 0.05 -0.07 -0.19 -0.37 0.02  
(16) Financial Leverage 22.28 489.84 0.00 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.05 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.06 -0.02 
n =10,413 firm-year observations for 1,395 firms. Correlations greater than |.02| are significant at p < .05.
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficients for H2a-c  
    Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
(1) CEO Gender (1=Female) 0.03 0.17                 
(2) CSR Strengths 2.06 2.90 0.08                
(3) CSR Concerns 2.24 2.13 -0.03 0.33               
(4) CSR Net -0.18 2.97 0.10 0.74 -0.39              
(5) Tobin's Q 1.98 1.20 0.00 0.02 -0.11 0.09             
(6) CEO Age 56.01 7.03 -0.06 0.02 0.06 -0.02 -0.07            
(7) CEO Tenure 7.18 7.37 -0.05 -0.11 -0.08 -0.05 0.06 0.42           
(8) CEO Duality 0.56 0.50 -0.03 0.12 0.15 0.01 -0.04 0.29 0.28          
(9) CEO Long-Term Compensation 4731.10 6337.63 -0.01 0.37 0.29 0.15 0.07 0.04 -0.02 0.09         
(10) CEO Short-Term Compensation 1227.62 1782.04 -0.02 0.12 0.19 -0.02 -0.02 0.08 0.02 0.10 0.29        
(11) CEO % of Shares Owned 1.82 5.35 0.00 -0.12 -0.07 -0.06 0.03 0.13 0.33 0.12 -0.06 -0.06       
(12) Board Independence 0.79 0.12 0.02 0.17 0.09 0.11 -0.08 -0.06 -0.14 0.09 0.09 -0.05 -0.12      
(13) Board Diversity 0.11 0.10 0.28 0.30 -0.01 0.30 -0.05 -0.03 -0.13 0.07 0.11 0.03 -0.07 0.18     
(14) Firm Size 2.16 1.29 0.02 0.49 0.40 0.20 -0.10 0.08 -0.10 0.16 0.40 0.23 -0.12 0.04 0.26    
(15) ROA 0.05 0.11 0.00 0.06 -0.01 0.07 0.37 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.09   
(16) Slack  2.39 1.98 -0.01 -0.17 -0.17 -0.05 0.16 -0.01 0.12 -0.07 -0.13 -0.12 0.05 -0.07 -0.18 -0.37 0.02  
(17) Financial Leverage 23.49 479.46 0.00 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.05 0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.06 -0.02 












Table 3. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficients for H3 
    Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
(1) CEO Gender (1=Female) 0.28 0.45                
(2) Firm Donations 88.63 366.47 -0.02               
(3) Individual Donations 9791.74 34869.42 -0.11 0.10              
(4) Lobbying 857.78 2444.71 -0.08 0.50 0.11             
(5) CEO Age 55.90 6.94 -0.15 0.05 0.18 0.04            
(6) CEO Tenure 7.30 7.99 -0.14 -0.05 0.25 -0.09 0.47           
(7) CEO Duality 0.54 0.50 -0.10 0.14 0.09 0.19 0.24 0.29          
(8) CEO Long-Term Compensation 6054.65 8489.21 -0.06 0.17 0.17 0.28 0.05 -0.01 0.04         
(9) CEO Short-Term Compensation 1254.73 1974.29 -0.07 0.11 0.05 0.13 0.04 0.03 0.10 0.22        
(10) CEO % of Shares Owned 1.90 5.66 -0.01 -0.04 0.06 -0.07 0.19 0.25 0.16 -0.11 -0.07       
(11) Board Independence 0.80 0.12 0.13 0.08 -0.03 0.12 -0.07 -0.12 0.01 0.08 0.03 -0.23      
(12) Board Diversity 0.17 0.13 0.57 0.04 -0.08 0.02 -0.09 -0.16 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.22     
(13) Firm Size 2.29 1.37 0.01 0.27 0.13 0.37 0.06 -0.10 0.12 0.35 0.20 -0.16 0.07 0.26    
(14) ROA 0.05 0.13 -0.02 0.06 0.03 0.09 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.12 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.18   
(15) Slack  2.32 2.13 -0.04 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 -0.05 0.18 -0.04 -0.09 -0.10 0.09 -0.14 -0.17 -0.32 -0.01  
(16) Financial Leverage 42.62 658.31 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.11 0.00 -0.03 0.04 0.07 0.03 -0.03 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.05 -0.03 




Table 4. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficients for H4 
    Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
(1) CEO Gender (1=Female) 0.28 0.45                  
(2) Firm Donations 90.58 370.52 -0.02                 
(3) Individual Donations 9973.68 35297.95 -0.11 0.10                
(4) Lobbying 876.31 2470.14 -0.07 0.50 0.11               
(5) Subsidy Award 685.79 8367.09 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.17              
(6) Contract Award 18905.59 224504.32 0.05 0.34 0.00 0.41 0.28             
(7) CEO Age 55.96 6.91 -0.15 0.05 0.19 0.03 0.00 0.03            
(8) CEO Tenure 7.27 8.03 -0.14 -0.05 0.25 -0.09 -0.02 -0.04 0.47           
(9) CEO Duality 0.54 0.50 -0.09 0.14 0.09 0.19 0.06 0.08 0.24 0.29          
(10) CEO Long-Term Compensation 6134.84 8564.92 -0.06 0.17 0.17 0.28 0.03 0.09 0.05 -0.01 0.04         
(11) CEO Short-Term Compensation 1262.87 1995.09 -0.07 0.11 0.05 0.13 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.10 0.22        
(12) CEO % of Shares Owned 1.92 5.72 -0.01 -0.05 0.06 -0.07 -0.02 -0.03 0.19 0.26 0.16 -0.12 -0.07       
(13) Board Independence 0.80 0.12 0.14 0.09 -0.04 0.12 0.05 0.07 -0.07 -0.12 0.00 0.08 0.03 -0.24      
(14) Board Diversity 0.17 0.13 0.57 0.04 -0.08 0.02 0.03 0.04 -0.09 -0.16 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.22     
(15) Firm Size 2.29 1.38 0.01 0.27 0.13 0.37 0.12 0.14 0.06 -0.10 0.12 0.35 0.20 -0.16 0.07 0.26    
(16) ROA 0.04 0.13 -0.01 0.07 0.03 0.10 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.13 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.18   
(17) Slack  2.34 2.15 -0.03 -0.09 -0.07 -0.07 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 0.18 -0.05 -0.09 -0.10 0.09 -0.15 -0.17 -0.32 -0.01  
(18) Financial Leverage 43.34 665.91 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.04 0.07 0.03 -0.03 0.03 0.03 0.1 0.05 -0.03 




Table 5. Regression Models for Female and CSR Activities 
 Model (1) 
DV: CSR Strengths 
Model (2) 
DV: CSR Concerns 
Model (3) 
DV: CSR Net Variables 
CEO Age -0.003 (0.002) [0.111]  0.003 (0.002) [0.138] -0.006 (0.004) [0.128] 
CEO Tenure -0.003 (0.002) [0.238] -0.010*** (0.002) [0.000]  0.009** (0.004) [0.037] 
CEO Duality -0.009 (0.029) [0.764]  0.121*** (0.028) [0.000] -0.150*** (0.058) [0.010] 
CEO Long-Term 
Comp. 
 0.000*** (0.000) [0.000]  0.000*** (0.000) [0.000]  0.000*** (0.000) [0.000] 
CEO Short-Term 
Comp. 
-0.000 (0.000) [0.441]  0.000*** (0.000) [0.000] -0.000*** (0.000) [0.000] 
CEO Shares Owned -0.022*** (0.004) [0.000] -0.001 (0.002) [0.752] -0.019*** (0.005) [0.000] 
Board Independence  0.703*** (0.115) [0.000]  0.208* (0.107) [0.052]  1.046*** (0.223) [0.000] 
Board Diversity  2.360*** (0.152) [0.000] -1.938*** (0.152) [0.000]  7.471*** (0.310) [0.000] 
Firm Size  0.436*** (0.012) [0.000]  0.287*** (0.012) [0.000]  0.339*** (0.025) [0.000] 
ROA  0.415*** (0.138) [0.003] -0.407*** (0.116) [0.000]  1.600*** (0.245) [0.000] 
Slack  0.013 (0.008) [0.102]  0.001 (0.007) [0.893]  0.036** (0.014) [0.010] 
Financial Leverage  0.000 (0.000) [0.855]  0.000 (0.000) [0.163] -0.000 (0.000) [0.790] 
CEO Gender   0.205*** (0.076) [0.007]  0.065 (0.082) [0.426]  0.395** (0.165) [0.016] 
Constant -0.874*** (0.316) [0.006]  0.456 (0.305) [0.135] -3.404*** (0.692) [0.000] 
Wald Chi2  3872.71***  [0.000] 2146.96***  [0.000] 2370.43***  [0.000] 
∆ in Wald Chi2  7.17***  [0.007]  0.63   [0.425] 5.75**  [0.016] 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Year and industry dummies included but omitted from table. Control models omitted for parsimony, but ∆ in Wald Chi2 
represents adding CEO Gender to a model omitting this variable.  
N=10,413; Standard errors in parentheses and p values are between square brackets. 
 
Table 6. Regression Models for Female and CSR Activities on Market Performance 
 Model (1) 
DV: Tobin’s Q 
Model (2) 
DV: Tobin’s Q 
Model (3) 
DV: Tobin’s Q Variables 
CEO Age -0.003 (0.003) [0.312] -0.003 (0.003) [0.318] -0.003 (0.003) [0.325] 
CEO Tenure  0.003 (0.003) [0.244]  0.003 (0.003) [0.249]  0.003 (0.003) [0.273] 
CEO Duality  0.023 (0.030) [0.455]  0.023 (0.030) [0.443]  0.025 (0.030) [0.416] 
CEO Long-Term Comp.  0.000 (0.000) [0.985]  0.000 (0.000) [0.983]  0.000 (0.000) [0.972] 
CEO Short-Term Comp. -0.000 (0.000) [0.812] -0.000 (0.000) [0.834] -0.000 (0.000) [0.808] 
CEO Shares Owned -0.001 (0.003) [0.742] -0.001 (0.003) [0.733] -0.001 (0.003) [0.703] 
Board Independence -0.091 (0.140) [0.517] -0.093 (0.140) [0.508] -0.077 (0.140) [0.579] 
Board Diversity -0.207 (0.169) [0.221] -0.205 (0.169) [0.225] -0.209 (0.169) [0.216] 
Firm Size -0.224*** (0.027) [0.000] -0.225*** (0.027) [0.000] -0.213*** (0.025) [0.000] 
ROA  1.131*** (0.158) [0.000]  1.132*** (0.158) [0.000]  1.125*** (0.158) [0.000] 
Slack  0.000 (0.009) [0.993]  0.000 (0.009) [0.991]  0.000 (0.009) [0.959] 
Financial Leverage  0.000 (0.000) [0.217]  0.000 (0.000) [0.223]  0.000 (0.000) [0.225] 
CSR Strengths  0.032** (0.014) [0.027]  0.031** (0.014) [0.030]    
CSR Concerns  0.010 (0.013) [0.452]  0.013 (0.013) [0.319]    
CEO Gender  0.042 (0.092) [0.647]  0.026 (0.081) [0.752]  0.006 (0.083) [0.939] 
CEO Gender x CSR Strengths -0.044 (0.043) [0.307]       
CEO Gender x CSR Concerns    -0.094** (0.044) [0.033]    
CSR Net        0.014 (0.012) [0.238] 
CEO Gender x CSR Net        0.008 (0.046) [0.868] 
Constant 2.839*** (0.285) [0.000] 2.834*** (0.284) [0.000]  2.804*** (0.295) [0.000] 
Wald Chi2 987.09***  [0.000] 1003.44***  [0.000] 938.75***  [0.000] 
∆ in Wald Chi2 1.04  [0.307] 4.57**  [0.032] 0.03  [0.868] 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Year and industry dummies included but omitted from table. Control models omitted for parsimony, but ∆ in Wald Chi2 
represents adding the focal interaction to a model omitting this variable.  




Table 7. Regression Models for Female and CSR Activities with Endogeneity Correction 
 Model (1) 
DV: CSR Strengths 
Model (2) 
DV: CSR Concerns 
Model (3) 
DV: CSR Net Variables 
CEO Age  0.036*** (0.011) [0.001] -0.030*** (0.011) [0.006] -0.007 (0.022) [0.752] 
CEO Tenure  0.063*** (0.018) [0.000] -0.064*** (0.018) [0.000]  0.005 (0.036) [0.890] 
CEO Duality  0.417*** (0.120) [0.000] -0.231** (0.117) [0.048] -0.171 (0.240) [0.477] 
CEO Long-Term 
Comp. 
 0.000*** (0.000) [0.000] -0.000** (0.000) [0.045]  0.000 (0.000) [0.156] 
CEO Short-Term 
Comp. 
 0.000*** (0.000) [0.000] -0.000** (0.000) [0.022] -0.000 (0.000) [0.202] 
CEO Shares Owned  0.084*** (0.029) [0.004] -0.087*** (0.028) [0.002] -0.023 (0.058) [0.697] 
Board Independence  4.760*** (1.109) [0.000] -3.118*** (1.084) [0.004]  0.806 (2.228) [0.718] 
Board Diversity -38.619*** (11.128) [0.001]  31.567*** (10.874) [0.004]  9.261 (22.341) [0.679] 
Firm Size  0.085 (0.094) [0.364]  0.558*** (0.092) [0.000]  0.325* (0.188) [0.085] 
ROA  1.903*** (0.430) [0.000] -1.646*** (0.415) [0.000]  1.519* (0.854) [0.075] 
Slack  0.032*** (0.010) [0.001] -0.015* (0.009) [0.098]  0.032* (0.017) [0.064] 
Financial Leverage -0.000*** (0.000) [0.000]  0.000*** (0.000) [0.001] -0.000 (0.000) [0.976] 
Inverse Mills  -4.050*** (1.099) [0.000]  3.306*** (1.073) [0.002]  0.177 (2.204) [0.936] 
CEO Gender   0.265*** (0.079) [0.001]  0.006 (0.084) [0.948]  0.398** (0.168) [0.018] 
Constant  23.000*** (6.486) [0.000] -19.023*** (6.328) [0.003] -4.535 (13.007) [0.727] 
Wald Chi2 3707.68***  [0.000] 2150.40***  [0.000] 2422.33***  [0.000] 
∆ in Wald Chi2 11.31***  [0.000] 0.00  [0.947] 5.58**  [0.018] 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Year and industry dummies included but omitted from table. Control models omitted for parsimony, but ∆ in Wald Chi2 
represents adding CEO Gender to a model omitting this variable.  
N=10,413; Standard errors in parentheses and p values are between square brackets. 
 
Table 8. Regression Models for Female and CSR Activities on Market Performance with 
Endogeneity Correction 
 Model (1) 
DV: Tobin’s Q 
Model (2) 
DV: Tobin’s Q 
Model (3) 
DV: Tobin’s Q Variables 
CEO Age -0.020* (0.012) [0.089] -0.019 (0.012) [0.108] -0.019* (0.012) [0.098] 
CEO Tenure -0.025 (0.019) [0.181] -0.024 (0.019) [0.211] -0.025 (0.019) [0.191] 
CEO Duality -0.162 (0.123) [0.189] -0.153 (0.125) [0.222] -0.156 (0.123) [0.207] 
CEO Long-Term Comp. -0.000 (0.000) [0.349] -0.000 (0.000) [0.392] -0.000 (0.000) [0.375] 
CEO Short-Term Comp. -0.000 (0.000) [0.113] -0.000 (0.000) [0.137] -0.000 (0.000) [0.123] 
CEO Shares Owned -0.046 (0.030) [0.126] -0.044 (0.031) [0.149] -0.045 (0.030) [0.135] 
Board Independence -1.848 (1.154) [0.109] -1.774 (1.175) [0.131] -1.794 (1.157) [0.121] 
Board Diversity  17.391 (11.570) [0.133]  16.627 (11.778) [0.158]  16.962 (11.602) [0.144] 
Firm Size -0.089 (0.099) [0.369] -0.096 (0.100) [0.340] -0.083 (0.098) [0.401] 
ROA  0.481 (0.464) [0.299]  0.510 (0.471) [0.279]  0.491 (0.465) [0.290] 
Slack -0.009 (0.010) [0.408] -0.008 (0.010) [0.431] -0.008 (0.010) [0.439] 
Financial Leverage  0.000 (0.000) [0.106]  0.000 (0.000) [0.129] 0.000 (0.000) [0.116] 
Inverse Mills  1.737 (1.145) [0.129]  1.662 (1.166) [0.154]  1.695 (1.149) [0.140] 
CSR Strengths  0.028* (0.014) [0.054]  0.027* (0.014) [0.060]    
CSR Concerns  0.009 (0.013) [0.467]  0.012 (0.013) [0.329]    
CEO Gender   0.022 (0.095) [0.813]  0.003 (0.084) [0.973] -0.014 (0.085) [0.873] 
CEO Gender x CSR 
Strengths 
-0.049 (0.042) [0.249]       
CEO Gender x CSR 
Concerns 
   -0.093** (0.041) [0.025]    
CSR Net        0.011 (0.012) [0.328] 
CEO Gender x CSR Net        0.002 (0.045) [0.964] 
Constant -8.017 (7.166) [0.263] -7.547 (7.295) [0.301] -7.783 (7.186) [0.279] 
Wald Chi2 992.30***  [0.000] 1013.44***  [0.000] 939.09***  [0.000] 
∆ in Wald Chi2 1.33  [0.248] 5.04**  [0.024] 0.00  [0.963] 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Year and industry dummies included but omitted from table. Control models omitted for parsimony, but ∆ in Wald Chi2 
represents adding the focal interaction to a model omitting this variable.  
N=11,0005; Standard errors in parentheses and p values are between square brackets. 
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Table 9. Regression Models for Female on Political Donations 
 Model (1) 
DV: Firm Donations 
 Model (2) 
DV: Individual Donations Variables 
CEO Tenure -0.838* (0.477) [0.079]    
CEO Duality 7.037 (5.854) [0.229]    
Board Independence -10.669 (23.727) [0.653]    
Board Diversity -14.210 (31.854) [0.656]    
Slack  1.543 (1.235) [0.212]    
Financial Leverage        0.016*** (0.005) [0.000]    
CEO Age  0.720 (0.456) [0.114]         0.255*** (0.069) [0.000] 
CEO Long-Term Comp.  0.000 (0.000) [0.286]          0.000*** (0.000) [0.000] 
CEO Short-Term Comp. -0.001 (0.002) [0.638]  -0.000 (0.000) [0.994] 
CEO Shares Owned -0.298 (0.550) [0.588]  -0.128 (0.106) [0.226] 
Firm Size         48.202*** (4.058) [0.000]   0.095 (0.549) [0.862] 
ROA 4.529 (15.481) [0.770] -1.803 (3.194) [0.573] 
CEO Gender      23.959** (12.150) [0.049]     -2.800** (1.326) [0.035] 
Constant -47.171 (52.360) [0.368]    12.023 (13.904) [0.387] 
Wald Chi2 1225.53***  [0.000] 212.19***  [0.000] 
∆ in Wald Chi2 3.89**  [0.048] 4.46**  [0.034] 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Year and industry dummies included but omitted from table. Control models omitted for parsimony, but ∆ in Wald Chi2 
represents adding CEO Gender to a model omitting this variable.  



















Table 10. Regression Models for Female and Political Donations on Benefits 
 Model (1) 
DV: Subsidy Amount 
Model (2) 
DV: Subsidy Amount 
Model (3) 
DV: Contract Amount 
Model (4) 
DV: Contract Amount Variables 
CEO Age -152.290 (246.454) [0.537]  242.709 (321.876) [0.451]  1,277.608 (1,332.453) [0.338]  793.369 (1,280.610) [0.536] 
CEO Tenure -193.747 (169.876) [0.254] -98.837 (342.452) [0.773] -279.304 (550.500) [0.612] -128.116 (445.803) [0.774] 
CEO Duality  4,511.157 (3,053.748) [0.140] -2,875.220 (3,534.202) [0.416]  5,423.928 (7,296.825) [0.457]  6,709.977 (9,039.698) [0.458] 
CEO Long-Term Comp.  0.016 (0.085) [0.852] -0.412 (0.379) [0.278] -1.000 (1.256) [0.426]  0.021 (1.203) [0.986] 
CEO Short-Term Comp.  0.547 (0.608) [0.369] -0.024 (0.155) [0.878] -0.973 (2.193) [0.657] -2.432 (3.376) [0.471] 
CEO Shares Owned -538.917* (326.768) [0.099] -296.337 (446.589) [0.507] -258.261 (384.138) [0.501] -578.416 (459.050) [0.208] 
Board Independence -30,314.209 (21,720.381) [0.163] -23,370.920 (19,460.869) [0.230]  15,701.358 (38,645.590) [0.685] -15,419.078 (44,371.914) [0.728] 
Board Diversity -8,409.062 (10,163.044) [0.408]  48,107.625* (28,365.527) [0.090]  37,047.520 (54,232.852) [0.495]  59,769.305 (59,186.020) [0.313] 
Firm Size  1,825.304 (1,155.781) [0.114]  3,757.331* (1,978.498) [0.058] -8,247.169 (7,897.889) [0.296] -12,231.418 (10,485.333) [0.243] 
ROA  7,357.475 (6,131.319) [0.230] -11,475.821 (7,694.678) [0.136]  1,000.423 (15,198.353) [0.948]  21,320.836 (20,039.957) [0.287] 
Slack -167.278 (350.409) [0.633]  1,693.906 (1,094.881) [0.122] -4,894.152 (3,365.053) [0.146] -1,825.441 (2,701.564) [0.499] 
Financial Leverage  1.587 (1.871) [0.396]  6.731 (7.346) [0.360] -6.633 (6.179) [0.283] -0.396 (4.974) [0.937] 
Lobbying Total  1,413.561 (1,170.504) [0.227]  1,651.547 (1,438.016) [0.251]  
41,353.961* 
(24,713.670) [0.094] 36,153.191* (21,056.832) [0.086] 
Firm Donations -477.665 (504.189) [0.343]  432.758 (961.938) [0.653]  2,331.770 (12,791.471) [0.855]  25,087.168 (16,024.827) [0.117] 
Individual Donations -59.089 (843.183) [0.944]  2,855.654* (1,692.563) [0.092] -6,708.897 (5,339.205) [0.209] -6,736.197 (5,524.672) [0.223] 
CEO Gender   10,520.444 (6,672.344) [0.115] -1,009.088 (6,252.280) [0.872]  10,016.349 (17,362.748) [0.564]  15,187.344 (24,641.793) [0.538] 
CEO Gender x Firm 
Donations 
-1,531.346* (815.393) [0.060]     75,726.523 (60,573.688) [0.211]    
CEO x Gender x 
Individual Donations 
   -8,637.932*** (2,978.489) [0.004]    -6,612.626 (10,919.525) [0.545] 
Constant -5,291.577 (16,915.746) [0.754] -1,225.145 (34,505.535) [0.972] -70,872.992 (86,975.164) [0.415] -25,508.838 (85,844.172) [0.766] 
Wald Chi2 211.07***  [0.000]  83.67***  [0.000]  21.90  [0.9459] 642.30***  [0.000] 
∆ in Wald Chi2  3.53**  [0.060]  8.41***  [0.003]  1.56  [0.211]   0.37  [0.544] 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Year and industry dummies included but omitted from table. Control models omitted for parsimony, but ∆ in Wald Chi2 represents adding the focal interaction to a model omitting 
this variable.  









Table 11. Regression Models for Female and Political Donations on Firm Performance 
 Model (1) 
DV: Tobin’s Q 
Model (2) 
DV: Tobin’s Q VARIABLES 
CEO Age  0.002 (0.012) [0.896]  0.002 (0.012) [0.889] 
CEO Tenure  0.003 (0.010) [0.792]  0.003 (0.010) [0.795] 
CEO Duality  0.073 (0.079) [0.354]  0.074 (0.079) [0.348] 
CEO Long-Term Comp.  0.000** (0.000) [0.012]  0.000** (0.000) [0.011] 
CEO Short-Term Comp. -0.000 (0.000) [0.828] -0.000 (0.000) [0.833] 
CEO Shares Owned -0.008 (0.006) [0.208] -0.008 (0.006) [0.206] 
Board Independence -0.598 (0.372) [0.108] -0.610 (0.372) [0.101] 
Board Diversity -0.229 (0.440) [0.603] -0.210 (0.438) [0.632] 
Firm Size -0.268*** (0.060) [0.000] -0.269*** (0.060) [0.000] 
ROA  1.294*** (0.372) [0.001]  1.299*** (0.373) [0.000] 
Slack  0.021 (0.021) [0.327]  0.021 (0.021) [0.325] 
Financial Leverage  0.000 (0.000) [0.781]  0.000 (0.000) [0.624] 
Firm Donations -0.003 (0.016) [0.864]  0.012 (0.013) [0.357] 
Individual Donations -0.004 (0.016) [0.825] -0.003 (0.017) [0.873] 
Lobbying Total -0.014 (0.027) [0.608] -0.012 (0.027) [0.643] 
CEO Gender -0.068 (0.082) [0.407] -0.061 (0.083) [0.463] 
CEO Gender x Firm Donations  0.048** (0.021) [0.024]    
CEO Gender x Individual Donations    -0.050 (0.057) [0.382] 
Constant  3.415*** (0.912) [0.000]  3.406*** (0.919) [0.000] 
Wald Chi2  375.03***  [0.000]  373.32***  [0.000] 
∆ in Wald Chi2  5.06**  [0.024]  0.76  [0.382] 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Year and industry dummies included but omitted from table. Control models omitted for parsimony, but ∆ in Wald Chi2 
represents adding the focal interaction to a model omitting this variable.  





Table 12. Regression Models for Female and Political Donations with Endogeneity Correction 
 Model (1) 
DV: Firm Donations Variables 
CEO Tenure -0.674 (2.128) [0.752] 
CEO Duality  8.094 (14.689) [0.582] 
Board Independence  1.423 (131.018) [0.991] 
Board Diversity     -123.438 (1,291.427) [0.924] 
Slack  1.671 (1.365) [0.221] 
Financial Leverage  0.016 (0.011) [0.138] 
CEO Age  0.791 (1.348) [0.557] 
CEO Long-Term Comp.  0.001 (0.002) [0.728] 
CEO Short-Term Comp.  0.004 (0.006) [0.471] 
CEO Shares Owned -0.029 (3.409) [0.993] 
Firm Size          46.217*** (11.688) [0.000] 
ROA 7.098 (49.855) [0.887] 
Inverse Mills2  -10.773 (128.139) [0.933] 
CEO Gender       24.652** (12.288) [0.045] 
Constant   35.341 (1,076.049) [0.974] 
Wald Chi2           1226.80***  [0.000] 
∆ in Wald Chi2                          4.02**  [0.044] 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Year and industry dummies included but omitted from table. Control models omitted for parsimony, but ∆ in Wald Chi2 
represents adding CEO Gender to a model omitting this variable.  




Table 13. Regression Models for Female and Political Donations on Benefits with Endogeneity Correction 
 Model (1) 
DV: Subsidy Amount 
Model (2) 
DV: Subsidy Amount 
Model (3) 
DV: Contract Amount 
Model (4) 
DV: Contract Amount Variables 
CEO Age 268.241 (467.690) [0.566]  190.691 (286.987) [0.506]  1,595.261 (2,159.826) [0.460]  1,686.237 (1,690.500) [0.319] 
CEO Tenure 509.751 (765.400) [0.505] -190.089 (438.908) [0.665] -238.734 (1,639.200) [0.884]  788.397 (759.503) [0.299] 
CEO Duality 9,082.728 (7,712.702) [0.239] -3,740.345 (5,003.413) [0.455]  6,183.152 (15,501.535) [0.690]  12,147.694 (12,032.258) [0.313] 
CEO Long-
Term Comp. 
0.531 (0.641) [0.407] -0.467 (0.429) [0.276] -0.677 (2.202) [0.758]  0.940 (1.606) [0.558] 
CEO Short-
Term Comp. 
2.365 (2.460) [0.336] -2.302 (1.480) [0.120] -16.026 (16.883) [0.343] -24.042 (24.599) [0.328] 
CEO Shares 
Owned 
602.304 (1,221.590) [0.622] -493.389 (876.987) [0.574] -174.136 (3,100.137) [0.955]  713.858 (1,061.034) [0.501] 
Board 
Independence 
14,049.960 (45,585.871) [0.758] -34,596.523 (26,577.215) [0.193]  17,803.090 (130,814.859) [0.892]  33,285.906 (52,592.430) [0.527] 
Board 
Diversity 
-447,495.75 (532,284.875) [0.401]  115,562.391 (214,314.000) [0.590] -9,226.316 (1144014.000) [0.994] -461,309.250 (403,755.156) [0.253] 
Firm Size -1,950.695 (4,315.987) [0.651]  5,041.416** (2,273.907) [0.027] -7,299.352 (13,439.204) [0.587] -14,228.690 (12,014.785) [0.236] 
ROA  23,879.721 (22,016.461) [0.278] -11,164.165 (11,176.119) [0.318]  4,939.860 (49,111.645) [0.920]  42,920.313 (31,620.043) [0.175] 
Slack  27.873 (486.078) [0.954]  1,648.844 (1,081.582) [0.127] -5,347.040 (3,661.536) [0.144] -2,074.286 (2,802.484) [0.459] 
Financial 
Leverage 
-1.609 (4.526) [0.722]  7.864 (7.599) [0.301] -7.031 (11.843) [0.553] -4.667 (6.443) [0.469] 
Inverse Mills -43,932.078 (53,062.348) [0.408]  6,568.130 (20,962.871) [0.754] -4,992.437 (114,746.063) [0.965] -53,381.258 (43,621.313) [0.221] 
Lobbying Total   1,388.052 (1,175.115) [0.238]  1,696.079 (1,500.059) [0.258]  42,250.512* (25,026.398) [0.091]  36,896.730* (21,115.914) [0.081] 
Firm 
Donations 
-498.970 (504.642) [0.323]  291.671 (987.291) [0.768]  2,000.203 (12,851.948) [0.876]  24,717.750 (15,841.703) [0.119] 
Individual 
Donations 
-19.024 (876.307) [0.983]  3,109.635* (1,673.658) [0.063] -6,688.097 (5,365.327) [0.213] -7,144.362 (5,723.086) [0.212] 
CEO Gender   10,797.488 (6,909.588) [0.118] -1,859.411 (6,466.850) [0.774]  9,714.079 (16,950.375) [0.567]  13,001.229 (23,918.184) [0.587] 
CEO Gender x 
Firm 
Donations 
-1,511.960* (806.683) [0.061]     75,871.102 (60,483.867) [0.210]    
CEO Gender x 
Individual 
Donations 
   -9,497.992*** (3,156.159) [0.003]    -8,479.188 (11,281.718) [0.452] 
Constant 363,877.563 (449,580.844) [0.418] -52,309.961 (192,074.828) [0.785] -24,010.273 (911,223.063) [0.979] 429,765.344 (346,430.688) [0.215] 
Wald Chi2 210.71***  [0.000]   88.65***  [0.000]  22.08  [0.956] 658.41***  [0.000] 
∆ in Wald Chi2 3.51*  [0.060]   9.06***  [0.002]  1.57  [0.209]  0.56  [0.452] 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Year and industry dummies included but omitted from table. Control models omitted for parsimony, but ∆ in Wald Chi2 represents adding the focal interaction to a model omitting 
this variable.  




Table 14. Regression Models for Female and Political Donations on Firm Performance with 
Endogeneity Correction 
 Model (1) 
DV: Tobin’s Q 
Model (1) 
DV: Tobin’s Q Variables 
CEO Age -0.007 (0.019) [0.719] -0.007 (0.019) [0.721] 
CEO Tenure -0.010 (0.027) [0.695] -0.010 (0.027) [0.694] 
CEO Duality -0.012 (0.197) [0.949] -0.012 (0.198) [0.953] 
CEO Long-Term Comp.  0.000 (0.000) [0.603]  0.000 (0.000) [0.599] 
CEO Short-Term Comp. -0.000 (0.000) [0.694] -0.000 (0.000) [0.695] 
CEO Shares Owned -0.029 (0.043) [0.491] -0.029 (0.043) [0.490] 
Board Independence -1.429 (1.683) [0.396] -1.444 (1.686) [0.392] 
Board Diversity  8.045 (15.611) [0.606]  8.093 (15.642) [0.605] 
Firm Size -0.197 (0.144) [0.172] -0.198 (0.145) [0.172] 
ROA  0.999 (0.697) [0.152]  1.002 (0.699) [0.152] 
Slack  0.017 (0.022) [0.449]  0.017 (0.022) [0.446] 
Financial Leverage  0.000 (0.000) [0.588]  0.000 (0.000) [0.574] 
Inverse Mills  0.831 (1.568) [0.596]  0.834 (1.572) [0.596] 
Firm Donations -0.002 (0.016) [0.911]  0.013 (0.013) [0.310] 
Individual Donations -0.004 (0.016) [0.824] -0.003 (0.016) [0.872] 
Lobbying Total -0.013 (0.027) [0.635] -0.011 (0.027) [0.670] 
CEO Gender -0.066 (0.082) [0.420] -0.059 (0.083) [0.476] 
CEO Gender x Individual Donations    -0.049 (0.057) [0.389] 
CEO Gender x Firm Donations  0.048** (0.022) [0.026]    
Constant -3.562 (13.234) [0.788] -3.595 (13.265) [0.786] 
Wald Chi2  375.03***  [0.000]  373.32***  [0.000] 
∆ in Wald Chi2  4.96**  [0.026]  0.74  [0.388] 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Year and industry dummies included but omitted from table. Control models omitted for 
parsimony, but ∆ in Wald Chi2 represents adding the focal interaction to a model omitting this variable.  
N=2,008; Standard errors in parentheses and p values are between square brackets. 
 
Table 15. Regression Models for Communal Traits and CSR Activities on Market Performance 
 (1) 
DV: Tobin’s Q 
(2) 
DV: Tobin’s Q 
(3) 
DV: Tobin’s Q Variables 
CEO Age -0.008 (0.015) [0.587] -0.010 (0.015) [0.487] -0.009 (0.014) [0.537] 
CEO Tenure  0.011 (0.016) [0.481]  0.009 (0.016) [0.572]  0.013 (0.017) [0.452] 
CEO Duality -0.080 (0.164) [0.626] -0.063 (0.161) [0.698] -0.090 (0.161) [0.576] 
CEO Long-Term Comp.  0.000* (0.000) [0.087]  0.000 (0.000) [0.111]  0.000 (0.000) [0.108] 
CEO Short-Term Comp.  0.000* (0.000) [0.097]  0.000 (0.000) [0.124]  0.000 (0.000) [0.120] 
CEO Shares Owned  0.021*** (0.008) [0.010]  0.022** (0.009) [0.012]  0.022*** (0.008) [0.005] 
Board Independence -0.100 (1.009) [0.921] -0.011 (0.940) [0.990] -0.176 (1.019) [0.863] 
Board Diversity -0.464 (0.702) [0.509] -0.520 (0.692) [0.452] -0.494 (0.715) [0.490] 
Firm Size -0.086 (0.143) [0.547] -0.078 (0.145) [0.588] -0.114 (0.127) [0.372] 
ROA  0.872** (0.355) [0.014]  0.863** (0.355) [0.015]  0.860** (0.361) [0.017] 
Slack -0.023 (0.047) [0.626] -0.019 (0.047) [0.682] -0.023 (0.048) [0.630] 
Financial Leverage -0.001** (0.000) [0.011] -0.001** (0.000) [0.018] -0.001** (0.000) [0.012] 
CSR Concerns -0.140** (0.061) [0.022] -0.138** (0.060) [0.022]    
CSR Strengths  0.063 (0.083) [0.452]  0.049 (0.085) [0.559]    
Agentic -0.025 (0.173) [0.886] -0.024 (0.176) [0.892] -0.029 (0.174) [0.868] 
Communal  0.169 (0.162) [0.294]  0.145 (0.168) [0.385]  0.136 (0.161) [0.398] 
Communal x CSR Strengths -0.021 (0.064) [0.739]       
Communal x CSR Concerns    -0.099** (0.047) [0.037]    
CSR Net        0.099 (0.063) [0.114] 
Communal x CSR Net         0.006 (0.082) [0.940] 
Constant 3.228*** (0.995) [0.001] 3.276*** (1.024) [0.001]  3.373*** (1.020) [0.001] 
Wald Chi2 230.83***  [0.000] 216.98***  [0.000] 252.91***  [0.000] 
∆ in Wald Chi2 0.11  [0.738]  4.35**  [0.036]  0.01  [0.939] 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Year and industry dummies included but omitted from table. Control models omitted for 
parsimony, but ∆ in Wald Chi2 represents adding the focal interaction to a model omitting this variable.  




Table 16. Regression Models for Agentic Traits and CSR Activities on Market Performance 
 Model (1) 
DV: Tobin’s Q 
Model (2) 
DV: Tobin’s Q 
Model (3) 
DV: Tobin’s Q Variables 
CEO Age -0.025 (0.040) [0.531] -0.022 (0.041) [0.594] -0.025 (0.041) [0.547] 
CEO Tenure  0.026 (0.057) [0.644]  0.024 (0.057) [0.681]  0.028 (0.057) [0.617] 
CEO Duality -0.152 (0.336) [0.650] -0.108 (0.337) [0.749] -0.153 (0.335) [0.648] 
CEO Long-Term Comp.  0.000 (0.000) [0.204]  0.000 (0.000) [0.305]  0.000 (0.000) [0.225] 
CEO Short-Term Comp.  0.000 (0.000) [0.134]  0.000 (0.000) [0.118]  0.000 (0.000) [0.150] 
CEO Shares Owned  0.066*** (0.025) [0.008]  0.064** (0.025) [0.012]  0.063** (0.025) [0.011] 
Board Independence  1.800 (2.293) [0.432]  1.972 (2.242) [0.379]  1.942 (2.275) [0.393] 
Board Diversity -1.326 (1.852) [0.474] -1.233 (1.881) [0.512] -1.259 (1.862) [0.499] 
Firm Size -0.571** (0.267) [0.032] -0.628** (0.272) [0.021] -0.583** (0.260) [0.025] 
ROA  1.849*** (0.636) [0.004]  1.779*** (0.596) [0.003]  1.853*** (0.653) [0.005] 
Slack  0.567* (0.325) [0.081]  0.558* (0.322) [0.083]  0.566* (0.326) [0.083] 
Financial Leverage -0.000 (0.001) [0.616] -0.000 (0.001) [0.601] -0.000 (0.001) [0.621] 
CSR Concerns -0.102 (0.136) [0.453]  0.732 (0.748) [0.328]    
CSR Strengths  0.971* (0.539) [0.072]  0.174 (0.149) [0.244]    
Agentic  0.025 (0.028) [0.382]  0.006 (0.026) [0.824]  0.026 (0.029) [0.375] 
Agentic x CSR Strengths -0.022* (0.013) [0.091]       
Agentic x CSR Concerns    -0.023 (0.019) [0.229]    
CSR Net        0.822 (0.518) [0.113] 
Agentic x CSR Net       -0.018 (0.013) [0.166] 
Constant 4.206 (3.323) [0.206] 5.081* (3.062) [0.097]  3.967 (3.348) [0.236] 
Wald Chi2 417.13***  [0.000] 469.49***  [0.000] 391.26***  [0.000] 
∆ in Wald Chi2 2.81*  [0.093]  1.27  [0.260] 1.04  [0.308] 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Year and industry dummies included but omitted from table. Control models omitted for parsimony, but ∆ in Wald Chi2 
represents adding the focal interaction to a model omitting this variable. 




Table 17. Regression Models for Communal Traits and Political Donations on Benefits 
 Model (1) 
DV: Subsidy Amount 
Model (2) 
DV: Subsidy Amount 
Model (3) 
DV: Contract Amount 
Model (4) 
DV: Contract Amount Variables 
CEO Age  11.822 (49.611) [0.812] -11.332 (47.452) [0.811] 7,599.133 (5,053.182) [0.133]  6,664.414 (4,696.285) [0.156] 
CEO Tenure -118.211 (79.984) [0.139] -101.887 (62.041) [0.101] -1,211.609 (1,881.882) [0.520] -1,840.875 (2,251.172) [0.414] 
CEO Duality  1,000.077 (875.433) [0.253]  811.149 (704.630) [0.250] -6,461.599 (13,589.096) [0.634] -2,456.789 (12,808.602) [0.848] 
CEO Long-Term 
Comp. 
-0.074 (0.060) [0.221] -0.069 (0.057) [0.226] 3.315 (2.185) [0.129]  2.538 (2.069) [0.220] 
CEO Short-Term 
Comp. 
-0.866 (0.527) [0.101] -0.631 (0.403) [0.117] -38.802 (31.047) [0.211] -24.353 (18.651) [0.192] 
CEO Shares 
Owned 
 4.240 (25.344) [0.867] -3.429 (20.956) [0.870] -2,112.810 (1,697.397) [0.213] -1,859.907 (1,826.327) [0.308] 
Board 
Independence 
-2,484.084 (1,840.894) [0.177] -2,046.672 (1,551.680) [0.187] 167,302.563 (152,400.125) [0.272]  92,345.383 (128,510.313) [0.472] 
Board Diversity  1,795.186 (2,196.993) [0.414] 3,388.831** (1,711.421) [0.048] 85,908.656 (111,190.531) [0.440]  91,899.719 (94,879.516) [0.333] 
Firm Size  793.462** (388.630) [0.041] 631.143* (370.976) [0.089] -4,361.281 (8,739.268) [0.618] -3,675.991 (8,258.097) [0.656] 
ROA  697.109 (731.667) [0.341] 322.220 (554.768) [0.561] 16,340.015 (18,431.605) [0.375]  4,678.256 (12,162.617) [0.701] 
Slack  50.315 (56.602) [0.374] 45.451 (72.374) [0.530] -2,291.781 (2,263.043) [0.311] -3,947.128 (3,870.212) [0.308] 
Financial Leverage  3.065 (2.018) [0.129] 3.269 (2.498) [0.191] -255.328 (231.157) [0.269] -196.421 (198.325) [0.322] 
Lobbying  110.488 (678.948) [0.871] 1,416.062* (768.532) [0.065] 60,576.883 (49,390.590) [0.220]  96,457.141 (66,244.297) [0.145] 
Firm Donations  -850.955 (558.748) [0.128] -528.705 (549.506) [0.336] -13,621.782 (13,821.706) [0.324]  25,458.705* (13,381.511) [0.057] 
Individual 
Donations 
 161.266 (645.026) [0.803] -355.507 (509.812) [0.486] 8,922.227 (11,938.051) [0.455]  24,897.352 (34,778.762) [0.474] 
Communal   465.475 (321.213) [0.147] 186.363 (230.900) [0.420] 30,301.824 (29,363.574) [0.302]  30,546.623 (31,438.844) [0.331] 
Communal x Firm 
Donations 




   101.340 (199.026) [0.611]     45,622.129 (37,067.941) [0.218] 
Constant -1,056.148 (2,366.077) [0.655] -6.142 (2,339.936) [0.998] -504,818.406 (337,796.094) [0.135] -418,655.438 (300,107.594) [0.163] 
Wald Chi2   177.23***  [0.000] 67.13***  [0.004] 187.14***  [0.000]  84.57***  [0.000] 
∆ in Wald Chi2   0.28  [0.597]   0.26  [0.610]    3.44*  [0.063]   1.51  [0.218] 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Year and industry dummies included but omitted from table. Control models omitted for parsimony, but ∆ in Wald Chi2 represents adding the focal interaction to a model omitting 
this variable.  







Table 18. Regression Models for Agentic Traits and Political Donations on Benefits 
 Model (1) 
DV: Subsidy Amount 
Model (2) 
DV: Subsidy Amount 
Model (3) 
DV: Contract Amount 
Model (4) 
DV: Contract Amount Variables 
CEO Age  6.583 (48.421) [0.892] -18.772 (49.654) [0.705]  6,987.552 (4,960.398) [0.159]  6,382.794 (4,469.708) [0.153] 
CEO Tenure -91.358 (75.237) [0.225] -91.365 (55.778) [0.101] -1,346.043 (1,322.953) [0.309] -1,546.433 (1,898.599) [0.415] 
CEO Duality  846.744 (864.808) [0.328]  824.050 (722.892) [0.254]  1,240.317 (15,234.437) [0.935] -3,685.668 (12,348.891) [0.765] 
CEO Long-Term 
Comp. 
-0.065 (0.055) [0.239] -0.071 (0.058) [0.222]  2.632 (2.019) [0.192]  2.486 (2.024) [0.219] 
CEO Short-Term 
Comp. 
-0.871 (0.548) [0.112] -0.659 (0.417) [0.114] -33.471 (25.345) [0.187] -25.432 (19.501) [0.192] 
CEO Shares Owned  24.893 (25.141) [0.322]  8.906 (16.393) [0.587] -1,607.841 (1,335.853) [0.229] -1,062.116 (1,068.049) [0.320] 
Board Independence -1,312.817 (1,726.748) [0.447] -1,818.343 (1,428.208) [0.203]  187,607.125 (160,110.297) [0.241]  117,553.844 (132,210.938) [0.374] 
Board Diversity  1,695.567 (2,040.899) [0.406]  3,689.676** (1,675.566) [0.028]  72,270.117 (101,554.516) [0.477]  80,969.406 (89,741.883) [0.367] 
Firm Size  816.118** (388.616) [0.036]  664.882* (375.140) [0.076] -8,151.816 (10,743.107) [0.448] -2,669.323 (7,788.166) [0.732] 
ROA  756.542 (779.913) [0.332]  387.303 (613.596) [0.528]  9,939.154 (15,434.856) [0.520]  5,402.312 (11,839.346) [0.648] 
Slack  40.906 (58.397) [0.484]  40.327 (72.733) [0.579] -867.578 (1,778.385) [0.626] -4,294.849 (3,938.805) [0.276] 
Financial Leverage  2.544 (1.674) [0.129]  3.190 (2.492) [0.200] -234.142 (220.854) [0.289] -204.342 (199.693) [0.306] 
Lobbying  98.526 (639.138) [0.877]  1,428.888* (767.442) [0.063]  66,066.023 (52,950.160) [0.212]  98,750.281 (67,355.406) [0.143] 
Firm Donations  -933.680* (505.774) [0.065] -520.603 (553.038) [0.347]  26,240.270** (12,393.667) [0.034]  26,295.969* (13,998.953) [0.060] 
Individual Donations  457.195 (595.414) [0.443] -275.322 (374.836) [0.463] -29,269.400 (20,337.133) [0.150] -1,680.470 (14,966.400) [0.911] 
Agentic -5.787 (290.784) [0.984]  169.895 (210.641) [0.420] -13,581.879 (19,593.406) [0.488] -13,681.414 (15,904.925) [0.390] 
Agentic x Firm 
Donations 
-988.877** (498.781) [0.047]     7,574.159 (29,435.441) [0.797]    
Agentic x Individual 
Donations  
   -308.133* (168.340) [0.067]    -40,504.684 (30,011.461) [0.177] 
Constant -1,380.295 (2,203.771) [0.531]  64.624 (2,389.982) [0.978] -499,218.500 (350,300.313) [0.154] -433,322.250 (308,159.031) [0.160] 
Wald Chi2  187.70***  [0.000]  70.49***  [0.002]  146.61***  [0.000]  99.44***  [0.000] 
∆ in Wald Chi2  3.93**  [0.047]  3.35*  [0.067]   0.07  [0.796]  1.82  [0.177] 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Year and industry dummies included but omitted from table. Control models omitted for parsimony, but ∆ in Wald Chi2 represents adding the focal interaction to a model omitting 
this variable. 








APPENDIX E: Figures 
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Figure 6. Female and Firm Donations on Subsidy Amount 
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Figure 3. Female and Individual Donations on Subsidy Awards
106 
 





























-1 SD +1 SD
Irresponsible CSR Activities
Low Communal Traits High Communal Traits
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Figure 10. Agentic Traits and Responsible CSR on Market Performance 
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Figure 12. Agentic Traits and Individual Donations on Subsidy Amount 
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